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Abstract
This practice-based thesis undertakes research into the contemporary aesthetic of interactive 
media art, in order to propose a useful practical model of interactivity founded on a critical 
approach to both existing theory and practice. It proceeds from the identification of a primary 
lack in contemporary aesthetics that arises from the predominantly materialistic comprehension 
of technologically-mediated artworks. The thesis establishes a new model for interactive art that 
offers an immaterial engagement with technology at a locus where cognition and the aesthetic 
intertwine. This model is constructed following a revision of both the theory and practice of 
interactive media art, which identifies a materialistic bias of technology-mediated art production 
caused by a confused concept of technology as both tool and medium.
This investigation confines itself to the last forty years of interactive art and the new model of 
spectatorship that has accompanied it. The main objective of what follows from this investigation 
is an account of agency in the artist and spectator interrelationship. In the context of 
technologically based artworks various approaches to spectatorship have frequently remained 
within the constraints of the traditional model of art that inherently drew on a separation between 
body and mind. It is argued in this thesis that neither the technology nor the participation itself, 
but the cognitive interconnection between 'artist-artwork-spectator' produces the primary 
aesthetic dimension of interactive media art. In this respect, not the physical object creation but 
the aestheticisation of this triangle produces the here identified immaterial/cognitive experience 
of the spectators. This can be achieved when the technology is applied as a transparent medium 
  one of the core concepts introduced in this thesis  which can facilitate an aesthetic quality 
or meaning creation through technology. The 'transparent medium' enables the cognitive-based 
experience production, which is identified as the immersive flow of the spectator's aesthetic 
experience. As such, the re-evaluation of the artist- spectator interrelationship proposes a new 
immaterial model of art which is called the Transparent Act. The introduction of the Transparent 
Act leads to the main intervention of this thesis which lies in an effort to recover a lost dimension 
in interactive media art. A recovery of this dimension enables access to a knowledge practice 
which is not necessarily located in ordinary cognitive experiences but in unfamiliar conscious 
states that can be compared to accounts of so-called spiritual experiences. The model of the 
Transparent Act is concurrently applied as a practise-based intervention and proof-of-concept in 
a major installation, the Mind Cupola. This artistic and technological contextualisation of the 
original intervention of this thesis is exemplified as an affective environment which aims for an 
immediate cognitive affection of the spectator by generating mechanical and audio-visual effects 
in the spectator's 'mind'. The artistic system uses special face analysis techniques to close the 
feedback loop and affect the spectator through the analysis of her/his reactions. The installation 
is built upon a 'passive' modality of interaction in which the spectator contributes to the artwork 
with subtle, cognitive-based interactions which are fed back through a complex open response 
system. The implementation of cognitive feedback loops, also described as the fractal structure 
in the spectator's cognition, constitutes the essential transparent medium through which the 
previously lost immaterial dimension of a spiritual-like aesthetic experience in interactive media 
art is achieved. The thesis concludes with suggestions of further applications including the 
evaluation of technologically mediated artworks.
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Preface
The research of this practice-based thesis draws on ten years of artistic practice that has 
integrated fine art, graphic design, technology-based design and creative technologies. It 
undertook an exploration of aesthetic solutions for the implementation of emerging 
technologies in art by reflecting on contemporary technologically-mediated artworks 
against the backdrop of its forty years of history. The research discussed in this thesis 
focuses on artistic practice and identifies how it has been transformed by the dynamics of 
changing technologies and how it has failed to produce an aesthetic continuum. This 
view is particularly based on the common perception that interactive solutions are risk 
factors for distribution and presentation (such as at contemporary media festivals) as they 
are unsatisfactory for both art and technology since they often mystify or restrain their 
technological qualities. This factor impacted greatly on the evolution of technology-based 
art, because its platforms, and as such its challenges, were restrained and offered no 
opportunities for finding an aesthetic solution.
Drawing on this observation, the following investigation focuses on what is often 
termed interactive media art, which brings a radical character to art with its particular 
quality of producing feedback between the spectator and the artwork. The notion of 
interaction is treated here as a phenomenological process of involvement created through 
the agency of body and mind; the quality of this interconnection suggests the 
effectiveness of the artistic meaning creation for human-machine interfaces. Seeking an 
aesthetic solution for this interactivity, the evidence for this argument is established by 
revisiting artworks that played an important role in the history of technology-based art, 
which are compared to the initial conceptualizations of the artists, resulting in the
observation that artistic outcomes often do not correlate with the artists' theoretical 
claims. Reflecting on this criticism, the following discussion draws from information and 
literature theory, theories on spectator perceptive processes, and media and 
communication studies in an attempt to outline and define specific qualities and aspects 
of technological interaction. A philosophical perspective on art production in particular 
examines the original source of contextual literature in order to rediscover lost aspects 
and qualities that can be applied in emerging art practice. A first hand reading of some 
key phenomenological arguments revisit and reinterpret a number of significant notions 
such as the 'structural openness', 'responsiveness', 'invisible tool' and 'creative ecstasy' 
that will be applied on the discourse of interactive art production. These not yet 
interconnected concepts will be synthesized and constitute a hermeneutic framework for 
the main argument in this thesis which introduces the concept of the 'transparent 
medium' as an artistic approach to technology. This discussion unravels the 
interchangeable nature of the terminologies 'invisibility' and 'transparency', which 
occurred in the contextual literature and calls for the differentiation of the cognitive 
qualities in the affective response to technology. Acknowledging their metaphoric 
potential, both terms are here applied to accommodate an immaterial scale of actions that 
differentiates aesthetic visibility from functionality
Through this, the transparent medium can be understood as an arena for the body- 
mind interconnectivity, which is characterized by immersion, body awareness and flow. 
Applying the body's cognitive capacities in the artwork, these concepts reveal a potential 
for knowledge production through aesthetic. This meaning creation goes beyond the 
embodied knowledge of the spectator, in the way that it incorporates new types of body
awareness along with inhabited sensory-motor knowledge. As such, new functionalities 
and associative meaning production can lead to so-called disembodied experiences, 
which are intensified by degrees of immersion. From a theoretical perspective, the 
transparent medium is both translucent and reflective: it applies embodied knowledge for 
functionality (invisible) and novel bodily involvement for artistic meaning (reflective). 
Transparency is here defined as an aesthetic quality of technology, which relates to the 
quality of the spectator's cognition; it is a body-mind status, which oscillates between 
inhabited knowledge and new knowledge creation. When the habitual bodily action turns 
into a submersive capacity, a cognitive flow is produced at the body-mind nexus. It 
carries a potential for new knowledge in the form of an uninterrupted cognitive 
experience between the artist and the spectator, which is also referred to as an immaterial 
dimension of the artwork.
This immaterial dimension of art re-establishes the intimacy between the artist 
and the spectator. This intimacy constitutes the cognitive quality that refers to the 
aesthetic potential of the body-mind nexus in technologically-mediated creations. As 
such, an immaterial approach to art is not a call for discounting material or physicality in 
the creation process, as contextual literature suggests, but is much more about how the 
immateriality provides a new meaning or functionality to materiality. It also diverges 
from approaches that understand immateriality in art as part of a particular religious or 
cultural ideology. The immaterial in this context instead refers to an aesthetic experience, 
which can reveal similar cognitive qualities as they are triggered in spiritual practices. 
This claim does not situate technology-based art in the framework of transcendentalist 
approaches; rather it draws attention to the potential of an immaterial dimension, which
III
has been lost in art production. As a consequence, a spiritual-like experience, as it is 
proposed in the main intervention of this thesis, is primarily an aesthetic experience that 
is produced through the heightened quality of transparency, termed as the Transparent 
Act.
The combination of the theoretical revision, the application of philosophical 
concepts and the analysis of existing interactive media artworks resulted in a 
multifaceted, interdisciplinary discussion that requires some forbearance from the reader. 
This excursion was also a result of extensive practice-based research, which created a 
dialogical investigation between critical discourses and artistic processes. Differentiating 
itself from other models, the Transparent Act is an aesthetic scheme for direct application 
in art practice. This model does not propose a universal aesthetic solution to technology- 
based art, nor a particular anatomy of consciousness in the aesthetic experience, but 
attempts to establish a sophisticated philosophical perspective for applications and 
evaluations in contemporary technologically-mediated art. Consequently it offers more 
than a contextual model for a better evaluation of technology-based art practice since it 
also serves as a basis for practical applications within a philosophical meta-discourse. It 
incorporates a particular utility for an artistic application, which draws on the 'matrix of 
immersion', 'body awareness' and the 'degree of transparency'.
Through a focus on the earlier mentioned cognitive qualities of an aesthetic 
experience, the thesis proposes a new practical application for interaction based on the 
nexus of body-mind, which is termed as 'passive interaction'. Central to this modality is 
the intellectual capacity of 'affection', which shapes human cognition during the 
interaction processes. It is proposed that directed or instant affection, in particular, will
IV
operate within an experience design of the spectator that builds upon mechanical, 
tangible or audiovisual impacts on the body through technology. This concerns the 
aesthetic application of the body-mind interconnection, introducing direct affection via 
audiovisual and tactile effects with the aim to shape consciousness through a variety of 
bodily states. Through this application the thesis introduces a particular artistic form of an 
'affective environment', which exemplifies a cognitive-based interaction instead of a 
responsive environment. This 'passive modality' of interaction is exemplified in the 
practical outcome of this research, which consists of an interactive media artwork called 
the Mind Cupola. The main objective of this method is to establish a network of 
interrelated feedback loops, which, through an evaluation process based on cognitive 
responses, return the information to the system, which reciprocally affect the spectator 
generatively. The philosophical approach applied in this art production creates a meta- 
layer of the artwork, by which the artist designs the fractal structure of the spectator's 
processes of consciousness through the affections triggered by the technology. In this 
way it contributes to an original knowledge production that revisits contemporary media 




i. Critical Discourse and Methodology
This thesis investigates the interconnection between the artist and the spectator 1 and the impact
this has on art practice. It argues that, although acknowledged as an important criterion of a 
particular genre of technology-based art, this interconnection has not been used as a potential 
tool in the creative process. This thesis proposes an aestheticisation of these interconnections 
through a triangular process of 'artist-artwork-spectator' which would serve as a new model for 
artistic and critical reflection on the artwork. The understanding of this process between the 
artist, artwork and spectator differs from old dualistic models which considered the artist-artwork 
and the artwork-spectator processes in a separated manner. This view breaks down the original 
linkage of artist and spectator that was based on materialistic conceptualisations of creative 
processes in which the attributes of the art object stood in the centre of creation. The model 
outlined here sees interactivity as an aesthetic process that rediscovers a lost dimension of the 
artwork.
Comprehending the 'artist-artwork-spectator' interconnectivity as potential 
characteristics of aesthetic, the thesis re-introduces a poetic layer which emphasizes an original 
volition of artist and spectator communication. The intimate interconnection between artist and 
spectator suggests a cognitive-based creation in which the 'making art' and 'experiencing art' 
processes are blended into one creative flow. In doing so, the epistemological gap between artist 
and spectator disappears and it can be proposed that such art produces new transcendental layers
1 The spectator in this thesis will be understood as a participant subject. It refers to an historical continuum of the 
'artist-artwork-spectator' triangle, which was transformed by new interactive art form to an active spectatorship. 
For an extensive elaboration of this term please see later in this chapter the contextual terminology of this thesis.
of experience. This further suggests that the poetic dimension of the work leads to access of 
knowledge that is not necessarily located in a common material encounter. It is posited that these 
transcendental layers of the artwork provide artists with an effective tool for altering the 
spectator's consciousness through their dynamic perceptual processes. This suggests that 
qualities of aestheticisation emerging from this new triangle draw most significantly from the 
spectator's cognitive experience. It follows that the processes for the creation of artwork frame a 
chain of events or experiences rather than constant aesthetic values.
Through recognition of the 'artist-artwork-spectator' interconnection, the thesis develops 
a critical framework and reconsiders technology-based art practice, proposing an immaterial 
model of aesthetics termed the Transparent Act. This model suggests an artistic creation process 
as an intimacy through a creative flow between artist and spectator in which the technology 
within the artwork is a cognitively affective application. Therefore technology-based artworks 
cannot only be considered as forms of art but also as carriers of the immaterial dimension of 
interactivity which is crucial to the aesthetic of the work. As such, the notion of degrees of 
transparency serves to describe the quality of the creative flow between artist and spectator, 
providing the capacity for a transcendental quality in the experience. It is argued that the 
Transparent Act fills a gap which occurred in art practice by the ignorance of the interconnection 
between artist and spectator as a potential aesthetic tool. It reintroduces an immaterial dimension 
to the artwork, provided by the cognitive interaction potential of technology-based art.
This investigation builds upon a practice-based methodology, setting up a discourse 
focused on technology-based art and design processes and outcomes. Through practice-based 
research this thesis aims to develop a more effective model for human-machine interactions 
applied through the development of new interactive art installations.
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This research applies an interdisciplinary investigation which uses accounts from the 
fields of philosophy, psychology, design and art theory, design and art history and computer 
science, looking for emerging concepts or approaches which, through a re-conceptualisation, 
may serve to produce contemporary solutions to technology-based art. The examination builds a 
body of evidence through a review of literature within these relevant fields, bibliographic and 
archival research of audio-visual media, analysis of technology-based artworks, critical 
reflections on contemporary art and design practices, and collaborative work with scientists and 
programmers in what is termed an evolutionary collective creative process (Fischer and 
Nakakoji, 1997, p.103). The evidence-based research also profits from concept-based 
investigations (for example the concept of transparency) in an interdisciplinary context, 
generating new insights of specific conceptions. Through the critical discourse of technology- 
based art, this thesis will suggest solutions for applications through this proposed new model. By 
applying the Transparent Act, the practice-based work of the research will attempt to present a 
sophisticated outcome which proves to be an aesthetic solution to the identified lack in art.
ii. Rethinking the Aesthetic of Interactive Media Art
The critical discourse identifies a significant lack in practical applications of the conception of
interaction through technology in artworks. It emphasises that although philosophical discussions 
of technology already provide meaningful solutions for how interaction can be understood, 
artistic applications appear to ignore them and therefore remain within a materialistic model of 
art, implementing technology-driven mechanistic frameworks. The thesis first revisits old models 
of interactivity in order to highlight their particular lack in practical applications which produced 
ambivalent concepts and artistic outcomes in interactive art practice. It proposes a philosophical
conception based on cognition in interactivity, which, by practical application, might serve as an 
aesthetic solution to the argument. This approach allows a psycho-philosophical approach to the 
creative process, suggesting a dematerialisation that brings forth an immaterial dimension to 
artworks. It is proposed that immateriality can be considered as a degree of transparency, thus it 
determines how far an uninterrupted cognitive flow can be created between the artist and 
spectator. The heightened transparency is considered as an oscillation between the technological 
stimuli and the spectator's intention which, in the following argument, is regarded as a potential 
for spiritual-like experiences. The research, laid out within the main contribution of this thesis, is 
an introduction of a cognitive-based model for interactive media art, which, through practical 
application, shapes the ways artists create and critique technology-based art.
The elaborate discussion in the first chapter intends to lay the ground for a new model of 
art, building up a network of interdisciplinary conceptions which serve as sophisticated 
applications in art practice. Chapter 2 opens up the critical discourse of interactive media art 
situated after modernism, when emerging technologies brought a previously unexplored 
characteristic to art: the potentiality of active spectatorship. Having acknowledged this, it is 
claimed that although the new role of the spectator changed the physical quality of the artistic 
outcome, it did not produce an aesthetic solution to art. The chapter explores this claim by 
discussing the pioneering practice of Myron Krueger who laid out the primary direction for 
interactive media art. The argument points out that Krueger produced an ambivalent approach to 
interactivity and new spectatorship, since he conceptually recognised a potential for immaterial 
qualities. Krueger saw the artist as creator of the spectator experience. In his application 
however, his work remained within a mechanistic, technology-driven interaction. He created 
works which attracted the active spectator through its technological novelty but provided no
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artistic conception of interaction. The chapter argues that Krueger's initial aim of providing a 
technological version of John Cage's participatory model of art, has failed, leaving behind a 
legacy which has had a significant impact on the development of interactive media art. Through 
the identification of this lack in Krueger's work, the thesis attempts to illuminate that art 
production for centuries has followed a material or object-oriented approach in which the artist- 
spectator interconnection was established through a dualistic model based on the one way 
communication. Interactivity through technology has brought a potential to art through which the 
lost immediacy between artist and spectator can be rediscovered, providing a solution for a new 
aesthetic in technology-based art.
Chapter 3 revisits earlier models of interactivity which Krueger claimed to have been 
inspired by. In retrospect it can be said that he applied two main models: the artistic account and 
the technological account of interactivity. Although these modalities are significant for 
understanding interactive media art, yet they were not fully applied in Krueger's work and 
therefore could not carry further the foreseen potential. The argument in this chapter looks at two 
conceptions of 'openness' and 'responsiveness'. It is argued that openness can be viewed as an 
artistic concept and responsiveness as a technological concept and proposes a revision in order to 
produce a new framework for technology-based art production. The notion of openness is taken 
from Umberto Eco's investigations of participatory art. These explain novel aesthetic claims 
based upon a heightened involvement of the spectator. Although Krueger referred to John Cage's 
practice of real-time art events, in which artist and spectator were both involved, it is argued that 
openness provides a more comprehensive scheme of artistic accounts of interaction. By 
revisiting Eco's original concept of semiotic openness, the emphasis lies on the significance of 
the concept of 'meaning creation'. From this, a re-evaluation of openness for technology-based
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artwork provides a crucial concept for a solution to Krueger's technologically driven 
applications. The re-evaluation, termed 'structural openness', defines not only openness in the 
spectator's perception but also a profound modifiability in the artwork itself. This redefinition of 
openness for technological application produces an aesthetic value through its potential to 
produce meaning. This chapter further identifies that structural openness is highly similar to that 
which Eco suggested as being an information-theoretical framework of art. He understood the 
artwork as a communication system which oscillates between a formal structure (in this case the 
technology) and the multiple meaning produced by a 'wonderment' of the spectator (Eco, 1989). 
In Eco's view, which contradicts Krueger's conception, an understanding of 'ambiguity' as 
disorder - a conception deriving from information theory - is significant for producing an 
aesthetic in the interaction process. This application of Eco's 'openness' is considered crucial for 
the development of an aesthetic model, particularly since it suggests that an aesthetic experience 
of the spectator cannot be produced through an efficiency of action-reaction in interactivity as 
Krueger believed, but rather through an artistic decision of 'order' and 'disorder' in the content, 
which creates the artistic meaning2 . In this way, a technological interaction is defined here as the 
potential for responsiveness.
Chapter 3 also emphasises that there currently exist no accounts which determine the 
technological quality of interaction in art; therefore, the investigation uses a cross-disciplinary 
convergence of communication, information and media theory to construct an evaluation model. 
This highlights that an understanding of the technological and emerging qualities in the artwork 
is crucial, even though their quality does not necessarily justify an aesthetic outcome.
1 This is not to be confused with an order or disorder in the cognition,which discussed in chapter 5.
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The legacy left by Krueger's work does not recognise this distinction and, as a 
consequence, interactive media artworks tend to only build upon an 'attraction' of emerging 
qualities without a significant meaning creation. The third chapter reveals that most of the 
modalities of technology, such as the conception of 'style of control' (Guedj et al., 1980) or 
'control of the message' (Rafaeli and Sudweeks, 1997), cannot differentiate between subtle 
levels of interaction. The thesis investigates the four-dimensional model of Lutz Goertz which 
displays a great variety of responsiveness in a similar multiplicity as observed in artworks. 
Although Goertz' model focused upon divisions of media, it is proposed here to apply it to the 
artworks which implement interaction through unique technologies. The chapter opens up the 
idea of the separation of the artistic tool from the artistic medium in the creative process, which 
is explored further on in the thesis (see chapter 4). By revising Goertz' model through a focus 
upon technology as a tool or medium, different kinds of responsiveness can be factored in, 
opening the way for a new understanding of interaction. The investigation points out that Goertz' 
model is effective not in an aesthetic evaluation of art but for a purpose which can be described 
as a mystification of technological qualities. It will be claimed that Goertz' model provides a 
scheme through which technology-based artworks can be evaluated for their original 
contribution of technology. This revisionist critical approach reveals that the model of 
responsiveness as a tool or medium can serve as a method of technological effectiveness in 
emerging technologies for artistic applications. From this perspective it can be declared that the 
emerging characteristic of technology only provides an artistic solution if it is linked to artistic 
meaning creation. As such, this chapter argues that a new aesthetic should be based not on 
physical qualities but on the creation of immaterial meaning. It concludes that not only the 
content but also the novelty of the technology belongs to the meaning, which in this way
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proposes an immaterial encounter of art that reveals an artist-spectator interconnectivity through 
aesthetics.
Chapter 4 draws on the revision in the previous chapter and proposes that this immaterial 
understanding, based on cognition, already exists in philosophical approaches of 
phenomenology. Heidegger's concept of tool-usage, in particular the concept of 'ready-to-hand', 
which in this thesis is termed 'invisible tool', provides a key approach to applications of 
technology in art that liberate an immaterial dimension. As such, invisibility, defined in this 
argument as 'readiness-to-hand', describes how far the tool becomes an extension of one's self. 
Heidegger's concepts of 'ready-to-hand' and 'present-at-hand' provide an approach for how 
technology can be understood through an immaterial application, with regards to the cognitive 
status in its user. Although contemporary conceptualisations of technology, such as the field of 
interface design, have implemented this approach, it has only been applied in relation to a 
technological effectiveness, ignoring a potential for aesthetic. A useful expansion of Heidegger's 
philosophy is provided in an application of these concepts by the scholars Don Ihde and Paul 
Dourish. They established the terms of'embodied relations' (Ihde, 1979) and 'embodied 
interaction' (Dourish, 2001), both of which imply that interaction not only builds upon the 
question of whether the tool is embodied or not, but necessarily includes the spectrum of 
embodied knowledge. It is in this sense that it can be proposed that the artist's intervention is 
situated at the threshold between 'experienced knowledge' and the 'new knowledge' created 
through an artistic interface. This distinguishes the artistic application from solely technology- 
driven applications and identifies a lacunae on which a new model of aesthetics for interactive 
media art can be built.
As argued previously, there is a necessity for a division in the technological application 
in creative processes, between the tool and the medium. In can be proposed that the tool 
represents the technology-driven effectiveness (technology as a design application) when a 
technology is applied in the 'making art' process. The medium refers to the act when the 
technology becomes an artistic interface with the aim to provide novel experiences in the 
spectator's perception (technology as an artistic application). This is what has been identified 
earlier as the meaning creation of the technology. By applying Heidegger's concepts into a 
formulation of the 'transparent medium', it follows that the technology is not only 'ready-to- 
hand' (invisible), which is an effective implementation of technology, but also 'present-at-hand' 
(opacity), which refers to the artistic meaning of the emerging character of technology. The core 
intervention of this thesis lies in the idea that technology as an artistic interface should not be 
invisible but transparent. As such, the artist's task is to produce a balance between the processes 
of 'mastering the tool' and processes which awakes novelty in the spectator's experience. This 
emphasises a differentiation between the notions of 'invisible' and 'transparent', which in 
contemporary theory are mostly not distinguished.
Chapter 4 discusses that in the literature invisibility has been commonly understood as a 
physical attribute, which is described in this argument as 'embedded technology' with regards to 
a cognitive evaluation. By introducing the new notion of the 'transparent medium' the cognitive 
involvement is characterised by the quality of immersion. To comprehend this cognitive-based 
immersion the chapter proposes a framework for 'body awareness'. The concept of body 
awareness, which is also commonly referred to as 'disembodiment' in interactive media 
discourses, will be described as the spectrum of cognitive layers, which refers to a body-mind 
status in technology-based art practice. It will also be applied as an artistic tool for experience
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design of the spectator which considers the cognitive affections through technological 
interaction. As the quality of immersion also refers to an effectiveness of artistic implementation, 
this chapter introduces a matrix of qualities evaluating the cognitive involvement of the 
spectator. This builds upon the discussion in chapter 3 by examining the active and passive 
bodily status within interaction, which proposes a variety of means to an effective immersion for 
a practical application. Whereas the active bodily interaction is here defined as an associative 
action-reaction capacity, the passive interaction represents a more challenging way of 
immersion, in which the spectator's intention is not only represented by reduced bodily activity 
but also by a measurable cognitive response (such as changes in emotion). The form of body 
awareness in the application of immersion is significant in producing the specific qualities of the 
spectator's experience within the transparent medium.
Through the establishment of the terms 'invisible tool' and 'transparent medium', it is 
claimed that the creative processes of 'making art' and 'experiencing art' can stimulate an 
immersion; a cognitive level of the spectator. An immaterial level is created through the 
interconnectivity within the recognised 'artist-artwork-spectator' triangle. To accommodate this 
cognitive artist-spectator relationship, chapter 5 discusses the psychological theory of flow. 
Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi's application of flow (1975) suggests that human action frequently 
produces optimal states in cognition; these are harmonious states when one's intention matches 
the produced outcome. This characterises the cognitive state of immersion in the aesthetic 
experience which Csikszentmihalyi (1988) referred to as a heightened state of flow or ecstasy. 
Although the flow is controlled by one's intention, in the state of ecstasy the flow might take 
over the ability to control, thus producing a unique unintentional experience. The argument of 
this thesis identifies this conception as a crucial cognitive modality of the artist-spectator
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interconnection and suggests the notion of flow as an immaterial boundary between the artist's 
action and the spectator's experience. It follows that the cognitive quality of the 'making art' 
process is immediately presented in the 'experiencing art' process; therefore the quality of this 
flow is represented in the spectator's subjective experience.
Through the notion of flow, Csikszentmihalyi furthermore draws out a resemblance 
between artistic and spiritual practices. The thesis borrows from this claim the idea that 
technology-based creation might produce an ecstatic or spiritual-like state in the spectator's 
cognition. This analogy is built upon in the chapter's proposal that both practices aim to enrich 
the spectrum of consciousness by using a variety of technologies and techniques of the body- 
mind nexus. It is suggested here that spiritual practices apply schemes of bodily techniques, 
which are similar in their effect to certain tools used in technology-based artworks. The chapter 
identifies the phenomenon of disembodiment as a significant quality in both spiritual practice 
and in the practice of producing technology-based artwork. It outlines the practices of Dervish 
dance and Sanskrit yoga, which are also discussed by Csikszentmihalyi, in order to exemplify the 
earlier established distinction between active and passive means of immersion. This examination 
suggests that whereas active interaction produces a fragmented body-mind interconnection, 
passive interaction is considered to be based on a body-mind fusion. It follows that a passive 
modality might produce more challenging ways of interaction, integrating not only technological 
feedback but also a cognitive feedback loop in which technology is used to capture cognitive 
processes. The modularity of active interactions has, for example, been displayed by Gromala's 
and Sharir's virtual environment; however, the modularity of passive interaction in their work 
has not been explicitly applied. Therefore, the endeavour of this thesis is to fill this gap and
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represent an artistic framework based on passive immersion which produces a new spectrum of 
consciousness through spiritual-like experiences.
Chapter 6 synthesises the previous discussion in order to establish a new model of 
aesthetic, based upon an investigation into an immaterial encounter of art. This chapter suggests 
that the immaterial quality in art might emerge through a 'dematerialisation' of the art 
production. Even though numerous approaches acknowledge a process of dematerialisation 
through technological applications, most argue within a materialistic framework and do not 
consider immateriality as a new state of consciousness nor as a cognitive quality. Therefore, the 
argument observes that immateriality builds upon a conception which cannot only be interpreted 
as the 'disappearance of the physical', the process of conceptualisation (Lippard and Chandler, 
1968) or a 'substance of communication' (Lillemose, 2005) but also as a flow-like quality 
(Lyotard, 1985) in a cognitive encounter of aesthetics (Moos, 2002). This new model might 
rediscover immaterial knowledge through the dematerialisation process; a lost dimension which 
existed before but one which the mechanistic applications of art have suppressed.
The thesis proposes to acknowledge the 'artist-artwork-spectator' interconnection as a 
new aesthetic declaration of art production. In this context, to seek an uninterrupted flow means 
applying the invisible tool in the 'making art' process, through which the transparent medium 
produces, an ecstatic state in the spectator's experience. Thus, the aestheticisation of the artist- 
spectator relationship gives grounds for a new immaterial-based production of art. As the 
cognitive encounter expresses a quality of immaterial interconnectivity, chapter 6 lays out how 
the notion of transparency (established in chapter 4) may describe this quality and provide 
insight for artists. In this respect, the 'degree of transparency' relates to successful cognitive 
interconnections between artist and spectator which are achieved by noiseless flow and
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supported by the constitution of immateriality as openness (meaning creation), responsiveness, 
invisible tool, transparent medium, body-awareness and immersion. The aim of an application of 
transparency is immediacy producing new knowledge for the spectator. As this knowledge is 
gained through an aesthetic experience, it can be defined as a poetic layer of the technologically- 
mediated experience. The transcendental dimension of the artwork is fulfilled when the meaning 
creation of the interactive act reaches a heightened transparency. The new spiritual-like 
experiences are the re-discovery of a lost dimension in technology-based art, achieved through 
the new aesthetic model of the Transparent Act.
The Transparent Act is an immaterial model of art. It breaks with the materialistic 
approaches to art and the mechanistic applications of technology. It introduces practices which 
do not focus on object creation or build upon attraction of emerging concepts of technology but 
build on a cognitive experience of the spectator. It is a transdisciplinary model which establishes 
a sophisticated network of conceptions in order to generate an evidence-based application for 
technology-based art. The Transparent Act provides a methodology through which technology 
can be applied in art as an aesthetic conception. In this respect, the main intervention of this 
thesis is not the cognitive-based modality that was already suggested by design-based 
applications of interaction, but the insight that this cognitive encounter can be linked to a poetic 
layer which stimulates a spiritual-like state of consciousness. Therefore the transparent interface 
can provide a potential instrument for the application of cognitively invisible technologies in the 
'making art' process, which facilities the meaning creation of the spectator. With this, the 
philosophical-based model of the Transparent Act aims to fill a gap, which has occurred at the 
threshold between technology and art, which has previously applied older modalities of aesthetic 
rather than produced a novel framework with an immaterial encounter.
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iii. Artistic Background and Practice-Based Research
The discourse here is based on artistic research through practice. This section provides the
background of previous and current artistic activity, highlighting the artistic practices of the 
author. Two particular interactive installations, Mirror_SPACE and the Mind Cupola, will be 
discussed in order to contextualise the practice-based methodologies used in the discourse and 
also to display an artistic continuum and development of concepts of interaction.
Mirror_SPACE and the Mind Cupola are technologically-mediated interactive artworks 
which invite the spectator to engage in their particular immersive environments. Entering the 
space, the spectator is immediately affected with the aesthetics of the surroundings. These real- 
time environments are empty and non-operative until the spectators enter and the system is 
activated. The environment is a system formed of customised software and hardware, which 
appears to the spectator as both aesthetic and functional interfaces. Through these interfaces the 
spectators can control the events of the environment by active or passive participation. An active 
participation involves one or more spectators in the creation of the artwork through bodily 
movement of tactile control. A passive interaction involves the sensory technology collecting 
biometric information (like face attributes or face emotions) and the spectator's control of the 
environment based on their cognitive processes.
The artwork of Mirror_SPACE (Zics, 2004/2005) (Figure 1.01, 1.02) established an 
active immersive environment. Spectators were invited to create their own 'mirror' image 
according to the rules of the artistic system. Users had to step into an illuminated circle in a dark 
room where they were scanned by a device directed towards their face. The mirror images 
appeared in front of the person on a large screen. Real-time three dimensional objects were 
generated through the particular space-time based data package of the person, including the value
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Figure 1.01 The light beam of the 'Mirror SPACE'
environment where spectators are scanned
(Zics, 2004)
Figure 1.02 The Immersive Environment of ''Mirror_SP'ACE' with interactors
(Zics, 2004)
of one's mood which is determined through face analysis and dynamic data. This analysed data, 
through a particular visualisation process, characterised an abstract sphere-like object on the 
screen, providing a variety of unique visual representations (colour, shape, complexity and 
movement). The aesthetic of the three dimensional object combined a microcosmic vision which 
was inspired by the drawings of the biologist Ernst Haeckel, and a networked structure which is 
based on contemporary visualisations of data networks such as the internet (Figure 1.03, 1.04). 
The stylised visual components of the aesthetic in Mirror_SPACE simulated the reflection of a 
mirror image without reference to physical reality with the aim of creating a sensation of 
interconnectivity. Therefore this work suggests a representation with a unique visuality which 
through its aesthetic experience might recreate a phenomenon of interconnected co-existence. 
The experience design in Mirror_SPACE is based on the body behaviour of the users and on the 
effectiveness of the interaction with his or her avatar. Whereas users who recognised and lived 
certain rules of interaction intensively had a greater opportunity of viewing and of being able to 
change their mirror image for longer, users who left their creature alone after its birth may have 
been excluded from virtual space. In this respect, the artistic system challenged its users to 
produce a more effective or even immersive quality of their experience. Just as the immersion 
was produced through the learning process of the rules of bodily movements, the aesthetic 
experience was achieved by a symbolic interconnectivity between bodily states and dynamic 
visual formulations. Although a spatial navigation of the user is common in virtual reality 
systems, Mirror_SPACE attempted to create an experience where the unique aesthetic and its 
efficient source of representation (face and dynamic data analysis) produced a novel knowledge 
in the participators' consciousness.
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Figure 1.03 and 1.04 Screen shots of the 'Mirror_SF'ACE' visualisation (Zics, 2005)
Whereas in Mirror JSPACE the artistic novelty was focused on an active immersive 
involvement of the user through a bodily action that produced an interaction, the practice-based 
research as part of this thesis, introduces the project of the Mind Cupola (Figure 1.05, 1.06, 
1.07), which is characterised by a passive immersive environment. According to the recognition 
of an artist-artwork-artist triangle, the artwork Mind Cupola has the role of producing intimacy 
between the artist and spectator. This outcome therefore is not based on object creations but 
rather on the production of an environment that stimulates a noiseless flow between the 'making 
art' and 'experiencing art' processes. Whereas the 'making art' process concerns the artist's 
creative process when in his/her intentional interaction with technology, the artwork is the 
reflection of the overall creation process, which reveals a dynamic confrontation in the 
'experiencing art' process of the spectator. The spectator internalises the artistic outcome 
through the cognitive process of immersion. The spectator's participation is crucial as it activates 
the artwork and his or her subjective experience evaluates the 'transparency' between artist and 
spectator. The artwork creates the interconnectivity between the artist and spectator and 
establishes a flow between cognitive processes.
The Mind Cupola represents a bio-feedback device which, with its embedded instruments 
and specific aesthetic, triggers affections in the spectator's perception (Figure 1.08). Entering the 
cupola, the spectator's head is surrounded with a machine which recognises the spectator's 
presence and attempts to affect him or her with various invisible or visible electromagnetic 
streams. The devices embedded in the cupola (such as cold stream, hot stream, vibration, light or 
sound) produce a pattern of affections which are linked to various conceptions of consciousness 
alteration. The devices react upon the data from the face analysis in order to produce a creative 
flow. Whilst in Mirror SPACE the person's face was analysed for an emotional characteristic,
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Figure 1.05 Spectator in the 'MindCupola' (Zics, 2008)
Figure 1.06 The 'Mind Cupola's ' affective environment fZics, 2008)
^^^^^^^^^^^••••^^^^^^^^^^^^^^•^^•^•••••^^^^^^^•^^^^^^^^••••••^•i^^^HBH^^
Figure 1.07 Spectator and the 'Mind Cupola's' illuminative 
environment (Zics, 2008)
Figure 1.08 The 'Mind Cupola's' embedded instruments and unique aesthetic (Zics, 2008)
the Mind Cupola's software recognises features of the face and measures particular changes over 
time. The data from the face analysis creates a visualisation based on fractal-like structures 
which, whilst in motion, produces a kaleidoscopic effect (Figure 1.09). This concept derives 
from the visual language of Mirror_SPACE which explored the affective quality of aesthetic and 
is developed further in the Mind Cupola for cognitive-based interactivity. This is achieved 
through real-time face analysis which continuously re-creates the visual experience according to 
the facial responses. A cognitive feedback loop was created through the analysis of bio-data 
which recreates the pattern of affection in the Mind Cupola and produces visual feedback. 
Therefore the system is continuously recreating itself according to the spectator's cognitive 
reactions and intentional actions. As such, the artistic system applies the idea of a functionally 
closed system which in turn accommodates the repetition of simple phenomena producing a 
heightened complexity. Through these features and set up, that the affections of the Mind Cupola 
might produce novel experiences in the spectator's consciousness.
Both artistic works aim for a novel quality in the spectator's experience which is 
achieved through the aesthetic conception of immersion. The novel contribution of the Mind 
Cupola project is that it re-introduced the meaning of interaction within a cognitive framework, 
rather than a physical activity. Thus, it applies technology in such a way that it has a particular 
affection in the spectator which might reveal a more effective way of interaction between human 
and machine.
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Figure 1.09 The 'Mind Cupola 'from the spectator's point of view;
the interactive visualisation and the camera-mover interface
(Zics, 2008)
iv. Contextual Terminology
This investigation builds upon what is termed 'technology-based art' production, a contemporary 
scheme of art practice that applies technology for an aesthetic purpose. In this respect, the 
investigation looks at artworks which, in both the 'making art' process and 'experiencing art' 
process, apply technology to produce a continuum for the aesthetic experience of the spectator. 
More particularly, it is focused on 'interactive media', which implements the conception of 
interaction and active spectatorship through emerging technologies which aim for innovative 
information exchange with a poetic or aesthetic layer. 'Interaction' here, and as elaborated in the 
following chapters, is understood as an action-reaction potentiality that results not only in a 
dynamic change in the structure of the artwork but also in the spectator's cognition. Thus the 
term interaction not only refers to a mental level between the spectator and the artwork (as, for 
example, through an application of Eco's 'semiotic openness') but also on a level of structural 
transformation in the artistic system. As a result of this, artworks will frequently be referred to as 
systems, as they often represent a complexity of networked elements, which, through action- 
affection processes, produce a scheme of experience. 'Active spectatorship', as it is understood 
in this thesis, comprises qualities which might enable a recovery of an aesthetic dimension that 
was lost in older models. The notion of the spectator in this context describes a participant 
subject who actively contributes in the 'making art' process. The term extends the historical 
continuum of the 'artist-artwork-spectator' triangle whose application defines a primary 
understanding of art production. This version of spectatorship acknowledges the importance of 
the spectator as the co-creator but amplifies the idea of active spectator as user or, as Rokeby 
(1995) called it, interactor. The application of users and interactions are appropriate to art works 
which demand physical and tactile interactive processes (for example Mirror_SPACE).
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However, the discussion of interactive artworks, in this thesis, establishes a cognitive interactive 
modality (in thesis termed as 'passive interaction') which has spectatorship processes similar to 
cinema reception; as such the spectator is best understood as a particular kind of participating 
subject.
The thesis' intervention in a philosophical encounter of technology-based art production 
and evaluation is based on the rediscovery of 'immaterial' qualities which are defined as a 
cognitive rather than a physical status. Although, in numerous accounts, immateriality has been 
acknowledged as having significant potential within technology-based art (Matta, 1976; Lippard 
and Chandler, 1968; Lillemose, 2005), most of these approaches interpret this as a new 
materiality. It is suggested that understanding a conception of the immaterial means not only a 
conceptual message but also the potential to reveal cognitive levels which are usually ignored in 
materialistic views. The notion of immateriality represents an examination of cognitive processes 
in particular affections, resulting in states of consciousness as an aesthetic experience. 'Seeking 
new knowledge' in the spectator's experience, as proposed in this thesis, might introduce a 
transcendent dimension into the art work. From this perspective laid out here immateriality is 
identified as a cognitive experience which might stimulate spiritual-like outcomes through new 
cognitive levels of aesthetic. This has been identified as a breaking down of a materialistic and 
dualistic comprehension of art which previously, most frequently, considered the physical 
qualities of an object without an affective interconnectivity between the artist and the spectator. 
This materialist approach has been promoted through many generations of interactive media art 
(identified as Krueger's legacy in chapter 2), constrained by mechanistic approaches and has 
built its aesthetic on attractions of emerging technology, rather than been linked to an artistic 
meaning creation. The thesis aims to establish a new model for art production which rediscovers
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this lost creation of immaterial knowledge by working towards a more effective interaction 
between the artist and the spectator.
As stated above, the main objective of the argument builds upon 'cognition' and the 
'cognitive qualities' most essentially characterised in the spectator's experience. The term 
cognition is applied based upon a definition from cognitive science:
Cognition is the process involved in knowing, or the act of knowing, which in its 
completeness includes perception and judgment. Cognition includes every mental 
process that can be described as an experience of knowing as distinguished from an 
experience of feeling or of willing. It includes, in short, all processes of consciousness 
by which knowledge is built up, including perceiving, recognising, conceiving, and 
reasoning. (The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1993, p. 434)
As this definition of cognitive processes refers to 'processes of consciousness', the following 
discourse characterises qualities in cognition as states of consciousness. This term is widely 
debated, particularly in consciousness studies, and its definition changes by discipline. This 
investigation applies the terminology used by Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, whose psychological 
conceptualisation of flow, as a substance of consciousness constitutes an important aspect of the 
thesis' argument. Csikszentmihalyi refers to the function of consciousness as:
...to present information about what is happening outside and inside the organism in 
such a way that it can be evaluated and acted upon by the body...With consciousness, 
we can deliberately weight what the senses tell us, and respond accordingly. 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 2002, p.24)
Csikszentmihalyi's insight is useful for the thesis as it provides an emphasis on the importance of 
understanding the interconnectivity between outside and inside; in other words, how bodily 
states might produce a change in consciousness. In this respect consciousness is understood not 
only as a state, or faculty, or awareness of anything, or one's thought (Shorter Oxford English 
Dictionary, Fifth Edition, 2002, p. 491), but also as an inner knowledge, characterised by a
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dynamic of a constantly changing quality or state based on body-mind interconnectivity. As 
consciousness is frequently linked to a dynamic change of the experience, this thesis also applies 
the notion of 'altered state of consciousness', introduced by Charles Tart (1969, p. 2) as the 
sensation when one: '...clearly feels a qualitative shift in his pattern of mental functioning'. This 
characteristic will also be referred to as 'noiseless flow', which frequently produces new 
knowledge or even an ecstatic state of consciousness (Csikszentmihalyi, 1988, p.4). These 
cognitive processes will be contextualised within a philosophical framework, investigating 
phenomena which are widely discussed in phenomenology as they provide essential insight into 
the key issues of human-machine interactions. The main objective this investigation is to apply 
the concept of a mind-body fusion that conceives of knowledge as a phenomenon of the (bodily) 
experiences. (Husserl, 1913) The phenomenological framework in this investigation is based 
upon classical concepts, as described by Edmund Husserl, whose understanding was developed 
further by Heidegger. Husserl proposed:
This phenomenology, like the more inclusive pure phenomenology of experiences in 
general, has, as its exclusive concern, experiences intuitively sizable and analysable in 
the pure generality of their essence, not experiences empirically perceived and treated 
as real facts, as experiences of human or animal experiments in the phenomenal world 
that we posit as an empirical fact. (Husserl, 1913, p.249)
The main intent of this phenomenological approach is to examine human actions as they appear 
to consciousness. Contrary to phenomenological approach that posits an 'essence of things' 
(Husserl, 1913), this discussion takes up the position of classical phenomenology in focusing on 
human cognition rather than an exterior quality of the thing. From this point of view the thesis 
examines the cognitive potential of knowledge-seeking and its aesthetic potential for art 
production. Based on this perspective, and to produce an account of cognitive qualities as a
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body-mind state, the thesis introduces the notion of 'immersion'. Immersion is often defined as 
an: '...absorption in an activity or condition' (Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Fifth Edition, 
2002, p. 13 22) which in this thesis more specifically refers to a condition of cognition. As 
immersion is not a well defined term in the particular context of interaction, the thesis refers to 
one of the few definitions in the literature provided by Oliver Grau (2003, p. 13), who suggests 
that: '.. .immersion is mentally absorbing and a process, a change, a passage from one mental 
state to another', which the thesis resituates through a phenomenological and 'positive 
psychological' encounter, as posited by Csikszentmihalyi (2002). As a result, immersion will 
stand for qualities which describe a body-consciousness state through the notion of body 
awareness. This approach allows the investigation to determine the quality of the experience as 
heightened immersion, suggesting a more effective interaction, which also includes a spectrum 
of experience design assuming diverse qualities in the alteration of consciousness.
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Chapter 2
Critical Discourse on Interactive Media Art: The 'Artist-Artwork-Spectator'
Triangle
i. The Primary Model of Interactive Media Art and its Deficiency
This thesis opens up an interdisciplinary investigation into contemporary art forms which are 
mediated through technological systems. It takes the approach that art within its historic forms 
and resonances have undergone shifts that were largely influenced by the social-economic- 
technological aspects of its spectatorship. This thesis recognises the significance of this approach 
and situates its discussion within the discourse that occurred after the collapse of the Modernist 
movement, when the introduction of interactive technology in art produced a rediscovery of 
active spectatorship. As such, the convenient starting point of this investigation is artist Myron 
Krueger's concept and practice of the 'responsive environment' (Krueger, 1977, p.423), which 
brought a radical transformation to art practice allowing a more inquisitive quality of interaction 
in art (Rheingold, 1991; Dinkla, 1994; Wilson, 2002; Lovejoy, 2004). With Krueger's artistic 
work the possibilities of interaction in artworks became intimately bound up with the aesthetic 
decisions that take place in the process of making art. Interactive technology provided the 
opportunity for artists to establish an immediate reciprocal communication with the audience 
(Krueger, 1991). In this respect, interactive media art began to establish a radical model of art 
and advocated a new spectatorship.
The problem identified in this chapter is that Krueger's model of interactivity, along with 
its reception and further development, could not provide a sophisticated model for an aesthetic 
approach to technology-based art production. This observation emerges from a reflection on the 
forty-year history of interactive media art which displays only a fragmental solution to an
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aesthetic in art. The discussion in this chapter recognises that Krueger's activity greatly impacted 
on the later development of interactive media art producing a technology-driven framework 
without an aesthetic solution for art. This chapter argues that revisiting Krueger's work helps to 
identify the lack of a contemporary understanding of interactivity. Proceeding from his work, the 
critical approach taken in this chapter segregates out the traditional strategies of technology and 
art, enabling the identification of the particular failures of Krueger's interpretation of 
interactivity. By recognising these qualities the chapter draws on and amplifies Krueger's 
primary recognition of immediacy between artist and spectator, but claims that his mechanistic, 
technologically-mediated understanding could not provide an aesthetic solution for interactive 
media art. Therefore, it can be said that, although Krueger's conceptualisation of spectatorship 
sets out a means towards a sophisticated model of interactivity his application in practice was 
restrained by an overemphasis on a fetishist characteristic of technological production. As 
consequence he could not fulfil his original intention which he articulated in one of his early 
works (Metaplay in 1970) as 'artificial reality' (Krueger, 1991, p. xiii). This was a concept now 
more widely known as Virtual Reality (VR), which in his later works applied a more 
technological than aesthetic solution to interactivity.
The following discussion outlines Krueger's concepts, based on the understanding that 
they have become a common approach to interactive media art. Through a critical discussion of 
this observation, this chapter elaborates Krueger's pioneering practice by introducing some of his 
interactive works, which provided a primary direction to the further development in interactive 
art. This investigation will emphasise that Krueger's practical work was not able to respond to 
his conceptual challenge and remained ambivalent. Whereas his primary understanding impacted 
on other pioneering works (for example those by Jeffrey Shaw or David Rokeby), these practices
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did not recognise the principal lack of aesthetic in Krueger's work, since they followed his 
legacy, remaining within the same mechanistic conceptualisation (for example, the usage of 
physically invisible/visible interfaces). Proceeding from the legacy left by Krueger, the following 
discussion will reveal the contemporary conceptualisation of interaction and address the 
inherited lack of aesthetics. This critical revision serves as a framework for the suggested 
solution, which will be elaborated in the following chapters.
ii. Myron Krueger's Ambivalent Model of Interactivity
The work of Myron Krueger outlines an early conflict between technology and art in the way 
that he conceived interaction. Krueger was trained as a computer scientist, and from this vantage 
point decided to develop 'responsive environments' as an investigation into a technology-driven 
aesthetic. Krueger's (1991, p.7) approach emerged from the appreciation of John Cage's work3 
of participatory art in which the artist: '...leaves the final realisation of the piece in the hands of 
each participant'. Krueger (1991, p.8) most significantly claimed that the artist's task is to design 
the spectator's experience: '.. .the computer can increase the artist's ability to experiment, so that 
the final compositions are based on a rich experience with the medium and the full expression of 
the artist's ideas'. His acknowledgment that experience is the central objective of creation 
contributed to a new understanding of interactivity in art. Krueger claimed that art had already 
developed a new rhetoric of interaction through historical forms, but it was suppressed because 
of an existing antipathy and a lack in skills of technology in the arts. In this matter, it can be said
3 John Cage's strategy of confronting the audience with unusual musical structure and action relies on chance 
generated in an interactive field where both sides developed dependency from each other. The spectators are 
inclined to a high degree of participation in developing different interpretations and ways to unfold the work. 
Through the indeterminacy that Cage developed in his multiple artworks many of his performances suggested a 
collaborative interrelationship between artist, performer and audience.
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that Krueger has recognized an opportunity for a unique contribution in art that profits from his 
scientific skills and knowledge of technology. He believed that fusing the artistic heritage of 
participatory art4 with science, particularly with the potential of emerging technologies5 , 
provided a solution to an aesthetic of a new art form. This understanding that participatory art 
formulates an aesthetic built upon a philosophy of 'uncertainty' (such as improvisation, chance, 
confrontation or provocation), however, was not able to provide an aesthetic scheme for 
interactive media art, as Krueger thought. This is based on the observation that human to human 
communication provides diverse solutions for an artistic conceptualization between artist and 
spectator rather than human to machine communication. It is argued here instead, that 
technology-based art strives towards an intimacy between artist and spectator rather than 
randomised action-reaction capacity driven from 'nugatory attitudes'.
Krueger's concept initially revealed that interactive art is a form of participatory art 
which, through the integration of technology, empowers a broader prospect of spectator 
involvement. However, Krueger's aim to reproduce a participatory character of artwork led him 
to a mechanistic approach of interactivity, ignoring the potentiality of experience design as a 
solution to aesthetic. His critical framework of art expressed this perspective:
4 In this thesis participatory is understood as artworks or movements that are characterised by audience 
involvement in the artwork. The dada movement brought a novel aesthetic claim of immediate interaction with 
the audience to which it is often referred to as a form of art nugatory at the beginning of twenty century (Richter, 
1997). The art nugatory haven't had a particular artistic form, their actions often carried out randomly or in a form 
of public congregation or demonstration. From this movement has grown John Cage's chance performances, the 
Tluxus attitude' and happenings whose artistic conceptualisation similarly builds upon the immediate reactions of 
the audience producing unexpected interaction (Smith, 1998).
5 An important quality of technology is that it is always in continuum. The 'emerging character' is a quality that 
artistic creation has to deal with. Whereas it enables novel forms of meaning it also carries the danger that this 
novelty turns to an attraction that surprises artistic qualities. A technological approach, however, gains a full 
expression of the emerging character, producing more powerful technologies every time. This characteristic of 
technology will be termed in this thesis as 'responsiveness', which has significance in technology-based art 
production but it is only a tool for artistic expression.
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It is the definition of that relationship in which both art and science are interested, and for which 
the aesthetic approach is more scientific. The scientific method works best when objects and 
forces can be isolated and studied one at the time. An aesthetic can be used to address complex 
problems with influences, ill-defined criteria, and diffused goals. (Krueger, 1991 [1983], p.9)
Krueger's understanding, as discussed above, appears to have served scientific mechanisms in 
interactive environments rather than constituting an inherent quality of the artwork. It appears 
that Krueger's ambivalent account of interactivity originated in the failed practical 
implementation of his theoretical conceptualisation. From the vantage point of the present day it 
is difficult to unravel whether Krueger's theoretical claims emerged prior to his practice or in a 
deductive way through analysis; what is clear is that many of his conceptual, artistic ideas were 
not articulated in his artworks. This gap between Krueger's theory and practice was generated 
through a post-historical approach in which he intentionally contextualised his practical work 
within the emerging framework of participatory art. This perspective on Krueger's work 
illuminates the characteristic of a mechanistic approach to art, which followed not the artistic but 
the ambivalent model.
With regard to Krueger's intention of a participatory solution through technology in art, 
he attempted to develop a tool that was able to react to the spectator's action. His concept of 
responsive environment was an enormous technological challenge at that time involving a great 
complexity in scientific realisation. Krueger (2001, p. 106) described his concept of responsive 
environment as an environment in which: '.. .a computer perceives the actions of those who enter 
and respond intelligently through complex visual and auditory displays'. Krueger dismissed Ivan 
Sutherland's high-end solutions of interactivity (in 1965 Sutherland introduced head-maintained 
displays [HMD] and goggles) arguing that they were too impenetrable for a spectator's 
engagement. Instead, Krueger (1992) sought the development of a different application of
technology that was more analogical to participatory art in order to enable a free interaction
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involving several spectators in the experience. He envisioned a new 'reality' without the physical 
presence of technology (since Sutherland's HMD was considered a visible interface) and focused 
on the participant's behaviour in order to enable an 'automated experience' (Krueger, 1991, 
p.18). Krueger's (1991) initial idea became the first technological solution of environment based 
high-end interactivity, which he referred to as 'artificial reality'.
In 1969 Krueger, along with others6 , created his first responsive light-sound environment 
titled Glowflow (Figure 2.01, 2.02). Even though the work was considered as the first ever 
known interactive environment (or installation), it only exhibited a limited responsiveness and 
generated a perceptual delusion rather than interaction, as Krueger himself also confessed. The 
environment of Glowflow was designed to stimulate participants in a dark room through a 
changing luminance of wall-mounted tubes that presented a distorted structure of the room. 
Krueger noted that participants could not explore an action-reaction interconnection in their 
experience; therefore the system's responsiveness occurred rather randomly and did not meet the 
spectators' expectations. Importantly, Krueger did not recognise that his 'interaction-creation' 
failed not because of a lack of technological responsiveness but because of the adaptation of 
artistic meaning in a particular action (designing the spectator's experience). From this it can be 
suggested that the lack of Krueger's artistic vision in technologically-mediated creation, perhaps 
inherited through his scientific background, created a mechanistic approach in his artworks.
The adverse reactions of the spectators in Glowflow, observed by Krueger, encouraged 
his closer examination of human-machine interactions, which led to the development of, what 
can be regarded as, the most appealing environment of his carrier. The artwork Metaplay (1970) 
(Figure 2.03, 2.04) was more similar to an artist's laboratory (without making the spectators
6 The contributors were Dan Sandin (computer scientist), Jerry Erdman (sculptor) and Richard Venezsky (computer 
scientist).
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Figure 2.01 The gallery environment of 'Glow/low' (1969) with the 










Figure 2.03 The floor plan for 'Metaplay' (19 70) (Krueger, 1991)
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Figure 2.04 The 'Metaplay's' (1970) interaction (Krueger, 1991)
aware about this) allowing an immediate study of the spectators' actions and reactions. The 
Metaplay has only rarely been perceived by art theorist as an influential piece; however, this 
investigation recognises it as a watershed that addressed the concept of an aesthetic layer in 
technology-based art. Krueger had identified technological inefficiency in responsiveness, and 
through Glow/low, he built up a new environment in which the functions of the computer were 
taken over by the artist who simulated the machine interaction. He set up a communication 
system in which the artist could immediately react to the spectators' actions and reaction. In 
order to implement this, Krueger constructed two separated rooms connected by video- 
broadcasting through which the artist received a real-time picture of the spectator (Figure 2.05). 
The spectators, without knowing that the interface was controlled by a human (and not by the 
computer), started to interact with their own picture that was projected on the screen, expecting 
some form of response. The artist at that point reacted to the spectators' action through a 
drawing, which was projected back and was superimposed over the spectators' image. Krueger 
described this in one of his following experiments:
I attempted to draw on someone's hand. He did not understand what was happening. 
And he moved his hand. I erased what I had drawn and started over where his hand had 
moved. Again, he moved. This became a game, with him moving his hand just before, I 
finished drawing. I finished my drawing. The game degenerated to the point where I 
was simply tracking the path of his hand with the computer line. Thus, by moving his 
hand, he could draw on the screen. This idea became the basis for many interactions. 
(Krueger, 1991 [1983], p. 13)
Krueger attempted to produce a new model of interface through the artist's observation of the 
spectator experience, which, by means of visual illusion, involved its participant in an interactive 
play. Even though the work conceptually explored immediacy between the artist and the 
spectator, Krueger did not produce further works which applied these conceptions on technology 












Figure 2.05 The system outline of 'Metaplay' (1970) 
(Krueger, 1991)
experiments instead turned to focus on visual affection and direct responsiveness between the 
system and the spectator, which he discovered by chance through the video-closed circuit of 
Metaplay1 (Krueger, 1991, p. 18). Krueger applied this discovery to his most frequently cited 
work Videoplace (1972-1990) (Figure 2.06, 2.07), which he constantly altered for twenty years 
afterwards. He produced various solutions to illusionistic visual displays, but only by exploring 
interactivity through technological variety. His responsive environments used visual metaphor of 
self-reflection in order to stimulate the participant into interacting with the virtual object or with 
another participant. Even though these environments initially formalised a 'mirror' quality to 
interactive systems (Rokeby, 1995), Krueger was not able to apply a meaning of this self- 
reflection, producing only a playful interaction. The best-known version of Videoplace is Critter 
(1984) (Figure 2.08), which enabled an artificial creature to interact with a person's silhouette. 
Although these installations motivated a playful engagement with technology, they offered only 
a technological novelty that ignored the immaterial approach of the spectator's experience design 
introduced in Metaplay. As Krueger's interest centred on technology produced attraction, this 
initial discovery of an aesthetic dimension to interaction was forgotten.
In opposition to Krueger's produced outcome, such as Videoplace, the argument here 
demands a full development of his initial idea of immaterial art, pointing to the considerable 
divergence between his conceptual claims and his practice. In Metaplay, Krueger intuitively
7 Krueger (1991, p.25) reports this accidental discovery, which appeared through the cameras that were directed 
on the computer screens, as: 'I realized that I was seeing more than an illusion. As I moved my finger to point to 
the data my colleague had just sent, the image of my hand briefly overlapped the image of his. He moved his hand. 
Although I noticed that phenomenon, its significance did not register immediately. When it happens again, 
however, I was struck with the thought that he was uncomfortable about our image touching. Without saying 
anything, I subtly tested my hypothesis. Sure enough, as I moved the image of my hand towards his, he repeatedly, 
but unconsciously, moved his hand to avoid the contact...The inescapable conclusion was that the etiquette of 
maintaining personal distance and avoiding touching that exists in the real world was operating at that moment in 
this purely visual experience.' This discovery is one of the earliest applications in videoconferencing technology.
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Figure 2.06 The system draft of'Videoplace ' (1974) based on Myron Krueger 's 
Description (Oliveira, 2007)
Figure 2.07 Screen shots of the 'Videoplace ' interaction between two participants
(Krueger, 1991)
Figure 2.08 Screen shots of 'Citter'(1984) ( Krueger, 1991,)
identified the importance of the immediacy between the artist and spectator, producing 
interconnectivity through the spectator's self-reflection, which created a shared interactivity 
through the artist's drawing and the spectator's bodily experience. Metaplay situated the artist 
and spectator on the same level through both creative experiences, which are in constant 
movement through the action and reaction circle. As such, the creator became the spectator and 
the spectator's experience became the creator's extension of his or her action. From the 
perspective of the thesis, technology is not only invisible in a physical sense as Krueger 
suggested, but in an aesthetic sense, as it does not reflect novelty but serves the artist-spectator 
interconnectivity. As such, Metaplay does not display an attraction through the emergent quality 
of technology but through the artistic meaning. With this suggestion, the previous object-oriented 
model of art, in which artist-artwork and artwork-spectator relationships were not 
interconnected, is replaced with an immaterial approach. This primary claim of the thesis 
becomes even more obvious through Krueger's particular treatment of the artwork through the 
experience of the spectator:
The sequence of events started with a group of six to eight people entering the darkened 
environment. The lights were brought up and their projected video images became 
visible. The typical audience reaction at this point was surprising. Often, faced by the 
large screen where the only active element was their own image, people would sit down 
and watch. Large-screen video projection was apparently undreamed of by many of the 
participants... After they overcome their initial awe, one of the interactions would 
ensue. (Krueger, 1991, pp. 23-24)
From Krueger's point of view this experiment provided much more of a technological 
conception, since he interpreted the overlapping images as an application of video-broadcasting. 
As his idea was reserved for emerging technological solutions, he was not able to acknowledge 
the opportunity (not particularly by the formulation of overlapping images) for a novel aesthetic 
strategy that could rediscover a lost touch in art production. Thus, interactivity provided a
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solution from the very early stages to resolve the materialistic character of art; however, it was 
only marginally conceptualised in theory and not applied in practice. Therefore, interactive 
media artworks that followed were based on a materialist model of production; although 
Krueger's work did not focus on the attributes of physical objects any more, his techno-fetishist 
approach of art still worked within a materialistic framework.
Through this, it can be pointed out that Krueger's approach constructed an ambivalent 
concept of interaction. Although he recognised the role of the spectator's interaction, he 
attempted to respond to it with a technological solution in his practice. Krueger (1991, p. 137) 
saw the result of his artistic practice as '.. .a whole new realm of human experience in which the 
laws of cause and effect are composed by the artist'. This provided a solution for an effortless 
interaction with the spectators in their playful interconnection with a novel system, but not with 
the artist directly. Thus, Krueger's model of responsive experience was more about 
accommodating visual affects and 'perceptive plays' in high-end interactive technologies than 
comprehending the aesthetic of interaction itself. His view remained within a technological 
approach that attempted to apply artistic ideas, such as John Cage's experiments. However, he 
was not able to reveal that interactive art is not only about participation but also an aesthetic 
endeavour or creation of meaning.
Through this chapter's overview of Krueger's work it can be concluded that his activity 
was not particularly artistic but predominantly technological. Although he claimed the objectless 
creation of art within a context of experience, he generated an object which, even though it 
remained physically invisible, by its fetishist character made it visible for reflections of 
attraction. His quest for aesthetic brought him to significant new technological developments
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(such as artificial reality, video conferencing and networked video communities), without 
offering artistic solutions.
Krueger's artistic legacy had a reasonable impact on following interactive media 
productions, his approach widely influencing the technology-based art world and their practical 
characterisation. The revision of his work, provided in this section, helps the following argument 
to understand the contemporary account of interaction in the context of spectatorship and shows 
how this affected the development of interactive media artworks that followed Krueger.
iii. Krueger's Legacy in Interactive Media Art
In the previous section it was argued that Krueger was unable to dissolve the old dualistic model
of art, in which technology was not fully understood and created an ambivalent model of 
spectatorship. This section will consider concepts that followed Krueger's legacy and produced 
fragmental solutions towards a new spectatorship. It will elaborate on the idea that Krueger's 
conceptualised immediacy between artist and spectator was long ignored. As such, interactive art 
production based on Krueger's legacy mostly attempted to improve technological potentiality 
and novelty whilst not solving the aesthetic inquiries for interaction; the post-Krueger 
formulations still worked within a materialistic view of interactive media art.
Most of the concepts approaching technology-based art have elaborated on the 
revolutionary character of the new spectatorship that technology provides and even set up an 
interconnection between the artist and spectator (Kent and Williams, 1994; Dinka, 1994; 
Rokeby, 1995; Daniels, 2000); however, similar to Krueger they do not link their role to 
aesthetics. Maiocchi et al. (1994) for example argue that an artwork sets up various 
interconnections to the artist, as seen in Krueger's works. It is most likely that the assumption by
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Maiocchi et al. arose not from Krueger's artistic outcomes but from his conceptual claims, as 
Maiocchi et al. proposes:
Traditional art is created by an artist and appreciated by the viewer. In an artificial 
reality like those created by Krueger, the relationship between the artist and the viewer 
is only one of several possible relationships; the relationship of one viewer to another 
can also be the explicit subject of the work, hi fact, an interactive exhibit augurs new 
relationships for artists with their audience and with their art. (Maiocchi et al., 1994, p. 
56)
Krueger's interest in participatory art came from the 'dada' inspired works of John Cage and the 
'Fluxus' artistic movement, representing an avant-garde aesthetic in which the immediacy 
between artist and spectator was founded on a deconstructive conceptualisation of spectatorship. 
A 'Fluxus attitude' was likely to include working with elements of disturbance or attacks on 
spectators to produce the particular meaning and not through a symbiotic co-creation in the 
artwork, which is seen in interactive media art. This suggests that Krueger set up a model for 
technological interaction influenced by the creation of discontinuity for the spectator and as a 
result was unable to produce an intimacy between artist and spectator and thus an aesthetic for 
interaction. Although the acknowledgment of the participatory engagement of the audiences 
needs to be credited to Krueger and his legacy, his deconstructive model of spectatorship has 
proven insufficient for the creation of a new aesthetic. This makes it necessary to look into a 
broader intellectual context of the contemporary literature strategies for potential solutions. 
The theory of 'openness' for example, discussed most extensively by Umberto Eco 
(1989), describes a new aesthetic based on the active spectator. Eco took up Duchamp's (1987, 
p. 187) assertion that: '.. .the spectator makes the picture' 8 and applied it to modern artworks
8 The wide-ranging consideration of the relationship between spectator and artifact is concentrated on the mental 
processes of the spectator that provide the interaction, therefore, such features as personal background, 
intellectual features and other capabilities of the person determine the achievable quality of the spectator - 
artefact interaction. This type of 'interaction' has no impact on the structure of the artwork and proves for a more
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which, as Eco claimed, placed the spectator's perception in motion. Contrary to participatory art 
forms characterising live-performances, Eco's participatory art argued for an aesthetic 
collaboration of artist and spectator, a model which might produce a better understanding 
towards a new technology-based spectatorship. This perspective will be elaborated upon in the 
next chapter, which argues that 'openness' provides a better model for interaction in art instead 
of Krueger's interpretation of performance art, potentially serving a fuller consideration of 
aesthetic. Overall, Krueger's legacy produced a misinterpretation of the integration of the 
participatory concept in interactive art. Whereas performance art could not provide an aesthetic 
solution to interactive media art in Krueger's application, it set forth a miss-belief that 
technology-based art is only about participatory characteristics, whilst ignoring interaction as an 
aesthetic layer.
An immediate impact of Krueger's understanding can be observed by looking at other 
pioneering practitioners, thusly such as David Rokeby or Jeffrey Shaw, who created their 
interactive work in the mid-1980s. Both artists took on board Krueger's strategy of interaction, 
producing more technological responses instead of providing a new aesthetic solution. Shaw's 
work characterised well the mechanistic approach as he contextualised high-end technological 
systems in art providing no aesthetic insights (for example the interactive work of The Legible 
City, 1988-1991). Rokeby was experimenting with the same technological solutions that Krueger 
used (for example in his enigmatic work of Very Nervous System, 1986-90); invisible video 
interfaces for the capturing of a spectator's involvement, although Rokeby used the bodily
objective experience. The artwork as object is not dynamic; hence the act of the spectator resembles an observer 
with attentive cognitive processes. On the other hand, very specific expectations are demanded from the artwork 
to provide the main features for the interaction. In view of this, the communication steps out of the spectator's 
psyche and is situated outside action. The physical and mental actions together form the spectator's experience. 
The artwork includes a new element of interface, which is the absorbing surface of the spectator's actions.
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movement to trigger changes in a spatial soundscape (Figure 2.09, 2.10). Rokeby did not accept 
Krueger's claim that interactivity has to provide clear cause and effect interconnection, 
producing an unpredictably aesthetic solution in his work; instead Rokeby, through artistic 
experiment of practice, was able to achieve an aesthetic solution responding to Krueger's 
Metaplay concept. He produced a crucial level of meaningful interaction for the spectator as he 
critically engaged with technology in the process of creating the artwork, which immediately 
linked him to the spectator's experience. Although he acknowledged the importance of 
interconnection between artist and spectator, he still did not identify it as an aesthetic model for 
interactive art production. His practice remained curious as he intuitively produced an immaterial 
aesthetic in his work but without a consistent continuum in his art production.
Interactive artists are engaged in changing the relationship between artist and their 
media, and between artworks and their audience. These changes tend to increase the 
extent of the audience's role in the artwork, loosening the authority of the author or 
creator. Rather than creating finished works, the interactive artist creates 
relationships... The power of this expression is multiplied by the fact that the interactors 
themselves become referents of the work. The works are somewhat akin to portraits, 
reflecting aspects of the interactors, transformed so as to express the artist's point. 
(Rokeby, 1995, p. 152)
With an instant and very practical approach, Rokeby could produce an intimacy to the spectators; 
however, this particular approach also was the cause for his limited success. Through his initial 
technological experiment he produced a one-off aesthetic formulation; but like Krueger, without 
a particular aesthetic intent he failed to recognise his experimental approach as key to an 
aestheticisation of interactivity. He was not able to set an aesthetic strategy for his later works 
which, through interactive art, remained without an aesthetic model of interaction.
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Figure 2.09 Image documentation of 'Very Nervous System ' (1986-90) (Rokeby, 2000)
Figure 2.10 Screen shots of the video documentation of 'Very Nervous System' (1986-90)
(Rokeby, 1991)
iv. Recognising the 'Artist-Artwork-Spectator' Triangle
The primary cause of Krueger's and Rokeby's regression of the aesthetic character of the
interconnection of artist and spectator was that their approaches were mediated by a materialistic 
and dualistic model of art. Both acknowledged that technology provided a potential tool for art 
which enabled the creation of an immediate experience for the spectator, but this was only 
fragmentally recognised and consequently not fully implemented in their works. As such, 
technology-centred creation reflected a materialistic quality of the artwork, which further 
manifested itself in a fetishist production in art. As a result, creators such as Krueger and Rokeby 
did not link artistic creation to the artist and spectator interconnection, but more to a dualistic 
model in which the artist-artwork relationship stands for the technology-inspired creation, and 
the artwork-spectator relationship for the technological attraction.
The recognition of the spectator experience as the extension of artistic creation provides 
the model of the 'artist-artwork-spectator' triangle, which the thesis establishes in an attempt to 
draw out a possible solution for an aesthetic of interactive media art. In the same manner as 
Krueger recognised in Metaplay, the interconnection is based not on the physical formulation of 
objects seen in a materialistic model of art or technology, which is a technicist's approach, but 
instead on the experience itself. The argument points out that the artistic experience mediated by 
technology produces the quality of the spectator's experience, which is the crucial aesthetic layer 
of the work. As such, the new spectatorship brings an immaterial connection to art, which means 
immediate interconnectivity between artist and spectator.
Early accounts of the 'artist-artwork-spectator' triangle have already been conceptualised, 
for example by Cezanne and Baudelaire (1860), although they were not practically applied in 
Modern art. They mainly emphasised that the artist creation should not focus on the physical
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creation of the artwork but on the triggered experience itself. One of the rare identifications of 
the importance and nature of aesthetic experience was also made by the French philosopher 
Mikel Dufrenne (1973 [1953]), who proposed a view of aesthetic which already included the 
essential qualities of technology-based art. Within the context of traditional art he displayed a 
phenomenological concept of aesthetic experience of the spectator, drawing out a philosophy of 
interactive art:
... at a deeper level, the experiences of creator and spectator are not unconnected; for the 
artist becomes the spectator of his own work as he creates it, and the spectator 
associates himself with the artist, whose act he recognizes in the work. (Dufrenne, 1973, 
xlvi)
Dufrenne suggested a similar aesthetic concept to that which Krueger had created, or which 
Rokeby distinctively achieved in his interactive pieces, whereby the artist's and spectators' 
cognitive experiences overlap each other. Dufrenne's concept suggested that 'making art' 9 and 
'experiencing artwork' 10 are immediately interlinked; the former is the generator and the latter 
the processor of the creative flow. He refers to the similar way that art production must enlist the 
aesthetic life of the creator as well as the aesthetic experience of the spectator (Dufrenne, 1973, 
xlviii). Similar to this idea is Gordon Pask's (1971 [1968]) notion of'aesthetically potent 
environments' (later in the thesis this will be linked to the newly introduced notion of 'affective 
environment' with a critical perspective on Krueger's 'responsive environment' (1977)), which 
was an artistic approach to Pask's well-known theory of cybernetics; the conversation theory 
(1961). Pask's constructivist approach explains interactions as constructing meaning between
9 'Making art' is the process of creating the artwork. In this thesis this term will be used as a denotation of being in 
creation. The artist carries out this action.
10 Experiencing artwork refers to the spectator's perception processes of the artwork. This is the fulfillment of the 
'making art' and is carried out from the spectator or user.
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two cognitive systems 11 in a conversation. The aim of the 'universe of discourse' (Pask, 1961, 
p.22) between the participants is to reach similar modality of understanding generating new 
meanings. Through this alternative perspective of cybernetics and communication theory, Pask 
came to similar declaration to Dufrenne. Namely, that the relationship of artist and 'observer' 
interlinked through their conversations and reciprocal negations produce fluidity between mental 
processes and material formulation so that their conversations might become one entity. Pask 
explains this as follows:
It does not seem useful to make a rigid distinction between the types of mental process that go 
when one occupies these different roles [artist and observer]... the composer is, in some sense, 
mentally akin to the performer, the listener; the man who views a picture is mentally akin to the 
artist who painted it. (Pask, 1971, p. 76)
Additionally, as early as 1959 Pask discussed approaches to 'artificial organisms' suggesting that 
there is a significant distinction between an 'observer' actively engaging with the system (in this 
thesis active spectator) and the scientific observation that is one's attempt at objective 
experience. This perspective might explain why Krueger failed in an aesthetical application for 
technology and that artists can potentially apply technologies through a non-scientific approach 
to produce aesthetically potent environments.
Applying Dufrenne's and Pask's concept it can be proposed that the 'events of art 
making' 12 can be mapped onto the 'events of experiencing art'. Following this application it can 
be suggested that this flow is characterised by the artist's externalisation which is then
11 In Pask's (1976) theory there is no such a distinction as human or machines. However, he differentiates entities 
of 'psychological' (P-lndividuals) and 'mechanical' (M-lndividuals). Whereas P-lndividuals are converse, M- 
Individuals provide the matrix of being embedded and observable. P-individuals are only assessable by language 
processor (as M-lndividuals) through conversation as they independent entities. They are also self-reflective and 
self-generative and contrary to M-lndividuals they evident self-awareness.
12 The events describe the various sequences of artistic creation. For instance, the creative process of painting 
includes the use of a brush, the implementation of different techniques, the making of drafts and discussions 
about the work.
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internalised by the receiver13 ; a circulation through which the aesthetic layer of the interaction 
emerges (this concept will be elaborated in chapter 5). It can be concluded that both artist and 
receiver operate within the same artistic qualities of experience during their creative activity, 
producing an immaterial level of aesthetic to which Dufrenne might have referred as the notion 
of'deeper level' (Dufrenne, 1973, xlvi).
Contemporary accounts of technologically-mediated creation, such as by Rokeby (1995), 
emphasise that it is not only the spectator but also the artist who interacts with technology. This 
is a key acknowledgement as it engenders a new, immaterial quality of technology-based art 
production in which the artistic creation concerns a similar process to the spectator's experience, 
interlinked within a dynamic flow. This suggests that technology provides not just a novel 
spectatorship but also a shifting flow of creation, in such a way that both artist and spectator have 
similar dynamic environments in a shared artistic process. Similar to this, Rokeby acknowledged 
the artistic action as a process of experiences which emerges through the spectator's experience. 
He (1998, np.) claims that: '...the process of designing an interaction should also itself be 
interactive. We design interfaces, pay close attention to the user's responses and make 
modifications as of our observations'. His assumption places Dufrenne's concept in the 
technological environment and substantially illuminates the fact that experiences from both artist 
and spectator apply the same equipment but with a different approach (this is explored further in 
the next chapter discussing the tool-medium distinction). Rokeby's claim provides a key 
approach in the way that the active spectatorship in technological production creates a much 
closer linkage of artist and spectator. Whereas in traditional creation artist and spectator have a
13 Pask (1961) described a fluidity between mental processes and reality, it is an intermediation or interactions 
between the material-language-virtual.
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very different environment and experience of creative processes (creating art and experiencing 
art), in this new model the creative processes bare similar qualities through the dynamic of 
interactive technologies. Rokeby illuminates this with the acknowledgment of the new role of the 
artist who is greatly depending on the spectator's actions:
As the role of the spectator is questioned and transformed, so is the role of the 
artist...The act of realizing a work is a process of progressively narrowing the range of 
possibilities by a series of creative choices until one of the possibilities has been 
manifested in the finished work. One might say that the interactive artist decides at 
some point in this process not to choose from among the remaining possibilities but to 
create some sort of audience-actuated choosing mechanism. (Rokeby, 1995, p. 136)
Correspondingly, Bolter and Gromala (2003, p. 36) describes the immediacy through the 
spectator's point of view whose experience recreates the artistic creation process: '...as the 
viewer, you were supposed to be able to reproduce the experience of the artist as he looked on 
the scene (or the imagined experience as he constructed an imaginary scene)'. Evidently, the 
spectator's experiential recreation provides a cognitive flow, which is the inimitable aesthetic 
quality of the interactive artistic system.
It can be argued that, although these conceptions have emphasised an aesthetic through 
the interconnectivity of artist and spectator, since they emerged from traditional modalities of art 
(not technology-based), they could not provide a solution for a realisation of the immaterial and 
remained purely conceptual. Most of the accounts acknowledged the significance of the triangle 
of'artist-artwork-spectator', yet the common encounter of the interconnectivity was 
implemented as a product of technology and not as a significant dimension of an aesthetic. Since 
the technological medium of interaction emerged through Krueger's work, the attention to the 
development of interactive media art shifted from an intuitive interest in artist and spectator 
interconnection to a potentiality of technological interaction. Krueger's solution focused more on
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the process between the system and the spectator, which led to a disregard of the artistic 
generative role. Thus, technology brought an evaluation to spectatorship in which the active role 
of the spectator stands more as a bi-product of the technology rather than a prospective to 
aesthetic. Importantly, it can be noted that conceptual and philosophical perspectives as 
Dufrenne's approach acknowledged the immaterial qualities of artwork, and some accounts 
determinate significant result, but these examples could not engender a drastic impact on the 
practical processes of interactive media art.
In summary, this chapter elaborates on a critical investigation into the initial concept of 
active spectatorship by recognising significant tendencies in the development of interactive art as 
they reflect contemporary lack of aesthetics. Myron Krueger's pioneering practice provided a 
logical starting point, since it mirrors crucial insights into an emerging art form. His work is of 
profound importance in this context, as it illuminates the radical transformation of art brought by 
technology as a medium; however, his legacy of technological art production led to a substantial 
fault, creating an ambiguous model of aesthetic in interactive art.
The problem was found to lie in the traditional materialistic view of art, which did not 
recognise immaterial qualities of the artwork but rather emphasised physical attributes of objects. 
This produces what this chapter argues to be a dualistic model in artistic processes, in which the 
'making art' and 'experiencing art' processes were not considered to be interconnected. The new 
interactive technologies brought a mechanistic understanding to art, which emphasised a 
technological continuum of novelty leading to a fetishist attraction in art production. Artistic 
concepts of interaction only underlined the participatory character of interaction, reducing the 
chances of recognising the crucial aesthetic layer. As such, this old technology-based model of 
art has not provided an opportunity for the new spectatorship to reveal itself in its essence.
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Krueger's model led to an understanding which still worked within the old model, producing an 
object-oriented view through its technological fetishism. It can be concluded here that the 
technology-centred understanding of interactive art could not resolve the initial conceptions, 
revealing the aesthetic challenge of the 'artist-artwork-spectator' triangle. Contemporary 
interactive media art has to reconsider the recognised triangle of'artist-artwork-spectator' and 
bring to it an aesthetic dimension. The aestheticisation of this triangle reveals how artistic 
meaning can be produced through technological interaction. This is achieved by the unification 
of the participatory character and the technological novelty generating a new aesthetic.
As Krueger's initial practice left an ambivalent aesthetic legacy for interactive art, the 
following chapters provide a critical revision of the existing models of interaction, and will 
discuss in particular concepts of participatory art (openness) and technological approaches to 
interaction (responsiveness). It will be acknowledged that the concept of 'openness' would serve 
as a better understanding towards a new aesthetic than that of Krueger's suggested live- 
performance models of participation. Through resituating the concepts of openness and 
responsiveness, it will be argued that is possible to work towards a novel aesthetic in which 




Old Models of Interaction: Participatory Art and Technological
Responsiveness
i. Former Models of Interaction in Art and Technology
In this chapter, two approaches to interaction, which shaped initial accounts of interactive art, as
mentioned earlier in Myron Krueger works (see chapter 2), will be revisited. The concepts of 
'openness' and 'responsiveness' are frequently applied in theories of art and technology and are 
considered here to have impacted upon the dominating materialistic model of interactivity in art. 
In the previous chapter it was argued that these concepts were misunderstood in the context of 
technological interaction because they were not considered in this new context but applied in an 
older scheme of aesthetic. Reflecting on this, it is claimed that, although interactive media art 
emerged from an artistic desire of new spectatorship, it cannot be considered as the further 
development of participatory art as Krueger's practice suggested. Whereas analogue 
participatory art forms displayed an avant-garde aesthetic scheme, the active spectatorship in 
interactive media art is based upon a 'constructive spectatorship' 14 . From this perspective, this 
chapter identifies two major concepts (artistic and technological interactivity) misapplied by 
Krueger which, as it is suggested here, with revision and reapplication, can provide the backbone 
of a novel aesthetic in art. The artistic approach of interactivity, as suggested earlier in chapter 2, 
elaborated by Umberto Eco (1989 [1962]) through the term of'openness' 15 or opera aperta
14 The thesis terminology of 'constructive spectatorship' refers to participatory art forms, which, in their aesthetic 
claim aim for a collaborative contribution of artist and spectator rather than numerous avant-garde real-time 
events that build upon provocation and immediate, unproductive action of the audience. Constructive 
spectatorship emphasises a spectator-artwork interaction by an open artwork.
15 Besides Eco's concept, there are other approaches to the notion of openness that were presented by Italian 
novelist Italic Calvino (1986). The openness in Calvino's work is represented as an unconventional way of 
comprehending novels, that he terms 'hypernovels' or 'literary machines'. They include a system of choice where
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(which translates as 'open work'), depicts most profoundly the meaning of active spectatorship 
in modern art (Figure 3.01). Although Eco's theory is mainly built upon a materialistic 
characterisation of art focused on physical object creation through examples of modern art, it 
provides a significant conception of how proactive spectatorship can be understood. Differing 
from Krueger's reference to Cage's participatory art, Eco emphasised the importance of science 
in artistic production, which, as the following argument will elaborate, provides a more 
applicable version of participation in the framework of technological interaction. In this manner, 
this examination notes that, because Eco did not account for a technological interaction at all, his 
model leaves a conceptual gap between his participatory interpretation of interactivity and 
models of interactive art. Recognising the lack of applications of Eco's model, a re-evaluation of 
openness within the framework of technology is taken up in the following discussion. It will be 
shown that a revision that implements Eco's crucial concept of 'meaning creation' provides a 
new, meaningful conceptualisation of interaction. By applying Eco's resituated concept, it 
immediately reveals the potential of an active spectatorship which comprehends an interaction as 
a unique poetic level of aesthetic. This thesis argues that although Eco's concept was, in its 
earlier applications, misunderstood and implemented as a materialistic approach of openness, on 
the contrary, the new framework of active spectatorship provides an essential ground towards a 
new aesthetic of art.
readers are able to select between different paths. Calvino renews the concept of narratives as he presents a new 
understanding of literary sense. The fusion of different facts of perception creates an open-ended structure. 
Consequently, the emergent narrative has a structure of intertextuality or even hypertextuality as the content 
brings together reality and virtuality. The 'interactive' reading structure dissolves the linearity, single-authority and 
expositional logic and hence generates a field of immersion with a higher degree of interactivity. The outcome of 
hypertextual literary creation is not intentional; the text develops its own life as it is not foreseen or deliberately 
controlled by the author. Throughout, the creative process is not distinctive and represents a multiple transparent 
structure which leaves space for creativity of the receiver. The writing and reading process as a creative act fuse 
together and the reader becomes the writer and the writer becomes the reader. It is open to diverse 
transformation of the literary text. Calvino applies his openness process in various novels, with his 1979 book If on 
a winter's night a traveler being of most note.
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Figure 3.01 Conceptual representation of Umberto Eco's 'opera aperta' (Zics, 2007)
In the same manner as with the treatment of openness, the chapter also examines and re- 
evaluates the conception of technological interaction (in this thesis comprehended as 
'responsiveness', see later in this chapter) and suggests modalities for a symbiosis of meaning 
creation through openness and technologically-emerging responsiveness. Through Krueger's 
work it becomes clear that in early interactive art, technology-driven interaction was the major 
trigger towards an active spectatorship. Therefore, it was noted that by technology brought 
profound changes to the creative process could not reveal its potentiality for art since its initial 
application was situated within the framework of the old dualistic artist-artwork and artwork- 
spectator model. As such, Krueger's concepts proposed new approaches to art but, because of the 
gap between conceptual and practical approaches, it maintained a materialistic model. Through 
Krueger's mechanistic approach and Eco's significant conception of a particular role of science 
in art, this chapter elaborates upon the technological approach of interactivity emphasising a 
significant divergence from what technology stands for in art. Through an investigation of 
contemporary theories the aim is to elaborate the emerging character of interaction within its 
diverse role for technology-driven artistic applications.
Furthermore, this chapter suggests that a conception of technological interaction can 
serve as an evaluation tool for artistic systems; because of its systematic approach, this 
evaluation tool can separate subtle layers of technical qualities in the artistic system. This might 
be useful as it supplies an application for analysis which might demystify technological 
standards that are often falsely claimed in artistic works. In this sense, the account of 
responsiveness provides a dual function in this thesis. Firstly, it re-characterises the technological 
function in art, moving away from Krueger's misinterpretation which explained the creation of 
artistic meaning only through the emerging technological character of the work. Secondly, it
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produces a spectrum of scientific qualities which more clearly describe the degree of the 
technological framework. As such, the term of responsiveness produces a novel interpretation of 
this argument, in that information and communication theoretical accounts are re-interpreted by 
the artistic conception of openness.
ii. The Artistic Account of Interactivity: Openness
Eco's initial concept of open work emerged from a semiotic investigation of literary transcripts
which he explained as potential applications for the creation of multiple meaning and 
interpretation, which can be comprehended as an open system. He developed this concept into an 
aesthetic examination of modem art revealing that open works activate their reader/spectator to 
co-create the artwork. Through this, Eco's concept produces an innovatory understanding of art 
production in which the artist and spectator were linked together in the framework of an 
unfinished work of art (Eco, 1989). Eco used the notion of 'work in progress' to declare the new 
spectatorships whose duty it is to finish the work. The essential point of Eco's proposal is that he 
interlinked the participatory character with what he termed an artistic meaning creation (Eco, 
1989), which he elaborated as multiple meaning perceived by every spectator differently, 
establishing the new characteristic of spectatorship.
Eco's claim of meaning creation is a crucial conception for the thesis because it might 
provide a solution how technology produces artistic meaning based on information theory. 
Elaborating on this notion it has to be noted that Eco differentiate meaning from those qualities 
in art which refer to 'information' or 'message'. He comprehends that whereas information or 
message is the content without an interpretation, meaning is the essence of the work which is 
formulated by the artistic intention and subjectively recovered by the spectator. As such, the
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active spectatorship suggests that single meaning produces a spectrum of interpretation in the 
artwork, which is based on the particular actions of a spectator. In Eco's sense, the degree of 
openness is determined by the balance between the formulated meaning of the artist and the 
acquired meaning interpretation of the spectator provided through the artwork. Therefore, it can 
be said that balance is an aesthetic scale of openness, which elaborates a creative capacity 
between the artistic creation and the spectator's act.
In order to provide a clarification to the allocated error in the applications of Eco's 
original conception, the investigation here defines three different layers of the notion of 
openness. The first layer is Eco's original concept (which the thesis will term as 'semiotic 
openness'), which in his time was a progressive conceptualisation of modern art and crucial for a 
profound comprehension of interactive art spectatorship. In this approach the spectator was an 
active interpreter only in their mental activities, without physically interacting with the work. As 
this model worked within a materialistic framework, in which no structural modification of the 
artwork was enabled, this first layer is unproductive to the thesis' aimed application of openness. 
The second layer relates to applications in interactive art, which recognise Eco's concept as 
being similar to interactive spectatorship but do not re-evaluate this in a new technological 
context, therefore providing a false implementation to art. The thesis will introduce a new third 
layer of Eco's concept (termed as 'structural openness') which identifies his model as an early 
example of the 'artist-artwork-spectator' triangle established in chapter 2, and suggests a re- 
evaluation of the first layer of openness. These three layers serve a main objective of this chapter 
by laying down technologically-mediated openness.
Eco's original concept built on the negation of modalities of art which solidly places the 
artist at the centre of the creation. He examined the Italian theorist Benedetto Croce's (1909
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[1902]) primary idea that declared art is a pure intuition (not logical knowledge) which can 
directly communicate with the receiver's mental apparatus and therefore the artwork and the 
spectator's interpretation has no efficiency in the creation. Croce's model suggests a fairly 
restrained conceptualisation of the spectatorship, ignoring its role in creation entirely. For this 
reason Eco denied this model and argued that the spectator has a crucial status as a translator. By 
characterising openness, particularly in art, Eco engendered a cross-genre art form termed 
'informal art', which is particularly driven from an aesthetic of active spectatorship and is here 
defined as the first layer of (semiotic) openness. Eco stated that the initial characterisation of 
informal art, which he declared as a visual art form, concerned intentions about reproducing the 
phenomenon of 'motion' in the artwork. He referred to painting techniques which tried to 
express mobility, most profoundly identified in the conceptualisation of dynamics in futuristic 
and cubistic works. Eco comprehended these new characteristics as significant as they redefined 
the structure and created deconstructive forms. He declared that artworks exhibiting kinetic 
movement (for example kinetic sculpture) produce a heightened openness and non-reproducible 
experience for the spectator. Exemplifying this experience, Eco depicted that, whilst the artwork 
and spectator are in motion, the spectator chooses his or her point of view, producing the specific 
connections and interpretations. Eco asserted this as the following:
The 'reader' is excited by the new freedom of the work, by its infinite potential for 
proliferation, by its inner wealth and the unconscious projections that it inspires. The 
canvas itself invites him not to avoid causal connection and the temptations of 
univocality, and to commit himself to an exchange rich in unforeseeable discoveries. 
(Eco, 1989, [1962], p. 91)
Through this conceptualisation, Eco's model of active spectatorship declared a different account 
to that presented earlier by performance-based participatory art form. Whereas live performances
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produced a variety of interpretation by the provocation of the audience, Eco explained an 
activation of the audience through the diverse qualities of 'motions' implemented in artwork. 
The similarity of these accounts is that both still elaborate a 'one-way' communication in which 
the spectator is just a receiver with a higher involvement (through the motion of the spectator or 
the artwork).
Interactive media artworks offer the potential of a two-way communication that leads to a 
structural modification of the work (Figure 3.02). A common error of Eco's concepts in 
applications of technology-based art production was the false acknowledgment that they both 
work along an active spectatorship, not acknowledging the diverse quality of artwork-spectator 
interaction. Eco's concept, as it was illuminated earlier, was situated in avant-gardism when art 
and science had rediscovered each other once more and technologies were rarely implemented in 
art creation; therefore he could not characterise a technology-based application. As such, the 
misapplication was caused through a direct use of the avant-garde aesthetic, which merged with 
a new materiality of technology in initial forms of technology-based art. Therefore, the problem 
lies in the application, in which Eco's original concept could not operate effectively, as it was not 
able to produce a meaning to the structural modification of the artwork.
Elaborating on a constructive implementation of openness, this chapter separates Eco's 
initial model, termed here as 'semiotic openness' 16 , from the thesis adaptation of Eco's model 
into the novel technology-based application of'structural or physical openness'. The 'structural 
or physical openness' refers to Eco's (1989, p.87) early proposal of informal art: '...they 
[artworks] characteristically consist of unplanned or physically incomplete structural units'. The 
idea of 'structural or physical openness' is different to the earlier accounts as it triggers explicit
16 A 'semiotic openness' refers to Eco's initial concept of openness that allowed a multiplicity in the interpretation 












Figure 3.02 Conceptual draft: Communication processes in traditional mediums (one-way) and in 
technological mediums (two-way) (Zics, 2007)
changes in the artwork which immediately reflect upon the spectator's experience. A radical 
change occurs, formulated through the generated immediacy between the artist and spectator; 
this allowed for an increase in the spectator's involvement and generated modifications in the 
artwork itself. Through the re-evaluation of Eco's model, in which the artist still carries the 
central role of the creative processes, 'structural openness' was found to provide a new approach 
to art production in which the artist and spectator are interconnected through their experiences 
and so are placed on the same generative level. As such, structural openness is considered the 
meaning creation of interactivity, which is most significantly characterised in the spectator's 
subjective experience and through this generates a unique aesthetic dimension.
Therefore, Eco's initial view that the spectator has a generative role in the creative 
process produced a revolutionary recognition that draws out a new understanding of structural 
openness, in which the concept of meaning creation established an interconnection between artist 
and spectator. Following these claims, it can be suggested that the concept of open work segues 
an immaterial conceptualisation of art. As a result, Eco's dualistic interpretation, in which the 
spectator's activity was reduced to multiple meaning creations, is transformed into a constructive 
model contributing a novel aesthetic of interactive media art.
iii. Meaning Creation as the Crucial Quality of Artist-Spectator Interconnection
As mentioned earlier, Eco's openness is of particular significance, as it provides an account of 
multiple meanings, which signifies the linkage between the artist and the spectator. The new 
adoption of structural openness brought a solution to interactive art which explained meaning 
creation as a solution to aesthetic. Elaborating the meaning creation in technology-based art,
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Eco's application of information theory 17 is particularly meaningful because, through a 
mathematical-based evaluation, it reveals qualities that are not only useful as an aesthetic tool for 
an artist (see chapter 6 discussing a practice aspect of this thesis, the Mind Cupola) but also 
provide new insight and address a new immaterial dimension between artist and spectator. From 
Eco's point of view the artwork is a communication system. A message of the artwork, 
according to Eco, can be described as a carrier of information which, by the means of the 
interaction, transports the meaning to the spectator. He comprehended creative processes as a 
highly compressed information-exchange which displays 'contravention of conventions' and 
therefore exhibits a high improbability and unpredictability:
The meaning of a message is a function of the order, the conventions, and the 
redundancy of its structure. The more one respects the laws of probability, the clearer 
and less and less ambiguous its meaning will be. Conversely, the more improbable, 
ambiguous, unpredictable, and disordered the structure, the greater the information - 
here understood as potential, as the inception of possible orders. (Eco, 1989, [1962], p. 
91)
Eco termed this phenomenon as 'ambiguity' and he elaborated it through the mathematician 
Norbert Wiener's 18 theory of disorder (Wiener, 1948). Wiener's theory explained the message as 
an organised system which might produce disorder regarding its degree of organisation. 
Following Wiener's claims, the mechanical approach evaluated information as order and the
17 Eco presumes that information theory is the science that accounts for the quantity of the information in the 
message. Nevertheless, Eco points out that large quantity of data in artwork does not necessary mean a high 
degree of meaning.
18 Norbert Wiener (1894-1964) is a well-known American mathematician and theorist whose work had greatly 
influenced information and communication theory. He was pioneering in the study of probability theory and the 
development of informational theoretical consideration of noise. He is also the founder of cybernetics which 
examined complex systems, communication processes and control mechanisms and initially established the notion 
of the closed loop or feedback. Wiener also used the term to compare animal and human information and 
communication processes to technological systems, with an eye to the potential development of artificial 
intelligence (llgauds, 1980).
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contrary is consequently the entropy19 . Therefore, from an information theory point of view, to 
increase the information in a message requires an increased probability of noise. Eco proposes 
that the level of disorder is immediately linked to unpredictability and multiplicity; therefore, 
multiple meaning in art is an aesthetic challenge of disorder. He further suggested particular 
tools with which to achieve ambiguity in art; for example, encountering accidents and chance in 
experience or using 'uncommon connections' or 'unusual laws' to create wonderment in the 
experience (Eco, 1989, p.94).
With his conceptualisation of information theory, Eco built a strong connection to other 
participatory forms mentioned earlier in Krueger's account, which differ from Eco's theory of 
informal art, as they are built upon the structurally altering potentiality of technologically- 
mediated art. It is argued here that, through the concept of openness, it is possible to observe 
where Krueger's error lay in its application using John Cage's aesthetic claims of spectatorship. 
As a consequence, it can be suggested that Eco's model of meaning creation also provides a 
potential tool to evaluate Cage's participatory understanding. From this perspective, John Cage's 
work was entirely based on the idea of indeterminacy, which he conceptualised as the 
participatory involvement of the audience. In a similar manner to Eco's suggestions of 
'uncommon connections' or 'unusual laws' (Eco, 1989, p.94), Cage (1961) suggested the model 
of'chance operation' which processed patterns of sound and silence involving accidental voices 
in the performance to avoid closed structures in the creation, as, he claimed, was common in 
traditional art. The usual physical manifestations of art through his model were replaced by 
sound, movements and gestures, which constituted his formulations of meaning creation based
19 In information theory entropy means the measurement of uncertainty with regards to random variables, 
random processes and dynamical systems. It is based on Shannon's theory of communication (1948), which 
quantifies the expected information value in the message (Gray, 1990). In this respect noise in the communication 
channel means a high uncertainty or entropy in the dynamic system.
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on an aesthetic oscillation of order and disorder. Through imitating nature-like processes, which 
generate close interaction between chance and audience selection, Cage enabled the audience to 
make their own interpretation, with the result that the audience and creator were equally involved 
in the meaning creation. One of Cage's well known performances was his instruction of a 
performer to sit at a piano and to raise the keyboard cover at the beginning of the piece and then 
remain motionless for 4 minutes and 33 seconds. The piece finished with the act of closing the 
keyboard cover and bowing to the audience. In this performance Cage conceptualised the chance 
events drawing the spectator's attention to a re-discovery of everyday sounds as meaningful 
events. Cage's participatory art introduced a particular form of interaction which focused on 
more destructive ideas between artist and spectator, producing a very particular aesthetic. From 
this perspective, Krueger's misinterpretation of Cage's work lay on this particularity, as Krueger 
could not deal with the deconstructive qualities of aetshetic in technology; therefore, he only 
partially applied Cage's model, losing his original aesthetic message. As a result Krueger's work 
inherited a participatory character without a particular aesthetic for technology-driven 
spectatorship.
Since the thesis has revisited and resituated the old participatory art forms of live 
performance and semiotic openness within an aesthetic declaration of the errors of Krueger's 
work, it will now suggest a particular application of information theory as meaning creation in 
technological art, elaborating Eco's declaration of ambiguity for art. Eco states that an artistic 
system needs both certain forms for obviousness within a practical function and a characteristic 
of ambiguity, the oscillation of which creates novelty in the meaning. Eco depicts the example of 
the Byzantine mosaic that includes both a formal system through the matrix of the mosaics and 
an ambiguity through the repeated representational forms. Thus, the entire matrix of the mosaic
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encompasses the message in which every mosaic has its own place and angular offset. As the 
system has to communicate a clear figurative signal from a particular perspective, the colour and 
angle of the bits within a collaborative process duplicate each other's signals. Through the 
ambiguity of the particles it produces a clear noiseless message of a holistic figurative 
representation. The argument here proposes that, in the same manner, an interconnectivity 
between technological interaction itself and artistic meaning creation can be comprehended. 
According to Eco's assumption, an ambiguity between action and reaction informs an aesthetic 
layer; thus, between the spectator activity and the artistic meaning, an unambiguous and 
heightened openness of an aesthetic experience might be created. In this thesis it is proposed that 
informational theory for meaning creation provides meaningful ways for an aesthetic in which 
the artist's decision on proportion of order and disorder produces the quality of interaction.
Importantly, this chapter acknowledges that this new technologically-mediated meaning 
creation is not only based on artistic content (seen earlier by Eco's semiotic openness) but also 
on the technological surface or interface (which later in the thesis this will be called 'medium', 
see chapter 4 for more). This new character of technology in art is defined by the fact that 
technology is not only a tool in the creation processes but also constitutes an aesthetic 
representation which is the artwork itself. It carries novel functionalities which lead the spectator 
to a wonderment of ambiguity by the artistic message. As such, in structural openness the 
medium itself becomes part of the meaning. Through this character it can be suggested that Eco's 
ambiguity concept can be applied in a more general sense, pointing out that interactive media art 
applies both a formal system which is obvious (in the form of the technology) and an ambiguous 
artistic content, to which the novelty of technology belongs. Therefore, designing artistic 
interfaces (using technology as medium) is understood to reproduce Eco's idea of an oscillation
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between functionality and content production within the novel surface of meaning. As a 
consequence, artistic interfaces have to diverge from the typically technology-driven interfaces 
because they are created with the requirement of both functionality and artistic meaning creation 
(chapter 4 expands upon this, discussing the transparent medium). One application of 
information theory in art production is that Eco (1989) declares that a 'controlled disorder' is the 
crucial decision that the artist has to make between the functionality and artistic content for a 
noiseless interconnection between artist and spectator. This recognition is significant since 
Krueger dismissed interaction through a formal application and, instead of a meaning creation; 
he prioritised the functional certainty of action-reaction. Krueger, after his initial work of 
Glow/low, continually attempted to improve the functionality of interactive technology, whilst 
ignoring the possible artistic meaning of interactive processes which did not implicitly rely on 
powerful functionality. As such, Krueger's work missed the opportunity for recognising that 
concepts of participatory art are not just about participation but also about a meaning creation as 
well.
The interconnection between the artist and spectator can instead be described using Eco's 
meaning creation, in which the spectator's actions have subtle meanings towards a novel 
experience. When the interaction embraces meaning creation, the artwork generates a poetic 
level which might produce a new knowledge in the spectator's consciousness (which will be 
expanded upon in chapter 6). Through Eco's account, Krueger's deficiency is accounted for, 
since, instead of applying a meaning to the actions, he worked towards functional solutions. 
Eco's multiple meaning has shown that interactive technology is able to evolve a crucial artistic 
dimension, which does not initially rely upon how effective the technology is. Therefore, Eco's
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concept of meaning creation in the framework of technology-based art production provides a 
crucial conceptualisation of interactivity, allocating significant quality towards a new aesthetic.
iv. The Technological Account of Interactivity: Responsiveness
The previous sections of this chapter have highlighted that approaches based upon information
theory, despite their general mechanistic approach, can offer a meaningful application which 
should not be understood as an aesthetic scheme but rather as a tool for creation. This chapter 
will now examine the technological account of interaction, which provides an emerging 
character that enables new ways of artistic expression but which in itself cannot articulate an 
aesthetic. The discussion emphasises that understanding technological potentiality is crucial to 
art, and therefore it has to be defined in a sophisticated framework to avoid the misapplications 
in aesthetic produced in initial accounts of interactivity. It is also crucial to clarify that this 
emerging quality is a mechanistic approach which dynamically redefines itself within a 
technological effectiveness that often produces an attractive novelty to art. As an aid to art in 
comprehending these characteristics it is suggested that modularity identified in order to help the 
evaluation and application of technology in creative processes. The argument here will point out 
that interaction can be applied only in the framework of structural openness if it ought to 
generate an aesthetic dimension through interactive technology.
This chapter examines a technology-driven interaction through the notion of 
'responsiveness'. As no common account exists for the specific role of technology in art, the 
thesis builds upon a cross-disciplinary investigation of media theory, communication theory and 
information processing theory which attempts to summarise scientific approaches of technology 
that assert a machine-centred quality of the interaction. The notion of responsiveness describes
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here a reaction capability (such as feedback) and its various qualities in the system; this reveals 
the technological aspect of an interactive system. Practically, responsiveness appears on the 
technological surface of the system as the 'interface', which is the artistic medium on which the 
spectator is invited to act upon.
The approach that this chapter focuses on is the characteristic which bares most similarity 
to interactive artworks, the so-called human-computer interaction (HCI). The theories show an 
agreement that interactivity is an over-used, under-defined concept (Heeter, 2000) and cannot be 
defined by a single description because of its multiple characteristic (Braman, 1989). As a result, 
the discussion initially attempts to recognise a meaningful application for art, which enables a 
differentiation between diverse technological qualities and subtle states of the system. In order to 
achieve this, this chapter will outline numerous theories exemplifying meaningful 
characterisation of responsiveness. Identifying an appropriate approach, the argument here draws 
out a potential model for technologically-mediated interactivity which meaningfully applies 
technological capacities in the creating art process and in the same manner evaluates this based 
on scientific models. This model does not claim an aesthetic quality of interaction but provides a 
useful tool to artists.
In this respect, there is a common approach formulated in numerous accounts (Dance, 
1967; Winograd, 1977; van Dijk, 1985; Durlack, 1987) which links technological interaction to a 
desire to recreate a quality represented in human-to-human communication:
... face-to-face communication is held up as the model because the sender and receiver 
use all their senses, the reply is immediate, the communication is generally closed 
circuit, and the content is primarily informal or adlib. (Durlak, 1987, p. 744)
This suggests that a technological approach to interaction can be understood as a desire for the
highest degree of unexpected action in the machine and human information exchange; thus, it
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aims to mimic human-like communication. The idea of humanised interaction was suggested 
initially by the English scientist Alan Turing, who introduced the 'Turing-test' (Turing, 1950). 
This test attempted to inquire into the question of whether machines can think or rather are able 
to produce intelligence. Turing's model was based on the assumption that machines have to 
perform as humans do, and in order to measure this he set up his 'imitation game'. In the test, 
two agents are questioned, a human and a machine, and their responses examined based on the 
hypothesis that they were human. Turing presumed that if the two results cannot be differentiated 
from each other, the machine is 'intelligent'. Although the Turing-test never truly gained a 
success as machines were far from acquiring human capabilities, Turing's concept stands as a 
symbol of working towards a desired level of human-machine interaction. More importantly, 
interaction through Turing's imitation game was described as a 'degree of humanisation', which 
enabled a measurement of responsiveness according to the degree of stimulation. The way 
Turing elaborated interaction led to a higher complexity of interaction, termed Artificial 
Intelligence (AI). AI is a prospect of interaction aiming to model intelligent systems with 
heightened interaction, which might provide an answer for Turing's vision and therefore also an 
answer for technological interaction.
Whereas the 'Turing-test' generated a vision of mechanistic accounts of interaction, 
interactive technologies only produced qualities which were far from characteristics of human- 
to-human communication. In order to elaborate on a spectrum of interactive qualities in 
technologies it is necessary to allocate theoretical treatments that efficiently display these layers. 
As it was mentioned earlier, a model of interaction cannot be generalised, but only specified; 
therefore the following discussion focuses on particular interactive technologies and their 
applicable qualities in artistic productions. In this respect, it will focus on the particular
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interactive medium of VR20 in art as it exhibits a variety of qualities and degrees of interaction. 
By addressing this perspective, the intention in this thesis is to select a comprehensive model of 
interaction which is able to evaluate the degree of interaction in an interactive system.
In the contemporary conceptualisation of interaction, various accounts have been 
characterised that often provide only a theoretical explanation without a coherent practical 
model. Numerous theories explain interaction, for example, as a 'style of control' (Guedj et al., 
1980; Rafaeli, 1988; Finn, 1988; Rogers, 1995) which evaluates interactions through its features. 
Accordingly, Rafaeli (1988, p. 110) stated that: '...one of the distinguishing dimensions [of 
interactivity] is the level of control the consumer has over the information system'. In a similar 
manner, Finn (1988) described interactivity as the sender/receiver proportion of control in the 
creation and presentation of the message. Thus, concepts of the 'style of control' elaborate on 
how well the user can act in the system, particularly using characteristics such as timing, 
selection and to what extent the system is able to 'control' the user. Through the potential to 
control and the quality of its displayed content, the 'style of control' accounts for the degree of 
controllability. Extending this towards a model of multiple qualities, Sally J. McMillan and 
Edward J. Downes (2000, p. 157) suggest that the primary characteristics of 'control' and its 
'amount of distribution' should be considered, as well as the characteristics of 'action-reaction 
efficiency' and 'perceived goals'. As such, the thesis acknowledges that the features-based 
approach elaborates significant aspects; however, in a comparable manner to that which 
McMillan and Downes have illustrated, this single process is not able to sufficiently elaborate 
characteristics produced in artistic VR systems. A particular feature analysis is only useful when
See also Krueger's account earlier in chapter 2.
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an artistic system specifically uses this tool as meaning creation (see earlier in this chapter; 
structural openness).
Besides concepts that allocate interactivity in features, the other broadly treated concepts 
of interactivity are approaches which describe interactivity through the 'quality of the message' 
(Rafaeli, 1988). Rafaeli (1988, p. 120) explains responsiveness as: '...feedback that relates both 
to previous messages and to the way previous messages related to those preceding them. With 
the term 'contingency view', Rafaeli claims that interactivity is a 'process-related construct' with 
its own entity. Thus, interactivity is not implicitly a feature of the medium as seen by the earlier 
models but rather a quality of information exchange (Rafaeli and Sudweeks, 1997, p. 3). The 
interactive system in Rafaeli's account is suggested to generate a response which, to a certain 
extent integrates the user's previous responses. In his view only relatedness beyond action- 
reaction evaluation can describe interaction. Applying Rafaeli's concept, the first level is 'non- 
interactive' or 'declarative' (Rafaeli and Sudweeks, 1997) in which interaction constructs a one­ 
way communication without a feedback system. The second level is the 'reactive interaction', 
which dictates that the message has just one immediate response: a system in which just one 
party is really active. Thus, it does not represent a feedback system but is 'quasi-interactive'; 
though the user can achieve changes, the recursive system only responds on a limited level. The 
'fully interactive system', as Rafaeli classifies it, not only communicates an open message but 
also precede it with a qualitative response, which means that the roles in the communication are 
interchangeable between the participants. Rafaeli concludes that full interaction can be achieved 
just by technologically-mediated human to human communication. In a similar way to the earlier 
accounts of'style of control', Rafaeli's model provides meaningful elaborations towards a 
mechanical definition of interactivity. Yet, because it only focuses on characterisation of an
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exchange and does not account for a great variety of interaction levels, the discourse here does 
not apply this for artistic system production and evaluation.
Although the simple process models of 'style of control' or 'quality of message' describe 
important characteristics of how interaction can be understood in the context of technology, they 
do not provide a scheme for the artistic creation which represents subtle and multiple dimensions 
of interactivity. The problem possibly lies in the fact that these conceptualisations focus only on 
conflicting, various qualities of interaction, but do not examine variety within one medium, such 
as the interactivity between two different web-pages. As a model does not exist which describes 
qualities in such a high complexity of the medium, the investigation relies on models which 
mainly focus on 'media interactivity' 21 but are able to provide more dimensionality in the 
interconnectivity of qualities. Even though the outcome of this investigation offers a model for 
responsiveness in artworks, it still remains provisional due to the need for further re-evaluation. 
This is caused by the earlier mentioned emerging characteristic of technology, which produce 
higher complexity or novel structures extending and refraining existing modalities of 
responsiveness.
Working towards an efficient model of technological interaction, the following argument 
will undertake an investigation into multi-dimensional approaches of interactivity (Laurel, 1986, 
1990; Heeter, 1989; Goertz, 1995), which might provide a more suitable evaluation towards 
responsiveness, as they embrace multifaceted characteristics of interaction. Through an 
investigation into the multiple characterisation of interactivity, most particularly the spectrum of 
qualities, complexity and functionality, the thesis allocates Lutz Goertz' (1995) four-dimensional
21 The term 'media interactivity' in this thesis refers to a tendency in media and communication theory to describe 
interactivity as a spectrum of qualities in media and differentiating those qualities from each other (for example 
interactive TV from internet). This approach does not elaborate on a spectrum of interactivity within one particular 
medium.
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approach as being particularly useful22 . Goertz' model draws out more than 500 patterns of 
interaction through his criteria of degree of choice available', 'degree of modifiability', 
'quantitative size of the available selections and modifications' and 'degree of linearity/non- 
linearity', exhibiting a wide spectrum of qualities required in artistic applications. All of these 
dimensions contain their own separate continuum which Goertz valued with a degree of 
interactivity rated between 0 and 4. Through this, it can be suggested that responsiveness offer 
meaningful application through Goertz' model providing subtle differentiation of interactive 
qualities in particular artistic systems.
The first dimension of Goertz' model is concerned with the amount and variety of 
possible options during the viewer's reception (see Appendix 1.1). This dimension differentiates 
between predefined choices, such as those given by web-sites, and where the options are 
multidimensional and users can reach different levels of experience, such as in VR. The second 
dimension is the 'degree of modifiability' (see Appendix 1.1), which describes the potential of 
creation for the user; namely to what extent the system can create new content through the 
actions of the user and the potentiality to store the messages. Applying this to interactive art, this 
dimension can be exemplified through two diverging approaches. The first approach describes 
the modification through the spectator's real-time actions creating a particular time-space 
experience and in this way does not fulfil Goertz' requirement of storing the content. The other 
approach, which fulfils Goertz' proposed quality of storing, is when the user's action is captured 
and saved in the system or, even more, their action modifies the system. In this approach the 
spectator's act does not disappear but is recallable or permanently affects the system's status.
22 There are numerous concepts which use multiple characteristics to describe interactivity such as Brenda Laurel 
(1990) and Carrie Heeter (1989); however, the investigation here understands these as not the most meaningful 
application for interaction of artistic systems.
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Through this it appears that Goertz' concept of the quality of saving capability builds more upon 
the requirements of technologies which are used in the 'making art' process (more extensively 
explained as the concept of 'tool' in chapter 4) rather than technologies which are itself artistic 
presentations (more extensively explained as the concept of 'medium' in chapter 4). This 
dimension allows the user the highest input of change. The third dimension (Appendix 1.1) is the 
'quantitative size of the available selections and modifications' which describes the quantity of 
the two former dimensions (Goertz, 1995, p.487). Lastly, the 'degree of linearity/non-linearity' 
(Appendix 1.1) refers to the qualities of information narrative, such as the tempo or progression 
of information, during the time of user communication. As an example, on one hand a movie 
provides the viewer with a system where they have no influence in the temporal sequences, 
whereas on the other hand hypertext would provide highly connected information.
This multiple model of interaction, here elaborated as a potential model of 
responsiveness, describes a more meticulous scheme, as it provides a spectrum of interaction 
with particular combinations and degrees of quality. Although some criticism claimed that 
Goertz' model is not coherent in practical application, as it produces too many variables and the 
third and fourth dimensions might be repetitive (Jensen, 1998), through this chapter's argument 
it can be pointed out that artistic systems can be meaningfully evaluated only through this 
multiplicity that defines the subtle differentiations of responsiveness. Furthermore, the argument 
presumes that through using a multi-layer structure, redundancy can be reduced by simply 
blending out unimplemented dimensions, producing a compact tool for technological potentiality 
in interactive systems.
Accommodating Goertz' systematic approach as a framework for interactive media art 
production, this chapter's argument suggests a particular differentiation, as was acknowledged
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earlier by Goertz' second dimension, between 'implementations as tool of the artwork' 23 and 
'implementations as medium of the artwork' 24 . The two approaches, which will be elaborated on 
in the following chapter as the division of tool and medium, describe diverse characteristics and 
functionalities in the creative processes; therefore, they need to be treated separately as they are 
seeking diverse kinds of responsiveness. The 'making art' 25 process, in which technology is used 
as a tool, stresses qualities which provide a high degree of modification through which high scale 
information is transformable (for example programming languages and modelling software). In 
the 'experiencing art' process26 , where technology is a representation (as in artistic interfaces), 
there is more emphasis on the qualities which immediately effect the user and do not carry a 
complexity of provided information (as in certain interfaces which may be easier to learn) 
(Figure 3.03). Therefore, technology as a tool is related to qualities provided in the second and 
third dimensions and technology as a medium is linked to qualities of first and fourth 
dimensions. This chapter has also identified that there are variations in, and overlaps between, 
the 'technologies as tool' and 'technologies as medium', because artworks are often multifaceted 
in their technological qualities. It has been emphasised that an application of Goertz' model as a 
tool for analysis on established artworks might dissolve the artistic mystification that often 
occurs in technological elaborations of art systems, hi this application a state of interactivity 
serves to describe qualities of the artwork without an aesthetic declaration.
23 Implementing the tool means using the technology in the 'making art' process; for example, when the artist uses 
specific software to create, program and model the work of art.
24 Technology as medium is mostly considered as an interface or other functional unit of technology. It is significant 
to the argument here as the user with this surface of technology interacts. As such, the design of this surface 
shapes the user's perception. Therefore, this type of implementation bears different qualities from the tool.
25 The 'making art' process refers to the creative process when the artist produces its artwork. It also described as 
artist-artwork interconnectivity.
26 The 'experiencing art' process refers to the creative process when the spectator is confronted with the artist 
produced artwork. It is also know as artwork-spectator interconnectivity.
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Figure 3.03 Conceptual draft: tool and medium as applications of 'making art' and 'experiencing art 'processes
(Zics, 2006)
As such, it has been recognised in this chapter that applications of Goertz' model on art 
production or on complete interactive media artworks exhibit diverse processes. An application 
in art production characterises an implementation which uses the technology's emerging 
character as a tool (but not meaning) of aesthetic. This is based on the thesis' observation that in 
interactive art production artists create not only artistic content but the technology (artistic 
interface) as well. From this perspective, the technology provides a new layer of meaning and 
also still serves as an instrument for the creative process. This acknowledgment is key since 
many of the misunderstandings emerge from this novel characteristic of art creation (that 
technology is also a medium), which mistakenly elaborates emerging qualities as a meaning. The 
argument in this chapter criticizes this approach and points out that this concept is what produced 
the mechanistic bias in Krueger's legacy. The constructive application of technology, as it is 
proposed here, concerns a technological functionality that is intrinsically linked to artistic 
meaning; therefore, technology in art does not stand for itself but as support of the artistic 
concept and experience.
However, a meaningful application of the mechanistic model is the technological analysis 
of the artwork through Goertz' four-dimensional model. This model might offer a useful 
conception since interactive media artworks often provide technological descriptions which do 
not concern the original contribution of the technological development. A recognition of 
emerging qualities in the artwork is significant, since they often influence the 'artistic meaning 
creation' and also because the functionality might contribute to other, perhaps non-artistic, 
technological developments. Goertz' systematic analysis enables to make this gap between 
conceptualisation and application visible. Although the systematic technological analysis does 
not provide an aesthetic improvement, it enables validation of conceptual claims, in particular
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the interconnectivity of technology and artistic vision and how far technology provides an 
emerging or creative character. This application is effective through an independent evaluation 
applied on the artistic system, as such possibly not from the artist.
Through the overview of contemporary concepts of interactivity, a particular approach 
has been identified, which uses interactive technology for creative knowledge or experience and 
has not yet been explored through a systematic evaluation based on technology. The models of 
interactivity, which usually emerge from information and media theory had to be re-evaluated 
using an analysis of interactive systems, which do not attempt to compare media (as in many 
earlier models, including Goertz') but describe the degree of interaction in a unique interactive 
media artworks. Goertz' model assists and evaluates aesthetic qualities revealing the 
potentialities of the novel role of technology in art production. From this point of view, the 
emerging character of technology is a quality but does not determine the aesthetic. This thesis 
furthermore attempts to establish a new approach to how interaction treats attributes of choice, 
modifiability, available modifications, linearity or non-linearity as tools of meaning with which 
the emerging character of technology can be improved, refined and combined in new ways. As a 
result, the emerging character of technology means not an amplification of unknown sensations 
of technology but an extension of earlier characteristics of artistic meaning creation.
In summary, this chapter has resituated two major concepts of technology-based art 
production: openness and responsiveness, which, in re-evaluation, serve as useful modalities in 
establishing a new aesthetic in interactive artworks. Eco's semiotic openness has been re- 
evaluated as structural openness, which re-allocated the spectator in the same generative role as 
the artist's technologically-mediated creation process. Through this new understanding, which 
depicts technological interaction as an application of structural openness and meaning creation, it
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has illustrated Krueger's practical errors which were located in the false interlinking between 
participatory character (openness) and technological quality (responsiveness). The identification 
of this by the thesis brings an immaterial dimension to art, which is identified as the meaning 
creation and aesthetically interconnects the artist with the spectator. The revision of the role of 
the technological quality of the artwork has further amplified the dimension of immaterial 
aesthetic as it situated emerging characteristics of technology into a tool function instead of an 
aesthetic quality. In this view, technology in art represents a unique implement, which, by means 
of experience, enables immaterial qualities of art and so provides an innovative perspective for 
artists in their practice.
The critical revisions in this chapter produce a useful application providing the grounding 
for a new aesthetic model for interactive media art. The outcome of this chapter's investigation, 
which characterised a novel immaterial dimension in art, is that has opened up an insight into art 
production which will be discussed in the following chapter through Heidegger's 
phenomenological theory of technology. The application of Heidegger's concept to the term of 
'invisible tool' will address the earlier mentioned division of technology into tool and medium 
within an evidence-based declaration of immateriality. This will provide a solution to how the 
earlier recognised 'artist-artwork-spectator' interconnection might be understood as a new aspect 
for an aesthetic within interactive media art.
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Chapter 4
Technology in Art: Invisible Tool and Transparent Medium
i. The Philosophy of Immaterial Art
This chapter attempts to establish a philosophical conception based on the framework of
phenomenology, which has recently been recognised as meaningful for practical approaches to 
human-machine interaction (Ihde, 1991; Dourish, 2002), but has not been considered specifically 
for technology-based art production. With this, the thesis seeks an experience-based approach 
which can serve as a relief from the Krueger inspired mechanistic comprehension of interactivity 
in art. Through the re-evaluation of Eco's participatory account of openness and Goertz' 
technology-driven responsiveness the thesis has prepared the foundation for strategies to revisit 
Krueger's misguided aesthetic. In their new formulations these accounts emphasise a meaning 
creation of interaction where the interactive technology is only a potential instrument for the art 
production and not an aesthetic solution itself. Through this critical revisionist approach it 
reveals an understanding for art which has the potential to describe the characteristic of the 
'artist-artwork-spectator' triangle accommodating an immaterial layer of technology-based art 
production.
The phenomenological approach in the thesis serves as a solution to Krueger's 
mechanistic view of art, as it is based not on formalised knowledge but on the phenomena of 
experience. From this perspective, this chapter's discourse focuses, in particular, on Heidegger's 
concept of the tool which, it will be argued, provides a model for describing technology through 
a cognitive and immaterial encounter. Comprehending tool-usage through experience in a 
Heideggerian sense provides an object-oriented ontology of technology which in this thesis will
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be termed 'invisible tool', and declares an interaction between an interface (the tool) and its user 
as being cognitive processes.
The term 'invisible' emerges from Heidegger's conceptualisation of the tool which he 
comprehends as something that is invisible through which things become visible (Heidegger, 
1967 [1927], p. 97). Invisibility in Heidegger's case refers to the phenomenon he described as 
the tool disappearing for its user during its use (which he termed as 'ready-to-hand', described 
later in this chapter). Based upon a meaningful elaboration of technology-based art production, 
the thesis draws out the essential understanding of Heidegger's concept that the 'invisible tool' 
can be applied to both physical and cognitive properties. In many previous applications of this 
concept these two perspectives have mostly not been differentiated27 and led to many 
misconceptions.
In order to avoid similar errors, this chapter suggests differentiating Heidegger's original 
concept and its application through other interpretations, to generate a meaningful understanding 
for technology-based art production. In one account invisibility stands for a non-material quality 
in art, which claims that technology-based creation opens up an opportunity for experience-based 
applications, which result in a dissolving of physical object creation. This means that there are no 
actual physical properties involved in the production of the artwork, but that the instruments are 
embedded in the user's environment. The other conception that emerges from Heidegger's 
writings, and one that in this thesis is assigned as an absolute necessity, is the cognitive 
modelling of the 'tool-user' (in this argument's case, the spectator/user) which embraces 
technology as an affection of the spectator's psychological processes. As will be exemplified in
" In many concepts the one characteristic triggers the other. For example, a physical invisibility of technology 
might produce a cognitive physical phenomenon that, however, in most concepts is comprehended only as a 
quality of invisible characteristics (see later in the chapter's argument).
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this chapter, both conceptions make meaningful contributions to the creative processes, but the 
latter is the one which lays down a backbone for a new aesthetic for interactive media art.
Heidegger's phenomenological understanding leads to fuller consideration of Goertz' 
responsiveness, which produces a particular division of technological implementation in the 
creative process as either tool or medium. The division helps to account for agency in the 
interconnection of artist and spectator, elaborating on the creative processes as a linkage between 
them. This chapter's main contribution is a re-interpretation of Heidegger's invisible tool in the 
context of interactive media art, through which artistic interfaces (the medium) are considered 
not only as an invisible but also a transparent entity. The relationship between the invisible tool 
and transparent medium and their particular reflection on the spectator's experience (later 
described in this thesis as the concept of immersion) moves the argument towards a new 
aesthetic of interactive media art.
ii. Heidegger's Invisible Tool
Heidegger's influential philosophical approach which built upon the writings of Edmund Husserl 
(1920) negated a formal mechanistic understanding from the sciences and envisioned a 
philosophical approach based on subjective experience. Heidegger, as a student and developer of 
Husserl's work, established his phenomenological approach in his text Being and Time (1927). 
Applying this text as the primary source of this chapter's discourse, Heidegger's essential idea of 
the tool will be introduced in an attempt to produce a practical account for art that conceptualises 
his metaphysical approach. Although Heidegger, in his later work (1949/1954), enriched his
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phenomenological conception of technology28, this discussion will rely on conceptualisations 
which provide a novel insight into technological applications for art and the new spectatorship 
(discussed earlier in chapter 2). As Heidegger's philosophy most frequently relies on a 
hermeneutic approach within a particular rhetoric, this investigation will attempt to remain 
within his terminology, expressing the aspiration of the thesis of providing a comprehensible 
articulation of his idea.
Heidegger's concept is one of the original comprehensions of object-oriented ontology, 
which has been rethought by many scholars since (Schultz, 1932; Merleau-Ponty, 1962; Ihde, 
1979; Harman; 2002) and also applied in practice (Winograd and Flores, 1986). The primary 
approach of Heidegger's tool argument arises from questioning the meaning of 'Being'. To 
comprehend the tool within the framework of the Heideggerian philosophy, an investigation into 
the ontological conception of Being, which immediately links to Heidegger's understanding of 
the world, seems necessary. The central notion in his philosophy is Dasein ('there-being'), 
which, in Heidegger's view, is the essence of being human and describes a quality of self- 
awareness. Heidegger asserts that Dasein means 'Being-in-the-world' as it occurs in the present; 
however, it has to be clarified that being-Dasein does not equate to an objective presence of 
Dasein but to that which in the terminology of the thesis may be described as an invisible 
essence of Being. This key distinction profoundly clarifies Heidegger's view, explaining that the 
essence of Being is a priori 'within-the-world'; it is independent of the knowledge of physical 
representation. In this respect, tools (Heidegger used the broader term 'Things') are entities that
28 Heidegger's work The Question Considering Technology (lectures in 1949, first published in 1954), which is often 
seen as only an fragment and unfinished proposal, through a hermeneutic framework turns to ethical issues of 
modern technology suggesting that technology has to be understood within its essence otherwise it is a supreme 
danger to human kind. The thesis acknowledges this aspect of Heidegger's theory on technology but since it does 
not contribute to the thesis argument it does not discuss it further.
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show themselves within-the-world in our concern of Being-in-the-world. Heidegger's 
comprehension of the 'world' is maintained by the totality of Things, which are in this context 
constituted by the tools ('things-at-hand', 'things objectively present') and being-Dasein.
The common idea of Heidegger's concept of tool is that there is a distinction between 
what a person does with a tool and the manner in which a person thinks about a tool, hi applying 
the tool it becomes invisible to its users during its implementation, thus becoming an extension 
of them. The objective presence of the tool only occurs if it breaks during its application. Thus, 
the terminology of invisible tool, introduced here, proposes an approach which understands 
technology not according to physical qualities but to an immaterial, experience based approach.
Heidegger's more particular terminology of tool, besides the earlier mentioned Thing, is 
'equipment' (das Zeug), which through its ontology elaborates on a novel characteristic of tool 
implementation. Heidegger (1962, pp. 96-97) explains equipment as: '...that which one has to do 
with in one's concernful dealings' 29 . The Heideggerian equipment does not describe only the tool 
as it is, but the tool within its task, such as writing, sewing, working, transporting or 
measurement. In particular, he suggests that there is no such a thing as equipment, just the 
'totality of equipment', to which the 'Being of any equipment' belongs (Heidegger, 1962, p. 97). 
Heidegger refers here to the characteristic that all equipment in someway describes its relation to 
all other equipment, and thus the role each has within the system of a 'totality of tools'. 
Therefore, equipment is always 'something to order to', and the totality of equipment displays 
the various ways of 'in order to' which can be 'serviceability', 'conduciveness', 'usability' or
29 The notion of 'concernful dealings' emerges from Heidegger's hermeneutic application of the Greek word of 
'praxis'. He insists that praxis refers to the concernful dealing with 'pragmata' (which is in Greek 'things'), meaning 
that they are 'in order to something'. What Heidegger emphasises with concernful dealing is that tools are 
comprehended according to their function and application and not to their appearance in disinterested 
contemplation. This is what later in the chapter will be called as the condition of 'ready-to-hand'.
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'manipulability' (Heidegger, 1962, p. 97). Applying this, there is a Being of tool and a Being of 
something 'in-order-to', which, although both occur as 'equipment' within the world, are 
described as one being materiality and the other immateriality. Heidegger explains this through 
an example of the hammer, to which 'in-order-to hammering' is assigned. Using the hammer 
signifies only the action of functionality in which it is experienced, but not the hammer itself. 
The technology disappears in one's hand as the user focuses on the immediate performance of 
the tool. Heidegger terms this condition of the tool as 'ready-to-hand' (Zuhandenheii) because 
the tool, through the experience of the user, is fused with the body. He describes this 
phenomenon with the hammer example as:
The hammering does not simply have knowledge about the hammer's character as 
equipment, but it has appropriated this equipment in a way which could not possibly be 
more suitable... the less we just stare at the hammer-Thing, and the more we seize hold 
of it and use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it become, and the more 
unveiled is it encountered as that which it is - as equipment. The hammering itself 
uncovers the specific 'manipulability' of the hammer. The kind of Being which 
equipment possesses - in which it manifests itself in its own right - we call readiness- 
to-hand. Only because equipment has this 'Being-in-itself and does not merely occur, 
is its manipulability in the broadest sense and at out disposal. (Heidegger, 1962, p.98)
In order to return the tool's presence as an object and making the user aware of it, its 
functionality must be damaged. A broken hammer loses its functionality and becomes what is 
described in Heideggerian terminology as being 'present-at-hand'. Heidegger claims that the 
hammer, in the act of 'presentness-at-hand', shows its 'equipmentality' and becomes invisible 
through 'readiness-to-hand' and thus it 'withdraws'.
Applying Heidegger's object-oriented ontology to technology (ready-to-hand and 
present-at-hand), Paul Dourish (2001) describes an interaction through invisible tool as:
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I act through the mouse; the mouse is an extension of my hand as I select objects, 
operate menus, and so forth. The mouse is, in Heidegger's terms, ready-to-hand. 
Sometimes, however, such as when I reach the edge of the mousepad and cannot move 
the mouse further, my orientation towards the mouse changes. Now, I become 
conscious of the mouse mediating my action, precisely because of the fact that it has 
been interrupted. (Dourish, 2001, p. 109)
In Heidegger's ontology within-the-world means being present-at-hand, thus Being-in-the-world 
characterises the ready-to-hand. Whereas 'readiness' for Heidegger is the 'Being of beings' 
initially encountered by Dasein, the 'objective presence' is the concern of Being of beings, 
which emerged through what Dasein encountered at hand. As such, Heidegger suggests that 
Dasein reveals itself through human experiences (by implementation of the tool) which are 
embodied (cognitive invisibility) and embedded (physical invisibility) in the world. 
Heidegger claims that the world and encounters within it, only fragmentarily 
acknowledge the essence or readiness-to-hand of entities because humans account for the world 
through presentness-at-hand. He (1962, p.69) states that an objective and every-day encounter is 
not able to establish a comprehension of the world in its essence: 'That which is ontologically 
closest and well known, is ontologically the farthest and not known at all'. Andrew Collier 
(2003) meaningfully explains the Heideggerian differentiation between readiness and 
'objectness', referring to a frequently acknowledged gap between practical and theoretical 
knowledge:
That the world of our practical concern, composed of the ready-to-hand and understood 
implicitly by what Althusser world call 'knowledge in a practical state' is necessarily 
both historically and biographically prior to that given by theoretical knowledge, and 
remains closer us even when we have theoretical knowledge. (Collier, 2003, p. 187)
Through Collier's interpretation of Heidegger's ideas, it is possible to suggest an experiment- 
based approach that would operate against a mechanistic notion of encounters, determining the
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world through immateriality. Comprehending this is crucial as it establishes Heidegger's 
essentiality in the framework of immaterial account (ready-to-hand) in opposition to materialistic 
conceptions (present-at-hand).
As such, the phenomenological formulation of invisible tool contributes a substantial 
diversity to the earlier mechanical comprehension of interaction exemplified by Goertz. 
Heidegger's conceptualisation of human action has emerged from recognising a lack in 
formalised scientific views and established a model which suggests that knowledge occurs not 
only through contemplation but by practical engagement. Through this suggestion he contributes 
a substantial understanding to immateriality, declaring that it is not the physical presence of the 
object but one's participation and experiences that make tools comprehensible. Underpinning 
this in one of his late writings, Heidegger extends his phenomenological view of equipment, 
considering technology as an immaterial matter:
Because the essence of technology is nothing technological, essential reflection upon 
technology and decisive confrontation with it must happen in a realm that is, on the one 
hand, akin to the essence of technology and, fundamentally different from it. 
(Heidegger, 1977, p. 4)
The notion of 'essence' here refers to the cognitive processes triggered by the technology and not 
to the ontological quality of an object. Through this evidence-based philosophical 
comprehension this chapter's argument suggests that technology cannot be accounted for via 
objectness or by technological productivity, as it was displayed in Krueger's work, but by 
readiness-to-hand, through an interconnectivity between the tool and its user.
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As mentioned earlier in this chapter there are two prevalent approaches to the 
interpretation of Heidegger's concepts30 , which will now be examined as applications of the 
invisible tool. One approach understands invisibility as a physical quality with the object 
becoming invisible, the other as a cognitive quality, which argues that during tool-usage the 
experience is characterised by a quality that ignores every other externality during this activity. 
The former considers the immateriality of an object, the latter the quality of awareness, which 
often reflects on the physical qualities of the tool. Whereas Heidegger considers entirely the 
latter aspect, the diversities in invisible tool applications arise through the various perspectives 
on the body-mind problem31 . In some conceptions the tool is perceived not only as cognitively 
invisible but also as physically invisible, assuming the existence of an object whether it is 
perceived or not. This thesis acknowledges that interaction might exhibit features of physical 
invisibility (for example embedded technology), which is not particularly an application of
30 There are other concepts that explain invisibility and transparency regarding the phenomenon of affection by 
technology. Although they provide different perspectives on this terminology, in order to be able to differentiate 
them from the thesis points of view a short overview will be provided. For Greg Elmer (2002) transparency and 
invisibility are the abilities to understand technology as a working construct. For example, the automobile is 
transparent to us in a sense that its mechanism is commonly known. Elmer claims that 'these technologies 
'transparently' laid out their 'rational workings' the invisible magic of the automobile is contained in its cylinders, 
but no one would imagine the 'horseless carriage1 contained miniature horses under the hood' (Elmer, 2002, p. 
14). Alternatively, post modern technology, as Elmer explains, has to hide functionality in order to encourage the 
every day experience. As a result, Elmer states that the digital machine is opaque and the average user denounces 
any attempt to reveal its internal workings. New technologies are everywhere yet they remain quite invisible. He 
argues that digital technology is impenetrable and that it is this 'invisibility that creates a mythic power for new 
technology, its magic power" (Elmer, 2002, p.15). Another account of transparency by Larry A. Hickman (1988) is 
the notion of 'transparency effect', which can be seen as another application of Heidegger's invisible tool. He 
argues that there is a danger in the habitualisation of technology. 'Transparent effect' is the situation, facilitated by 
technology, in which the observer (user) is not conscious of the processes anymore. Hickman (1988, np.) points out 
that the observer is not able to render the situation because s/he is fully immersed into the effect of the 
technology and therefore the situation from his or her point of view becomes uncontrollable. He explains this in 
the following: This complex effect has to do with areas of our experience that we have habitualised, of which, 
therefore, we are not directly conscious-Even though we are not asleep, there may be great areas of our 
experience that have become transparent to us, or which we fail to recognize for reasons other than their opacity'. 
31 The body-mind problem is a long-term discussion in philosophy that has produced a variety of views of body and 
mind interconnectivity. This thesis takes the view to which phenomenology refers to, as it sees body and mind as a 
unity, however, it declares that there is a great spectrum in the quality of this interconnection.
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Heidegger's concept but often claims cognitive invisibility as well. These two approaches, 
handled here separately, allow the conclusion that creating a tool is a mental modelling of the 
user and not a physical object creation, which in a Heideggerian sense means the tool is either in 
use (ready-to-hand) or broken (present-at-hand).
In this respect, one of the most direct applications of Heidegger's invisible tool, which 
suggests meaningful ways to understand technologically-mediated experience as a cognitive 
process, is Don Ihde's (1979) notion of'embodied relations' 32 , which was later further 
developed as 'embodied interaction' by Paul Dourish (2001)33 . The main intervention of Ihde's 
experimental phenomenology is that he revises Heidegger's concept through qualities of man- 
machine interaction. Critiquing Heidegger's concept as it only accounts for two conditions of 
tool implementation as being in usage (ready-to-hand) or broken (present-at-hand), Ihde points 
out that the tool is not only a perceptual extension of the human but is based upon learned 
relations, which means humans inhabit tools by using technology. He explains these embodied
32 Besides embodied relations, which Don Ihde considers as first level, he introduces two other levels of 
technological implementation ('hermeneutic' and 'technology cocoon') out of which the characteristic of 
'technology cocoon' is akin to the application of invisible tool as embedded technology (see later in the chapter). 
Ihde argues that these two characteristics are a reconsideration of Heidegger's invisible tool as he did account for 
the impact of these concepts. As such, the second level of hermeneutic relation is used for the exploration of the 
world. Here the interconnection between world and machine is considered, which Ihde describes as partial in 
opacity. As an example, Ihde describes the exploration of macro and micro phenomenon or revealing invisible 
realm which generated new layers of knowledge giving a reconsideration of the man-world relationship. The last 
level of technological mediation is the condition of ubiquity or what Ihde describes as 'technology cocoon'; man 
lives in an artificial environment where technology embodies him. In this, machines are embedded in life and 
affect the way in which mankind expresses itself. In this level transparency becomes a territory. Technology 
cocoon represents various levels of transparency which apply diverse methods: the first level is through the 
technology, the second with technology, and the third within the technology. All three characteristics provide a 
useful artistic application. The first level, as seen before, opens up consideration for the practical implementation 
of transparent interfaces. The second level allows for implementation of technologies which may reveal new 
information both human and environmental (for example: thermal imaging, galvanic skin response, EEG). The third 
level gives opportunities for the artist to consider higher levels of complexity in technologies as the environment 
embodies their usage serving for models of the spectator.
33 Also a practical model for HCI (Human Computer Interaction) design in which technology is approached not from 
a mechanical comprehension, as earlier stated by Goertz, but rather from a phenomenological point of view.
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relations between man and machine as a quality of the tool's readiness in interaction, displaying 
its diverse grades of transparency34 :
With this we have one type of human-machine relation, an experience through machine. 
The correlation structure of intentionality remains, in that I do experience something 
other than the machine being used, and at the same time, my experiencing is extended 
through the machine for that intentional fulfilment. I may thus describe the chalk as 
having partial transparency relation between myself and what is other. And in fact, the 
better the machine, the more 'transparency' there is. (Ihde, 1986, p. 141)
Both Heidegger's invisibility and Ihde's transparency assign the disappearance of the tool 
through interaction to the fact that the person becomes cognitively immersed during its use. 
Thus, while the mind is immersed the ordinary awareness of the body dissolves. A differentiation 
is claimed by Ihde as he explains that a tool cannot be instantly invisible to its user. There is a 
learning process of tool-usage (later in this chapter called 'mastering the tool') - especially using 
tools with new functionalities - when the tool is still visible and only cognitively disappears if 
there is an embodied relationship (the tool is mastered) between the user and itself. Thus, it can 
be declared that Heidegger provides an account only for invisibility regarding the condition of 
the tool, whether or not the tool is applied. More profoundly, Ihde's conception of embodied 
relations focuses on the condition of the user; that is, how far one can recall knowledge related to 
the particular experience. This explains how invisible the tool is to the users, defining a cognitive 
quality of the tool-usage.
The concept of embodied relations is further expanded by Paul Dourish who introduced 
the idea of 'embodied interaction' 35 . The thesis identifies Dourish's conceptualisation as
34 This does not cover the same meaning of transparency as that of this thesis (see later in the chapter).
35 Dourish explains that 'disembodiment' is a contradictory notion to embodiment, through which he (2001, p.102) 
claims that experience in the VR is 'disconnected observation and control'; therefore is inefficient (the thesis 
handles the term 'disembodimenf with a diverging approach; see later in the chapter). Dourish negates the 
pattern of interaction in VR because humans do not have inhabited knowledge about it and therefore cannot
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significant as it provides a more holistic understanding of the invisible tool and potential 
practical applications for artistic interfaces. Dourish declared that the epistemology of the body 
suggests an embodied model of cognition arising from the learning process through body 
experiences, which Dourish explained as follows:
Embodiment is not a property of systems, technologies, or artifacts; it is a property of 
interaction. It is rooted in the ways in which people (and technologies) participate in the 
world...Our actions cannot be separated from meaning, which both makes our activities 
meaningful and is itself transformed by them. Embodiment is about engaged action 
rather than disembodied cognition; it is about the particular rather than the abstract, 
practice rather than theory, directness rather than disconnection. (Dourish, 2001, p. 189)
This proposes that experience-based knowledge is saved in the memory and can be recalled by 
the same bodily action. For example, the learning process of driving becomes embodied 
knowledge and therefore the car can disappear for its user. In this manner, 'embodied design' 
develops a particular understanding of interaction that suggests interfaces can be designed in a 
way that produce a balance between the process of recalling experience-based knowledge and 
the learning process of the tool (interface). This conceptual innovation, which later in this 
chapter will be handled as a significant characteristic of 'mastering the tool', provides an 
important explanation of effective technological (not artistic) functionalities as connective 
processes of the spectator.
Ihde's notion of transparency should be resituated into a notion that here will be 
understood as invisibility. This differentiation is crucial to the argument, as the notion of
produce effective engagement. The rejection of virtual reality systems within unknown properties of interactive 
engagement emerges from Dourish's philosophical beliefs, formed from a phenomenological view. He sees 
Cartesian Virtual Realities as a loose copy of the world without the embedded meaning triggered by the real world. 
The things that Dourish negates in his theories are the things that artists find crucial in VR, hence creating a new 
world, giving new symbolic forms and language and revealing new understanding towards the 'real reality'. 
Therefore the thesis emphasizes that Dourish's concept of embodied interaction might give a comprehensive 
solution for a designer towards to an improvement and better understanding of the technology mediated world; 
however, artists cannot just rely on inhabited knowledge as the world restricts their artistic creation on known 
models of the world.
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transparency is reserved as another characteristic of interaction, describing the crucial quality of 
artistic interfaces (see later in this chapter for further explanation). Therefore, embodied 
interaction provides an expanded notion of the invisible tool and so describes invisibility in 
cognition through the embodied knowledge between tool and user. What is novel in Ihde's 
theory is that it suggests a state of cognitive transition of tool application, in which process the 
tool is still presentness-at-hand (visible) but already shows qualities of readiness-to-hand 
(invisible). These qualities will be comprehended as significant to artistic interfaces as they 
provide a guideline for functional applications of interactive technology. An effective application 
of mastering the tool means a cognitive immersion (see later in this chapter) of the user into the 
artwork.
Another application of Heidegger's invisible tool, which is based on technological 
functionality, is in the invisible equipment. As invisibility is here understood to be a cognitive 
quality, it has to be clarified that invisible technology does not always produce invisibility in 
experience and a non-invisible interface might also generate cognitive invisibility. Numerous 
accounts claim an interconnection between physical and psychological dimensions. Mark Weiser 
(1988) embraced physical invisibility as a quality which immediately provides an immersive 
experience. With this he draws out a characteristic of 'embedded technology' 36 which means an 
environmental invisibility that Weiser (1988, np.) comprehended as: '...so imbedded, so fitting, 
so natural, that we use it without even thinking about it'. Importantly, Weiser's observation 
refers not only to a physical invisibility but explains that the invisible tool in the experience 
determines how conscious the person is during the implementation of the tool. In this matter
36 Embedded technology means being embedded in the nature or environment so that the user does not perceive 
great changes in interaction with these machines.
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physical invisibility means a cognitive invisibility as well. The same inter-linkage between 
psychological and physical qualities has been described by Heer and Khooshabeh:
There is a distinct aesthetic appeal to rendering systems physically invisible, but total 
invisibility, and the lack of feedback and control that implies, is obviously undesirable. 
From the psychological perspective, designing calm or ubiquitous technologies is 
clearly a valuable goal, but just what factors are involved in creating such systems are 
often not elaborated - many times it seems assumed that these invisible technologies 
will be amenable to a simple walk-up-and-use paradigm. (Heer and Khooshabeh, 2004, 
p.2)
This approach identifies that physical invisibility often leads to simplicity in function which 
despite creating a psychological invisibility, does not provide enough functional multiplicity. 
Therefore, it can be proposed that, in Heer and Khooshabeh's view, physical invisibility is still 
much more connected with the quality of embedded environments than with particular cognitive 
qualities. Embedded technology aims for the disappearance of objects for a fuller quality of 
experience and therefore technological tools are embedded in the environment to become a part 
of the everyday life experience. Heer and Khooshabeh (2004, p. 4) describes this as 'invisible 
computation', aiming to infrastructuralise computing which moves a desktop application: '... into 
more diverse and immediate contexts of use'. Tolmie et al. (2002) proposes the most profound 
interpretation of this interconnectivity, suggesting an emphasis on cognitive qualities which can 
be produced by physical qualities. He suggests that invisibility is not a literal transformation into 
the physical, because it would exclude the most important characteristic of the interface, the 
cognitive qualities. He introduces the term of 'invisible in use' with which he draws out the issue 
of a bipolar application of invisibility:
The notion of 'invisibility in use' is a difficult idea. Its full implications for the design 
of technology have not yet been discovered. Often 'invisible in use' is understood as 
meaning literally (perceptually) invisible as enabled by the miniaturisation of 
computational technology that allows devices to become smaller and (perhaps) 
perceptually less visible...The aim is not for a hidden computer. Indeed a computer that
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behaved as computers currently do and required the same form of interaction but which 
could not be seen or heard could be more remarkable, more present than before. The 
challenge for design is to go beyond simply focusing upon the perceptual qualities of 
devices and to make computational resources that can be unremarkably embedded into 
routines and augment action. (Tolmie et al., 2002, p. 404)
Tolmie et al. acknowledge that interaction design needs to consider both the desire for physical 
invisibility and also non-distortion of cognition. They suggest that the centre of every interaction 
is the cognitive process which can be supported through the conception of embedded (physically 
invisible) technology but is not necessarily considered an application. From this it can be argued 
that interactive media art production has to consider both a Heideggerian invisibility and 
physicality, with the acknowledgment that only a cognitive invisibility can provide effective 
interaction.
There exist examples of creative applications which reveal how the invisible tool can be 
understood as a cognitive quality. Scott Amron's switch-hook creation called 'Off" (Figure 4.01) 
presents the example of the everyday scenario of someone taking off his/her coat and hanging it 
on a hook, which 'hooks up' the light connection in the installation. With this device Amron 
creates invisibility for the act of coming, and leaving, home. His design serves to reduce the 
noise between the different levels of affection during the crossing of the threshold when coming 
in and out; by linking two oppositional actions together he produces a smooth cognitive 
transformation. The action of hanging is a metaphor of being home; thus the act of switching on 
the light transforms the event of hanging into electrical energy. The event of coming home, 
hanging the jacket and turning the light on are metaphorically assimilated, producing an 
'invisible experience'.
Another example is prominent in automotive design where the sounds of different
mechanical parts of the car are designed to make the driving experience more intense. In this
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Figure 4.01 Scott Amron's light 'switch-hook' titled' Off' (Amron, 2007)
case, in a similar way to the media artistic implementations, the interaction between man and 
machine is at the centre of the design experience. The 'psycho-acoustic' research is based on the 
subjective human perception of sound and its aim is to create an aesthetic experience of driving 
through balancing emotional states according to sound variations.37 In this instance the invisible 
tool is created through cognitive modelling of psychoacoustics.
Overall, designing interactive technology involves a need to comprehend its 
phenomenological quality, thus creating the spectator's chain of actions. Seeking invisibility 
means an experience design which reflects the spectator's cognitive status within the 
technological function. In this sense, invisible tool is not an object but a quality of the resulting 
experience in the spectator's consciousness. It concludes that Heidegger's phenomenological 
framework and its application provide a thoughtful resonance on the earlier recognised lack in 
Krueger's approach to interaction. Heidegger's original contribution to interactivity manifested 
an approach which explains the thesis earlier recognition of an 'artist-artwork-spectator' 
relationship and so provides a primary solution to an immaterial aesthetic in art.
iii. The Potential of Heidegger's Invisible Tool for Artistic Application
To apply Heidegger's invisible tool on the previously established 'artist-artwork-spectator' 
triangle as a potential solution towards a new aesthetic, this section will suggest unpacking the 
division of technological application as tool and medium, which was touched on in chapter 3. 
The tool is the technology that is applied in the 'making art' process; consequently the medium is
37 For instance, the car manufacturer BMW creates a complete soundscape for the car interior to enhance 
emotional response (Thoma, 2007). The invisibility is produced through the sound feedback as it comforts the user 
and generates an aesthetic pleasure through the activity of driving the car. Therefore, designing the sound emitted 
from the engine is an aesthetic response to the acceleration of the vehicle, represented through the particular 
acoustic that the design of the car provides. Thus, there is a difference between how a sports model sound 
compared to a limousine, even if they carry the same engine.
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part of the 'experiencing art' process. This claim arises as technology-based artworks use 
technology not just in the creation process but in the artwork itself. As such, the argument here 
suggests that Heidegger's model of tool can be implemented not only on technologies which are 
most likely to be used in non-artistic applications and serve for the art production (see earlier in 
this chapter) but also on the technologies which represent the artwork. Through this claim, 
technologies used in the triangle's initial processes (the making of the artwork) will be termed 
tools, as according to Heidegger's invisible tool, and technologies which are implemented in the 
latter processes (the experiencing of the artwork) will be termed as medium, referring to their 
representative character. In this matter, this chapter reclaims a novel application of the invisible 
tool, which provides a solution to technology as a medium.
The key point that this chapter acknowledges is that artist and spectator use the same 
equipment but with diverse qualities. Both artistic and technology-based theoretical accounts 
have identified that technology assists in different qualities in the work of art and artwork 
(Lansdown, 1988; Paul, 2003; Walter, 2004; Lovejoy, 2004); however, the discourse here takes a 
more particular examination. Whereas these concepts relate to a mechanistic evaluation without 
a profound investigation and application of those qualities, the examination in this chapter aims 
to build up an immediate connection to an immateriality, recognised earlier through the artist- 
spectator relationship. In other words, it will be claimed that the art production (tool) and art 
experience (medium) require diverse means of technological application because they produce a 
cognitive 'creative flow' 38 between them.
38 Creative flow here elaborates on an interconnection between artist and spectator. The concept will be later 
revealed in the framework of Csikszentmihalyi's psychological investigation (see chapter 5).
85
To provide an evidence based examination, this chapter's argument builds on existing 
accounts which underpin the later proposal for an application of invisible tool as artistic interface 
or medium. John Lansdown characterises this division in the following:
...tool: in which the computer is used to help us to do things that could be done more 
laboriously or more slowly by hand; medium: in the way that printing, or oil painting, 
or lithography can be seen as a medium; catalyst: in other words, as a way of inspiring 
new creative approaches to art and design; smart apprentice: as assistant having enough 
intelligent to explore new possibilities and approaches when shown how to do so. 
(Lansdown, 1988, p. 147)
Lansdown's definition shows that technology offers a spectrum of application relying on the 
function in the creative process. The thesis' examination is focused only on the diversity of tool 
and medium because these applications are based on creative processes, and not on the artistic 
content creation, as with the other classification mentioned by Lansdown. The notion of the tool 
in this investigation is comprehended as an instrument of artistic creation, the notion of medium 
as the artwork itself. Thus, although the categories of'catalyst' and 'smart apprentice' describe 
important qualities of technological contribution to artistic content, they do not contribute to the 
thesis' primary investigation of artist and spectator relationship.
The technological tool and technological medium model draws out a key characteristic of 
technology-based artworks, which provides a basis for segregation from artworks implementing 
either a 'traditional tool' 39 or a 'traditional medium'. To accommodate this quality, the argument 
here suggests outlining a matrix of tool-medium schemes, which helps to the understanding of 
the status of technology in artworks and therefore helps to the comprehension of their
39 The thesis understands traditional implementations that are forms of medium or tool using established 
techniques, and technologies, which throughout art history may be considered as well known representations of 
artwork. New technologies and artistic implementations cover every kind of new technological development, 
emerging technologies and creative technologies. It is important to distinguish these as many artworks using 
technology cannot be considered as technology-based because they do not exhibit technology as a creative tool.
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characteristic for a technology-based aesthetic. Besides the implementation of tool and medium, 
which are both technological in interactive artworks, it is possible to draw out four patterns 
which exhibit the entire spectrum of the artwork's qualities (Figure 4.02): (1) tool: traditional 
and medium: traditional, (2) tool: traditional and medium: technological, (3) tool: technological 
and medium: traditional, (4) tool: technological and medium: technological. These classifications 
are meaningful to the thesis, since they clarify the misinterpretation of artworks claiming to be 
technological although they follow 'traditional' aesthetic claims. These artworks apply 
technology rather as a replacement of traditional methods or as an aid in art production, rather 
than a holistic application with its own aesthetic. In this respect, it will be emphasised that 
artworks which are only fragmentally technological cannot be considered as technology-based 
artworks because they are 'remediative' applying a hybrid scheme (for example digital prints as 
a technological tool or digital documentations of traditional artworks as a technological 
medium). This perspective is suggested by Jay David Bolter and Richard Grusin's (2003, p.83) 
notion of'remediation', which is: '...the making of new media forms from older ones', emerging 
from the specific feature of technology as medium and operating not just through its 
technological function but in the way in which it relates to earlier and alternative technologies.40 
Bolter and Grusin assign this as follows:
40 One such example that Bolter and Grusin (2003) depict is that of paint software that builds upon methods of 
traditional art practices; yet their quality is far behind traditional implementations. Such tools of remediation do 
not help the artist to express their intention in a remediated environment. The inadequate understanding of the 
tool as an artistic implement is reflected in the issues of remediation. Towards a solution, it will be suggested that 
artists need to understand technology-based art not as a formulation for replacement of traditional methods, but, 
as an exploration of technology in its own essence for extension of a range of artistic expression. In every age of art 
novel, means for creation were developed; however, the demands of new media are understood in the 
perspective of previous forms of art in order to implement independently and approach its spectator effectively.
87
«* - - *°s>.
Figure 4.02 Conceptual draft: The matrix of artworks based on their qualities in medium and tool
(Zics, 2006)
Whenever we focus on one aspect of a medium (and its relationships of remediation 
with other media), we must remember to include its other aspects in our discourse. In 
the case of film, for example, when we look at what happens on the screen (in a 
darkened theatre), we can see how film refashions the definitions of immediacy that 
were offered by stage drama, photography, and painting. (Bolter and Grusin, 2003)
As such, Bolter and Grusin describe that the danger of remediation through new media is 
justified only by their long-standing qualities, which reached a satisfactory conclusion in their 
original context. This approach led to frequent misuse of new technological media that 
multiplied old characteristics without an adequate aesthetic claim. Therefore, this chapter 
proposes that hybrid tool-medium applications often exhibit a misinterpretation of tool, in which 
the creative processes are much more linked to remediation (digitalisation or transfer to 
analogue) than to innovation of emerging technology. A remediation of analogue to digital or 
digital to analogue, however, cannot display artistic continuity. The main cause is that they do 
not produce an active flow between the creative processes and, as such, are not able to fulfil the 
aesthetic aim of immediate and authentic experience (Bolter and Grusin, 2003). Thus, the 
process of remediation breaks down the continuity of flow, causing less invisibility (invisible 
tool) in artworks. It can be concluded that technological tools and media bare crucial 
characteristics, as they display generative qualities of cognitive processes, creating continuity 
between them. Technology-based artworks, in which both tool and medium display dynamic 
means of creation, greatly diverge from earlier media as they enable an immaterial encounter of 
aesthetics.
Thus, technology-based artworks resituate art production and representation through the 
technologically-mediated creative processes, which is facilitated by the triangle. The artwork is 
now a system which comes into presence by means of technological interaction; it is a
representation of 'tool-using' (the creation of the artwork) and itself as a medium (the spectator
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experiencing the artwork). The initial artist-artwork act is the creative process of 'making art' 
where the artist uses tools in order to express their concept. The tool potentiality lies in a 
readiness-to-hand as seen by Heidegger, which can only occur through the artist mastering the 
particular tool for that creative process. The most profound characteristic of a technological tool 
is its permanently emerging nature through its continuity and dynamic qualities, as discussed 
earlier in responsiveness (see in chapter 3). Because of this particular emerging characteristic, art 
production is often formulated as a 'creative collaborative process' (Fischer and Nikkei, 1997) 
which occurs when the artist, in order to realise the potential implementation of technology, 
collaborates with specialists, scientists and programmers (the same emerging characteristic in the 
medium often enriching the artistic meaning with its novelty). The process describes a 
constructive arrangement where the artistic intention compromises the specialist's knowledge 
and the technological potential:
Visual interaction design [or other technology-design] is viewed as a process of seeking 
for compromises between what is desirable (expressed by the designer) and what is 
possible (expressed by the programmer). In the collaboration, each of the designer and 
the programmer collects, represents, interacts with, and reflects on various types of 
representations. (Nikkei, Yamamoto and Aoki, 2001, p. 103)
As such, it can be suggested that programming skills and activities serve as non-mechanical 
tools41 of creation. Artistic and scientific collaboration brings a new dimension to the creation of 
artwork, which opens an explicit layer to the artist-spectator interconnection, in which human 
skills are invented for an immediate interconnection between tool-artist and artist-spectator. This 
emergent feature of the 'making art' process is substantial as it generates a novel pattern of art 
production, which profoundly changes the traditional actions of tool-usage. Through this feature,
41 This thesis produces the notion of 'non-mechanical tool' to assign a quality that is produced by human skills in 
the application of tool. Non-mechanical tools represent a specific quality, in which not only the tool's capacity but 
also the quality of the application assigns the superiority of the tool.
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the artist handles not only the beneficial scientific expansion but also the reduction of co- 
authorial processes.
The other part of the triangle, the artwork-spectator interconnection, is represented by the 
technological medium which is the artwork itself. The medium is one of the most crucial 
formulations of the 'tool', characterising a particular artistic conceptualisation through which the 
spectator's experience is carried out. It is the surface of the system (screens, interfaces) existing 
in that particular moment in time, on which the quality of the artistic creation builds. The centre 
of the medium is the interface, which is a 'sensitive membrane' of the artwork, where the artistic 
idea interacts through the technology with the spectator's expectations. In interaction, the 
spectator's attention draws upon the surface of the interface where the artistic content through 
that particular experience emerges. Here, the earlier classified physical visibility or invisibility 
becomes part of the representation of the artistic decision. Visible elements are tactile, visual and 
wearable sensors; all physical objects of spectator interaction. The invisible utilities are 
technologies (such as sensors, motion tracking cameras, position trackers or pressure mats) 
which are embedded in the artistic environment and are not noticeable to the spectator.
A crucial characteristic, on which one of the original contributions of this thesis is based 
upon, is that technology as an artistic interface provides a revolutionary quality differing from 
other technological applications. As the artist designs the medium, it can be noted that not only 
the content of the artwork but also the tool itself is formed by an artistic formulation. This 
chapter claims a novel interpretation of Heidegger's invisible tool, incorporating this with the 
earlier account of meaning creation by Eco, which, in the artistic interface, assigns the 
Heideggerian condition of presence-at-hand. Therefore, it is proposed that all technology 
requires 'invisibility' to function, which is understood in a Heideggerian sense as readiness-to-
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hand; however, technology as an artistic medium has a crucial character as an artistic surface, 
which is the characteristic of presentness-at-hand. Present-at-hand, as described here, means not 
a functional visibility, as in the application of tool, but rather as a layer of artistic meaning, 
which ensures that the artist, through creative technologies, supports the artistic content. 
Supporting this claim, Masaki Fujihata (2001) proposes that the interface should not be invisible 
but instead transparent. He suggests that the interface should have some visibility as it is also a 
part of the artistic meaning creation. The innovative artistic interface bares layers of new 
meaning, which allows novel exploration for the spectator:
...a sophisticated interface is called 'transparent', if it connects human and machine 
without any stress...I would like to say 'interface' must not be invisible. Interface is an 
object or an icon which sends some signals to the user, which attracts you to do 
something, which shows what it is connecting to and what you can make possible. 
(Fujihata, 2001, np.)
Fujihata depicts the 'transparent interface' as something that sends signals to the spectator, 
compelling them to act, revealing connectivity and possibility in the artistic content. Whereas 
HCI designers (see the earlier applications of Heiddeger's theories by Dourish and Ihde) claim 
invisibility for technology, artists inventing interfaces argue for a non-invisible interface. Similar 
claims were characterised in Rokeby's (1995, p.133) conception of'transforming mirrors', in 
which he argues that: '.. .the medium not only reflects back, but also refracts what it is given; 
what is returned is ourselves, transformed and processed'. The idea of the mirror as technological 
reflectivity is not new; one of the most influential concepts was raised in McLuhan's concept of 
'extended man' (1964), in which, drawing on Freud, he builds an analogy with the Greek myth 
of Narcissus42 , who was numbed by his mirror image and the technologically-generated effect.
42 Marshall McLuhan (1964) believed there was an analogous relationship between the mirrored self-image of the 
Greek mythological hero Narcissus and the technological devices of modern man. Narcissus embodied the well
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McLuhan's concept recalls the notion of tool-usage that applies embodied knowledge (how 
effective the by spectator acts with their learned knowledge); the numbness Narcissus encounters 
can be understood as the not yet embodied knowledge and thus illustrates the amount of artistic 
innovation that is provided by the interface. This is what Rokeby (1995, p.133) sees as the 
artist's interest; to 'explore the meaning of the interface itself as opposed to the engineer's 
interest in keeping the illusion of invisibility. Jay David Bolter and Diane Gromala (2003, p.27) 
take the 'mirror' concept further and claim that: 'If we only look through the interface, we 
cannot appreciate the way in which it shapes our experiences'. Their concept of 'windows and 
mirror'43 allocates a similar dualistic characteristic to Fujihata's concept, in which the window 
describes a transparency (in the thesis' terminology this quality is understood as invisibility) and 
the mirror quality describes a reflection which, as Bolter and Gromala (2003, p.6) claim,
known human nature of narcosis (numbness). The experience created a shock situation where numbness is turned 
into immunity to the world and exists just for his own reason. The characteristic is signified in the myth when Echo 
attempted to win Narcissus's love with his own speech, but the numb youth understands as an appearance of his 
lover (self-image). The mirror conveys the possibility of being extended. Narcissus was in the moment, numbed 
when he saw his mirror image. The fascination with this extension generated a new psychological condition 
whereby his awareness was transformed in his own repetition. While the organism tries to maintain equilibrium 
the entire being is in numbness. This is comparable to some mental disorders where the patient, after the sampled 
shock effect, is unable to develop evident behaviour pattern.
43 Bolter and Grusin explain the window and mirror concept through the earlier established notion of remediation. 
In this application remediation (borrowing and refashioning previous media) is used as a conception to illuminate 
their other terminology of immediacy and hypermediacy in order to account for transparency and opacity. For 
Bolter and Grusin, remediation is a drive of immediacy or a way to produce the perfect medium of illusion. This is 
what is called the 'desire of disappearance' (in this thesis: invisibility). Bolter and Grusin argue that Western 
representationalism has s long term tradition of immediacy. The medium is a window through which the objects 
are represented. One example is the linear perspective which creates an illusion of a 3D world in VR. Leone Battista 
Alberti (1956, [1435]) described this perspective as a 'window of the world'. Immediacy evokes the need for 
hypermediacy. Hypermediacy is the medium mixing of various 'old media'together to make it visible. With the 
effect of remediation one becomes aware of the new characteristic of the medium, hence immediacy produces 
hypermediacy. The intense awareness towards the medium, by the WWW desktop interface, enables the user to 
control the usage of the medium. Hence hypermediacy generates and reflects not only the object of 
representation but the media themselves. Instead of trying to dissolve the technology/medium (being in the 
presence of the object) as immediacy, rather it emphasises the characteristic of the medium (being presence in the 
media). The 'window and mirror' concept is an artistic approach to the interface which describes the interplay 
between being aware and being immersed in the medium. This is what Bolter and Gromola (2003) call an 
oscillation between transparency and opacity.
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oscillates between invisibility and opacity. They observe that technological approaches dictate 
that the interface will disappear, although the expectation is that awareness returns at the right 
time and in the right place. Bolter and Gromala claim that artistic interfaces choose a different 
application and avoid a full illusion in functionality, applying the 'mirror strategy', which they 
explain as:
When we watch a film, we can sometimes get so absorbed in the story that we may 
temporarily forget about everything else, even that we are watching a film at all. The 
film as an interface has become transparent for us. Sometimes however, we want to step 
back and appreciate how the film was made. This awareness enriches the experience of 
the film. (Bolter and Gromala, 2003, p.27)
The same claim emerges from Tiffany Holmes's (2002) notion of 'dynamic seeing', which 
explains the essence of the artwork not as the interface itself but rather the design of one's 
experience through the interface. Similar to Fujihata, she describes an oscillation between 
visibility and invisibility that occurs through the spectator's processes of mastering the tool and 
uses this ability to explore the content of the medium.
I would argue that the most engaging component of interactive works is not the actual 
action or gesture performed by the navigator but rather, the process of actively learning 
to self-direct one's own passage through a piece. The interactive art experience is one 
that blends together two individualized narratives. The first is the story of mastering the 
interface and the second is about uncovering the content that the artist brings to the 
work. (Holmes, 2002, p.90)
By taking these views into account, it can be proposed that artistic interfaces44 claim a dualistic 
quality, which in a Heideggerian sense means being ready-to-hand (invisible) and present-at- 
hand (visible) at the same time. This particular capacity is the key claim for the artistic interfaces 
in this thesis, which so profoundly diverge from the tool application in art production. Therefore
44 Artistic interface means an interface which is part of the medium of the artwork. The thesis differentiates 
interfaces from screen-like technologies (which are often also considered as virtual interfaces, such as by Lev 
Manovich, 2001), therefore the medium constitutes interfaces and screens.
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the argument suggests the terminology of 'transparent medium' which displays both ready-to- 
hand and present-at-hand. In this respect, the established notion of mastering the tool is a key 
term in this context, as it explains the difference between invisibility and transparency.
Mastering the tool, according to the earlier established Heideggerian application of 
embodied interaction, means an ability to recall the embodied knowledge which one has gained 
through experience. Importantly, in artistic interfaces, embodied knowledge builds upon these 
embodied experiences (attempting to recall learned actions) combined with the artistic novelty 
that seeks innovation. Whereas novelty in embodied interaction means an inefficient interface, in 
accounts of transparent media it is seen as an artistic quality of the meaning creation. Therefore, 
it can be noted that embodied interaction as functional invisibility (ready-to-hand) belongs to 
both the tool and medium. In the transparent medium the functional embodied process and 
wonderment (explained by Eco's account of openness in chapter 2) generated by artistic novelty 
produces a constructive fusion in artistic interfaces, which the argument handles in a similar 
manner to the characteristic of present-at-hand. As such, the creative process characterises a 
fluctuation between artistic novelty and embodied processes, both adopting the artistic content, 
producing the artistic meaning. Through the 'embodied novelty' the spectator's cognitive states 
are transformed into immersion.
The resituated invisible tool produces a characteristic of transparency by fluctuating 
between the functionally invisible and the artistically reflective states. Artistic reflectivity means 
that the interface provides innovation or a new function which is novel, but through an artistic 
guide (the artist's anticipation of embodied knowledge in the spectator's experience) reflectively 
is effortlessly learnable in the creative processes. These novel means of interaction, which are 
accommodated by the interplay between the processes of mastering the tool and uncovering the
94
content, generate a new layer of meaning, which is crucially reflected in the spectator's 
experience. The argument considers this layer as an extension or element of the artistic content. 
The task of artistic creation is to achieve a balance between the quality of the function and the 
artistic content which so determines the quality of the interaction and as such allocates the 
quality of the cognitive flow between the artist and spectator. Therefore, the transparent medium 
is a reflection of the process of art production, most profoundly characterised by its extra layer of 
meaning, which provides the interplay between artistic content and function.
Overall, this chapter acknowledged that the technological representation of the artwork- 
spectator interconnection exhibits dissimilar qualities from earlier applications of the invisible 
tool. An artistic application of Heidegger's invisible tool provides a crucial conception of 
technology, suggesting that artistic interaction requires a special treatment. The artistic interface 
and its qualities differentiate from that of typical human-computer interaction applications, as 
they carry an artistic layer of function and meaning. Applying this, it was pointed out that 
technology in the 'making art' process is invisible, and in the 'experiencing art' process is 
transparent. This diversion from invisible tool has been identified as a particular characteristic of 
artistic interfaces, expanding the functionality with an innovative aesthetic dimension. The key 
aspect of looking for novel forms in the medium is not only a creation of new content but also a 
functional improvement (making the medium in its technological quality more invisible), which 
suggested that not only the content changes but its carrier does as well. This insight offers a 
redefinition of the interrelationship between artistic tool and content by the means of constantly 
changing technology.
95
iv. Characteristics of Transparent Medium: Immersion/Body Awareness
In order to differentiate the materialist application of interaction from the artistic application of
the invisible tool, the crucial characteristic of the transparent medium allocates a cognitive 
involvement of the spectator. To accommodate a meaningful approach, the concept of immersion 
will be discussed, as it enables a characterisation of cognitive processes in aesthetic experiences. 
Although numerous theories conceptualise the specific experience of interaction as immersion 
(Grau, 2003; Wolf and Perron; 2003; Bartle, 2004), it remains an ill-defined term. Therefore, in 
this section there is an intention to offer a more complete description of the notion, focusing on 
the particular quality of immateriality. As interactive technology in art, or more specifically the 
artistic interface, builds upon a model of interaction which uses a variety of bodily actions (for 
example, tangibility and full body movement), the discussion here suggests establishing the 
notion of 'body awareness'. This explains the cognitive quality of bodily states (which also 
means the quality of the body-mind nexus) and helps to unpack how immersion can be 
understood as a cognitive state.
Immersion can be broadly defined as: '...the experience of being physically immersed 
within a virtual environment experience', as Blade and Padgett (2002, p.20) suggest. It is 
understood as a cognitive state of humans, where every faculty of the person is fixed on one 
phenomenon. More closely, immersion is a contemporary notion of interactive media, especially 
VR. In this manner, Oliver Grau (2003, p. 13) exemplifies this in the context of cognition: 
'Immersion can be an intellectually stimulating process; however, in the present as in the past, in 
most cases immersion is mentally absorbing and a process, a change, a passage from one mental 
state to another.' Furthermore Grau (2003, p. 349) points out that: '.. .the principle of immersion 
is used to withdraw the apparatus of the medium of illusion from the perception of the observers
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to maximise the intensity of the message being transported. The medium becomes invisible. As 
Grau refers to the Heideggerian invisible tool it is important to refer back to one of its significant 
applications in embodied interaction, which claimed immersion through the embodied 
knowledge of the interface. As such, mastering the tool means a capacity for immersion.45 In the 
transparent medium this characteristic was described as being within the interplay with the 
artistic novelty; therefore, immersion means enabling the spectator access to the artistic content.
There is another significant concept that is revealed in the investigation of immersion, 
which helps to accommodate the notion of body awareness through a body-mind modality. 
'Disembodiment' is a frequently used term which refers to a transformed bodily status of 
cognition such as the: '...transcendence of body limitations through electronic prosthesis' 
(Ajana, 2005, np.). This terminology here will be handled in a broader sense, describing it as a 
'virtual embodiment' of a bodily status in the mind; as opposed to the earlier account of 
embodied interaction, it suggests a disembodied knowledge (not yet gained knowledge). Mark 
B. N. Hansen (2004) explains disembodiment as akin to the varying quality of body-brain (in this 
argument applied to the body-mind) interconnectivity:
45 In a similar vein, Marie-Laure Ryan (2003) describes an experience of reading a hyper narrative that, according to 
his claims, produced a 'dramatic performance'. This claim, similar to those described by Eco as openness, explains 
that the process of reading provides due creative thinking processes to the receiver of the structure of the texts to 
recreate it: this is known as mediumistic formulation. At the same time, the intruding demand of perception into 
the fiction (substantial formulation) occurs. Consequently there is more interaction in the mediumistic 
formulations producing less immersive experiences in the substantial formulation. However, the introduced notion 
of dramatic performance, whereby the user with their body immerses in the fiction and interacts through an 
instrumental creative process, represents an entry to a homogenous structure where immersion and interactivity 
replenish each other. As such, Ryan's example described the desired balance between the 'interface' (as Ryan puts 
it, the hypertextuality) and the content creating immersion.
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The disembodiment characteristic of the visual image is thus synonymous with its 
dependence on the activity of the body-brain: lacking any material autonomy of its own, 
the image does not pre-exist its actualisation and can be given body only through this 
activity...The aesthetic experience solicited by these works juxtaposes as spectatorial 
synthesis that seamlessly fuses virtual and physical space with the background 
awareness, triggered by certain material elements, that the events thus fused belong to 
impossible space-times. In this way, attention is drawn to the capacity of the spectator's 
body-brain activity effortlessly to produce a virtual image out of heterogeneous 
material. (Hansen, 2004, p.64)
Hansen explains VR as a medium of 'body-brain achievement', which is an 'aesthetic 
experimentation' (2004, p. 161) of the concept of perception through the body; or, as it is termed 
in this thesis, the concept of 'body awareness'. Correspondingly, Ajana proposes that the bodily 
awareness of the biological body transforms to a virtual body, which is not necessarily a body 
but a substance or better a state:
...virtual tools cease to be external objects and become part of our phenomenological 
corporality, just as the blind man's stick becomes an extension of his sensorial activity. 
Consequently, the construction of self in cyberspace follows an alternative mode of 
'embodiment'...the mind and body become one in order to pursue a unified goal, and if 
either is missing, the result is the non-existence of the experience. So however we might 
say it, in cyberspace one is, in effect, embodied in one's disembodiment. The body in 
this context is no longer seen as the obsolete object or the inert container of the mind, 
but an integral entity, which is reassigned with an indispensable role, that of the 
medium. (Ajana, 2005, np.)
Through the concept of disembodiment, body awareness suggests a spectrum of cognitive levels 
which are linked to the qualities of bodily involvement, embodied interaction and the content of 
the artwork which includes the wonderment of the interface. Meaning creation in interactive 
artworks is based on the quality of the immersion, thus the transformation of body awareness 
constitutes one of the artistic decisions that manipulate the spectator's cognition as 
disembodiment.
A meaningful technological application, which illustrates how body stimuli produce a 
variety of body awareness, is provided by a project developed in the Institute of Neurology at
University of Central London in 2007, where researchers attempted to simulate out-of-body
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experiences (OBEs). In OBE people consider themselves awake but the experience itself is 
situated outside of the body. Unlike spiritual practices where the person's awareness is 
disembodied into immaterial sensation, OBE displays the quality of the experience as the subject 
seeing themselves in a physical representation (autoscopy), creating the disembodiment (the self 
perceived outside of the body) and the impression of seeing the world from different 
perspectives46 (extracorporeal egocentric perspective) (Blanke and Arzy, 2005). One of the 
subjects reports the experience as:
Suddenly it was as if he saw himself in the bed in front of him. It was as if he were at 
the other end of the room, as if he were floating in space below the ceiling in the corner 
facing the bed from where he could observe his own body in the bed...he saw his own 
completely immobile body in the bed; eyes were closed. (Lunn, 1970, p.46)
The neuroscientist Henrik Ehrsson (2007) has reproduced the experience with head-mounted 
displays and two video cameras producing a stereoscopic real-time video located behind the 
user's head (Figure 4.03, 4.04).47 The experiment shows that self-reflection as produced in VR 
forms a strong response in consciousness and produces a self-transformation. Consciousness 
relocates the body; the real body becomes disembodied. As such, body awareness through 
perceptual deformation produces a form in which human consciousness perceives the body and 
the stimulus in different locations.
By drawing on the concept of immersion through body awareness, the thesis suggests 
differentiating interactions by the type of body involvement, since they might produce diverse
46 OBEs most frequently occur through clinical conditions such as brain damage, epilepsy or drug abuse, however, 
it also occurs in 10% of the healthy population. (Blackmore, 1982)
47 The participants saw their own back pictured from the perspective of someone sitting behind them, producing a 
phenomenon seen in OBEs. The participant's chest was stimulated with a rod and at the same time (outside of the 
camera view) the virtual chest was stimulated. Participants reported a 'bizarre experience' as they felt they sat 
behind their physical body, seeing themselves.
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Figure 4.03 and 4.04 Henrik Ehrsson with a volunteer during the virtual 
QBE experiment (Ehrsson, 2007)
cognitive qualities in immersion. The argument lays out three different characteristics of 
spectator body involvement which emerge from a variety of proactive engagements with 
interfaces used in artistic production: passive, tactile (which is considered as a particular form of 
passive interaction) and active. Active interaction exhibits the highest level of body involvement, 
displaying full body actions; passive interaction is the lowest, displaying meditative states of 
cognition; tactile interaction displays subtle control that activates attention and concentration in 
cognitive processes. It is important to mention that all three categories display disembodied 
qualities, although within different cognitive characterisations.
Active interaction occurs when the body itself is used as a controlling mechanism, which 
is captured by wearable sensors or invisible equipment (such as motion tracking). This type of 
interaction is unique, as the movement of the body is already embodied knowledge of the users, 
although there is always a semiotic of control (artistic novelty) which has to be learned. Using 
the transparency of the interface (or medium) here means to learn the symbols of body 
movements according to the system, which can produce a sensation as if the body was 
dissolving: a so-called disembodied awareness. Comprehending this particular bodily status in 
virtual reality systems, Diana Gromala and Yacov Sharir describe the following subjective 
experience:
Yet as experience immersion in the simulation, I simultaneously lose the sense of being 
grounded in physical space, I experience the sensation of disembodiment. However, my 
body still remains in the physical realm, constrained by the apparatus and tracking 
range. The sensation of disembodiment cannot be disconnected from the sensation of 
embodiment, physicality, groundedness. I lose the sense of which environment my body 
exists in. It problematizes my experience, since the sense of being grounded is usually 
primary to a dancer's experience [dervish dancer who performances spiritual practice]. 
(1996, Gromala and Sharir, p.284)
Active interaction triggers, by high transparency of the interface, ecstatic states of body. The
body awareness here is shifted by the body movement and transformed into an immersive state,
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which Gromala and Sharir believe resembles the experience of spiritual practices (further 
outlined in the following chapter).
Tactile interaction means using symbolic interfaces which the spectator has to translate. 
Although the application builds upon active bodily involvement, there is a differentiation from 
the earlier classification, as it implements not the full body movement but other interactions to 
provide embodied knowledge. In this respect, mastering the interface (transparency) means 
understanding the interconnection of various symbols and actions. As the interaction is tangible, 
the interface is an object and the spectator usually uses their hands to interact. As the rate of 
body involvement is low, the immersion is based on the concentrated decision of the spectator, 
who through the complexity of a controlled chain of actions, is disembodied into the virtual 
world. Contradictory to active interaction, which describes subconscious states, here the attention 
and thus the conscious decisions lead to disembodiment. Therefore, tactile interaction remains 
much more as an experience of the 'tool-user' in the making process rather than as an artistic 
implementation of the medium.
Passive interaction is akin to a movie spectatorship, with the difference that the spectator 
controls the reactions through their bio-data (blood pressure, emotional analysis, EEG, galvanic 
response, physiognomic analysis, and behaviour analysis). The body involvement is very low as 
the spectator affects the system through representational states of cognition (for example, their 
emotions) but not through a motor involvement of the body. The disembodiment is created 
through more meditative mental states, where the flow of actions leads the spectator to the so- 
called disembodied state.
The thesis identifies a pattern of immersive experiences, which can be drawn into a 
systematic model, in order to establish a matrix displaying these dimensions (see Appendix 1.2).
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This matrix is useful as it provides an abstraction for application, displaying qualities which have 
not yet been systematised. This immaterial conceptualisation of interaction is not based on 
scientific analysis but on the subjective experience of the spectator, measured by psychological 
modelling of self-reports. The matrix of the immersive qualities serves to fulfil claims which 
have been made by other practitioners, such as Rokeby:
...we need to expand the terms of interactive feedback loops from simply measuring 
functionality and effectiveness, to include an awareness of the impressions an 
interaction leaves on the user and the ways these impressions change the user's 
experience of the world. (Rokeby, 1998, np.)
Reflecting on this, the argument here points out that this matrix might fill a gap caused by a 
technology-oriented description that does not acknowledge immaterial qualities in the creative 
processes. In this matter, this chapter's discourse suggests applying the 'dimension scheme' used 
by Goertz' model earlier (discussed in chapter 2), as it already provides a comprehensive method 
of evaluation (see in Appendix 1.2). As such, this matrix of immersion sets up a scale from 0 to 4 
(1 - No immersion, 2 - Fluctuation between immersion and embodiment, 3 - Controlled 
immersion, 4 - Illusion: disembodiment) referring to increasing immersion and subsequently a 
change in states of consciousness. These layers, which also refer to the activity of the spectator 
as 1-learning, 2-understanding, 3-effective interaction and 4-full immersion, describe the stages 
of the spectator's cognitive processes when confronting a novel interface. As the active, tactile 
and passive modalities describe diverse aspects of body awareness, this matrix differentiates 
between the levels of immersion they provide. Whereas an active interaction produces an ecstasy 
through a learning process of body semiotics, tactile interaction aims for a more particular 
information exchange, activating attentive qualities in perception that oppose active interactions, 
resulting in a heightened control of actions. Finally, the passive interaction aims for an
inwardness of the spectator, without an everyday encounter of body states, which is more likened
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to an ecstatic state (as seen in active interaction) in the way that the person might achieve an 
uncontrolled meditative state. Thus, full immersion can be produced by a variety of body 
awareness, resulting in diverse immersions and thus diverse states of consciousness in interactive 
media art. A heightened level of immersion means the accomplishment of a significant aspect for 
an aesthetic where it may be possible for the artist to achieve a balance between technological 
functionality and the acquired artistic knowledge.
This new matrix of immersion established in this chapter attempts to provide a model 
which describes degrees of cognitive quality in the spectator's creative process. The concept 
generates a new aesthetic evaluation for art, in which the quality of the immersion suggests a 
potentiality of artistic meaning, even if immersion does not ultimately qualify an aesthetic. The 
importance of the contribution lies in the new understanding of an 'experience measurement', in 
which the cognitive flow between the artist and spectator in its most crucial formulation 
(spectator's experience) is evaluated. In this respect, the matrix does not just evaluate the 
particular experience but also provides an assessment of the flow. This suggests that the artist, 
according to the characteristic of the interface (active, passive and tactile), consciously works 
with the spectrum of the potential spectator's body awareness, and aesthetically applies this 
spectrum to fulfil the established triangle. Therefore, the experience design of the artwork 
applies body awareness as a potential conception of interactive art, which produces the crucial 
immaterial layer of the artwork. Establishing this dimension of creation, the thesis hopes to build 
a meaningful implementation for artists when developing artistic interface.
Through the argument of this thesis it has been claimed that the recognition of the 'artist- 
artwork-spectator' triangle might produce a meaningful aesthetic model for art. This claim 
emerges from this chapter's philosophical investigation, aiming to fill the gap recognised in
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Krueger's legacy. The most crucial philosophical contribution to a novel understanding of 
interactivity was provided by Martin Heidegger's invisible tool and his recognition of various 
cognitive states of the tool-user. Even though this experience-based approach produced a turning 
point in the concept of human-machine interaction, for a long time it was not acknowledged as a 
potential model of art. His idea that technology becomes invisible in the work process was more 
recently further developed by various theorists (Ihde, 1991; Rokeby, 1995; Fujihata, 2001) and 
extended to the artistic possibilities of interface. The invisible tool describes the quality between 
a user's intention and the occurrence of a produced outcome. The concept of the transparent 
interface which is introduced in this thesis suggests a level of new meaning which is still to be 
discovered. As such, the transparent medium is a pillar towards a cognitive-based creation which 
represents both novel layers of meaning and cognitive flows of interaction. Significantly, the 
cognitive interpretation of technology re-evaluates the general understanding of interactivity.
These old views, accommodated by Krueger's legacy ignored the mental affectation of 
technology and built upon concepts of participatory art and communication theory, providing 
materialistic accounts of interaction. Recognising the lack in these theories, this novel approach 
constructs a cognitive linkage in which artistic creation is situated. In this respect, Heidegger's 
concept of the invisible tool provides a primary scheme for the earlier examined and re-evaluated 
accounts of openness and responsiveness. Thus, technology and its interfaces, besides 
functionality and responsiveness, offer further layers of meaning and openness. These layers are 
most significant since they enable the interfaces not to be invisible (as claimed in the 
technological approach) but transparent like artistic interfaces. The transparent medium is the 
model of technology in art, which, alongside the content, ultimately shapes the artistic meaning. 
Through this, the conceptualisation of Heidegger's present-at-hand does not stand for a
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functional error but rather an innovative layer that makes the tool visible. It is also proposed that 
the active, tactile and passive modalities refer to the spectator's body involvement, describing the 
various qualities of immersion in the creative experiences. The term immersion primarily 
conceptualised a practical model of the spectator's experience through the cognitive quality of 
body awareness. As such, this chapter suggested a matrix, based on self-report, providing a 
scheme and evaluation system for an artist, describing an immaterial quality of the spectator's 
act. The discussion on immersion concluded that this new cognitive quality also depicts the 
artist-spectator interconnection as, in the way it was argued earlier in chapter 2, the spectator's 
experience immediately linking to the artistic experience.
Through this, the thesis has arrived at an immaterial characterisation of creative 
processes, which signals a flow-like phenomenon producing the crucial dimension in experience. 
As it has been identified that flowing characteristics of the experience produce the recognised 
'artist-artwork-spectator' triangle, the discourse will be situated in the contemporary psycho- 
philosophic concept of flow that supports an immaterial dimension explaining a crucial aspect of 
consciousness. Similar to the state of full immersion, the notion of flow, as described by the 
psychologist Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, explains an optimal state of subjective experience, 
generating novel, or, in the way this thesis terms it, spiritual-like experiences. Mapping the 
invisible tool on Csikszentmihalyi's notion, it is possible to create an account of a transcendent 
level in the artwork which reveals the crucial immaterial dimension of the spectator's experience 
explained earlier. This quality, which Csikszentmihalyi describes as an ecstatic state, is the 
essential outcome of the transparent medium and will now be outlined in the following chapter.
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Chapter 5
Flow as Artist-Spectator Interconnect!vity: The Potential of a Creative
Ecstasy
i. Creative Processes as Flow in the 'Artist-Artwork-Spectator' Triangle
Previously it has been noted that applications of artistic and technological accounts of
interactivity have been miss-situated in artistic production and therefore maintained within a 
materialistic approach of art. The re-conceptualised accounts of 'structural openness' and 
'responsiveness' have revealed a new understanding of art, which creates an aesthetic that is 
built upon the immaterial qualities of the artist-spectator relationship. An evidence-based 
solution of immateriality arose through Heidegger's philosophical framework, which offered a 
new role for technology in art: the phenomenology of the interface (invisible tool/transparent 
interface). Through this, the division between tool and medium demonstrated that the artist and 
the spectator work towards a similar experience with different qualities of technology. As such, it 
has been anticipated that the 'artist-artwork-spectator' triangle can be seen as a cognitive flow in 
which the quality of the artistic creation is immediately manifested in the spectators' experience. 
Comprehending the artistic experience as a flow-like phenomenon, this chapter suggests a 
comprehensive investigation into the notion of flow.
Flow is a contemporary psychological term used to describe human consciousness as 
being based on the phenomena of experience (Csikszentmihalyi, 1975); it has been discussed 
primarily as a cognitive and phenomenological investigation of experience by the psychologist 
Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi (1975). This investigation draws on his concept of flow to approach a 
fuller understanding of the 'artist-artwork-spectator' triangle and its role in the new aesthetic of 
interactive media art. Earlier accounts, for example William James (1890), Henri Bergson (1998,
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[1907]) or Edmund Husserl (1964 [1928]) claimed that introspection generates a temporal 
sequence of consciousness or flow48 . Similar to the recognition of the interconnection between 
artist and spectator with a flow like quality, Csikszentmihalyi (1965) based his positive 
psychological theory49 on studies of artistic activities, through which he identified a specific 
quality of experience. Csikszentmihalyi (2002) based his theory on the observation that artists 
had an observable behavioural turn, having finished their activity when they lose interest in their 
work of art. Founded on this result, he explained the creative process as being outside of the 
moment, at the borders of consciousness. Csikszentmihalyi in particular studied artists during the 
creation of paintings and described this process as an optimal mental state associated with a total 
submersion hi the artwork. He explained this quality as 'stand to side' (the translation of the 
Greek word ekstasis; The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1983, p.781) experiences or the 
ecstatic state, and argued that these states drive the artistic creation process. He further described 
that: how in this euphoric state, the artistic activity transforms into unconscious events with a 
strong emotional fusion between the artwork and artist, producing a new spectrum of cognition. 
Csikszentmihalyi (2002, p.40) has termed this as 'flow' 50 , as many of his subjects described the 
creative process as: 'It was like floating' or 'I was carried on by the flow'. Through this, it can be 
pointed out that the concept of flow explains similar qualities to those described as immersion in 
the technologically-mediated creative processes.
48 William James (1890, p.239) is one of the initial scholars who described consciousness as a flow. James (1890, 
p.239), in his book The Stream of Thought, characterizes it as flowing: 'Consciousness ... does not appear to itself 
chopped up in bits. Such words as 'chain' and 'train' do not describe it fitly as it presents itself in the first instance. 
It is nothing joined; it flows. A 'river1 or a 'stream' are the metaphors by which it is most naturally described.' 
Similarly to Csikszentmihalyi, James sees consciousness as adoptive and thus one can regulate it.
49 A positive psychological approach, instead of the traditional psychological interest of mental illnesses, examines 
the human condition with regard to mental 'wellness' (Seligman, 2002).
50 The initial model of his concept was published in his book Boredom and Anxiety in 1975.
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Csikszentmihalyi rejected the traditional view of art production which suggested a social 
interest by the artist rather than a cognitive-driven activity. Instead, he defined an immaterial 
approach, in which he saw experience as a cause of total amalgamation, in which the 
consciousness reached the particular level of ecstasy in some cases (Csikszentmihalyi, 1988, 
p.4). To comprehend this specific quality of the experience, Csikszentmihalyi studied people 
who did not get any external rewards for their activity, but had great motivation in their works 
(such as rock climbers, dancers and amateur sport players). He argued that flow is generated 
under certain conditions, primarily under an 'optimal challenge', when one's capabilities match 
the encounter. If the optimal challenge is too low (the activities are too easy) it would lead to 
boredom; or, the activities do not fit to one's capacity, generating anxiety which can be 
interpreted as noise in the flow51 . Csikszentmihalyi termed this activity as an 'intrinsic 
motivation', an internal force without obvious external inducement recalling the 'autotelic 
experience' 52 . Csikszentmihalyi built upon the research on motivation from Abraham Maslow's 
(1968) theory of 'peek experience', which explained the phenomena as the wish of 'self- 
actualisation', even though Maslow could not provide a satisfactory scientific examination. He 
also used Richard deCharm's (1968, 1976) and Edward L. Deci's (1985) experimental studies 
which concluded that people who are externally rewarded for activities experience more a 
reduced quantity of intrinsic motivation than those without rewards. Based upon these concepts, 
Csikszentmihalyi (Csikszentmihalyi and Nakamura, 2002, p. 90) acknowledges one's duty to act
51 Csikszentmihalyi (2000, p. 381) provides the following matrix to capture the quality of the optimal experience: 
(a) a clear sense of what has to be done moment by moment; (b) immediate feedback as to how well one is doing; 
(c) an intense concentration of attention; (d) a balance between opportunities for action (challenges) and capacity 
to act (skills); (e) exclusion of irrelevant content from consciousness; (f) a sense of control over the activity; (g) a 
distortion of sense of time - usually hours pass by in minutes; and (h) a feeling that the activity is intrinsically 
rewarding, or worth doing for its own sake. 
The term refers to goals that is motivated intrinsically or inherit.
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upon one's own condition by using the set of challenges and their accurate responses to gain 
unified experience of flow. He emphasised that man became a: '...self-regulating organism 
interacting with the environment' by setting out a dynamic system. Csikszentmihalyi (2002, p.2) 
concluded that: 'People who learn to control inner experience will be able to determine the 
quality of their lives, which is as close as any of us can come to being happy'. Csikszentmihalyi 
allocated 'control' as an intentional process, which this chapter applies as a novel interpretation 
of 'artistic control' regarding an active spectatorship. Essential to the optimal artistic control is a 
balance of the artist and spectator's intentional experience, based upon the recognised 'artist- 
artwork-spectator' triangle.
To establish Csikszentmihalyi's claim of an affective state of experience it is necessary to 
elaborate his understanding of consciousness53 . Importantly, he pointed out that there are 
profound differences between his view and the way consciousness is understood in the field of 
behavioural science54 . Csikszentmihalyi agreed with Smith's (1969) concept of'introspective 
behaviourism', in which: '...conscious experience is an internal event about which one does do 
directly, what one wants to do' (Smith 1969, p. 108). Csikszentmihalyi (2002, p.247), however, 
emphasised a phenomenological view and claims that consciousness is based upon the 
'subjective dynamics of experience'. As noted earlier, he (2002, p.27) stressed the significance 
of intention, which he considered to be: '...the force that keeps information in consciousness 
ordered', and he (2002, p.6) further pointed out that: '...the optimal state of inner experience is
Csikszentmihalyi (2002, p.24) referred to the function of consciousness in this way: '...to present information 
about what is happening outside and inside the organism, such a way that it can be evaluated and acted upon by 
the body... With consciousness, we can deliberately weight what the senses tell us, and respond accordingly. And 
we can also invent information that did not exist before: it is because we have consciousness that we can day 
dream, make up lies, and write beautiful poems and scientific theories.'
54 Behavioral science, as Csikszentmihalyi insisted, had ignored the existence of consciousness as no empirical 
knowledge was available to prove it. Also, the personal reports provided as descriptions of consciousness were 
held as being too subjective and not sufficient in rigorous scientific method.
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one in which there is order in consciousness'. From this point of view he comprehended 
consciousness as a substance that, with human control, may enable improvement in the human 
condition. He acknowledged that human cognition is able to improve itself with conscious 
mental activity, which he comprehended as:
The opposite state from the condition of psychic entropy is optimal experience. When 
the information that keeps coming into awareness is congruent with the goals, psychic 
energy flows effortlessly. (Csikszentmihalyi, 2002, p.27)
Thus, flow stands in contrast to the phenomena of psychological entropy, bringing disorder to 
consciousness. The notion of flow is reminiscent of the invisible tool (see chapter 4), which 
reveals the degree of invisibility as a cognitive quality of the uninterrupted flow between the user 
and the interface55 . Therefore, the concept of Csikszentmihalyi's flow can be applied to the 
artist-spectator interconnection; for example, when artists apply technology without conscious 
attention in creative processes (producing the invisible tool) or when the spectator is immersed in 
the artistic environment (mastering the tool). As such, the argument in this thesis characterises 
the noiseless experience in a similar way to Csikszentmihalyi's flow, which is described in the 
following way:
...intense and focused concentration on what one is doing in the present moment, merging of 
action and awareness, loss of reflective self-consciousness (i.e. loss of awareness of oneself as 
social actor) a sense that one can control one's actions; that is, a sense that one can in principle 
deal with the situation because one knows how to respond to whatever happens next, distortion of 
temporal experience (typically, a sense that time has passed faster than normal), experience of the 
activity as intrinsically re-warding, such that often the end goal is just an excuse for the process. 
(Csikszentmihalyi and Nakamura, 2002, p. 90)
55 If the interface is in the condition of readiness-to-hand, the interaction is noiseless (not distressed). The interface 
becomes immediately present-at-hand because it needs too much consideration or control from its user.
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Csikszentmihalyi (2002, p.42) also declared that the result of this harmonious state is when: '... 
the self becomes complex as result of experiencing flow' 56 . This is a spectrum of novel levels of 
consciousness, which might produce the heightened quality of experience that he terms as 
ecstasy. Csikszentmihalyi (2002, p.42) insisted that flow is a controlled experience but there is a 
level of consciousness which is: '...beyond the determining forces that the person is seemingly 
controlled by', which he explained as an ecstatic state. This can be identified as an essential 
concept for an addressing of the aesthetic experience in technology-based creation and suggests 
its application for a new aesthetic. In this respect, implementing the concept of flow and ecstasy 
in interactive art means that the spectator controls the 'flow in the interaction', which might turn 
into an ecstatic level of experience in which the spectator is overtaken by the control of the flow. 
Through this, it can be suggested that noiseless experience and its heightened quality of ecstasy 
can produce novel and unknown states of consciousness; an expanded spectrum which is crucial 
to technological art production and which might serve as an aesthetic drive for the new art form. 
Csikszentmihalyi's intervention of flow as a substance of consciousness and particularly 
his concept of'intrinsic motivation' facilitate an interpretation of subjective experience as being 
the immediacy between artist and spectator, shaping an aesthetic solution for interactive media 
art. In the following, this chapter proposes an extended model of Csikszentmihalyi's flow, which 
proposes that a flowing experience takes place not only in the artist-artefact processes, as 
Csikszentmihalyi claimed, but also in the artwork-spectator processes. In this respect, the 'artist- 
artwork-spectator' triangle exhibits a creative closed circulation of flow, in which artists and 
spectators drive each other in the reciprocal ecstatic state through flow (Figure 5.01). As this
56 Complexity here means to become further differentiated from the earlier or original self. Csikszentmihalyi sees 
that the experience of flow is able to change a person into a 'more unique individual'. The self become integrated 













Figure 5.01 Conceptual draft: The creative ecstasy as the outcome of the flow production by the 
applications of invisible tool, degree of openness and responsiveness (Zics, 2007)
application suggests the application of Csikszentmihalyi's concept of ecstatic state in creative 
processes provides a meaningful approach for a creation of spectator experience. In this respect, 
being in the flow includes the psychological quality of the uninterrupted interactive experience 
(for both the creator and user of the artwork), which acknowledges a potential of technology- 
based art for expanding a spectrum of state of consciousness.
ii. Ecstatic State: Spiritual Practice as a Model for Artistic Interaction
As flow is understood to be the substance of consciousness that produces qualitative states in the
making and experiencing processes of art, it can be argued that the spectator experience is an 
extension of the artistic experience. This leads to a consideration that the artwork generates a 
dimension which is profoundly characterised by the spectator's unique experience. The 
subjective experience arises in the interaction of the artwork, generating new states of 
consciousness or even ecstatic states. Focusing on this subjective experience, and using 
Csikszentmihalyi's claim of flow experience in art and his particular examples of religious 
practices (Csikszentmihalyi, 2002, p.74), this chapter proposes a suitable analogy between 
'creative ecstasies' and 'spiritual ecstasies'. The analogy serves to describe similar phenomena in 
flow experiences, which might allocate significant strategies and qualities for the artistic 
production of spectator experiences. As such, creative and spiritual ecstasies both relate to 
Csikszentmihalyi's optimal experiences, which, as it is argued here, occur instantly in a 
technology-triggered aesthetic experience. What artistic interaction might gain from religious 
practice is how an experience of flow can be produced through degrees of body involvement, 
stimulated by a variety of technologies and techniques (for example dance). Therefore, the thesis 
suggests that technology-based art does not recreate particular spiritual states of consciousness
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but enriches the spectrum of consciousness that is similar to these experiences (which later will 
be referred to as spiritual-like experiences57).
Although Csikszentmihalyi's account identified religious rituals and practices as primary 
formulations of flow experience, it has to be noted that these claims are based on insufficient, 
undeveloped research58 . Therefore the discussion here attempts to present findings, based on 
Csikszentmihalyi's conceptualisation between flow and spiritual experiences, in order to expand 
the potential applications of flow, by using an interest in technologically generated affection to 
produce a spiritual-like state of the consciousness. Elaborating on this claim, the argument 
establishes a significant resemblance between spiritual ecstatic states and flow-like experiences 
in the 'artist-artwork-spectator' triangle.
The term spiritual is here understood to be a cognitive human quality which often relates 
to scientifically non-describable phenomena59 . As such, spiritual practices can be interpreted as 
methods of self-exploration or self-expansion. Csikszentmihalyi's proposal, which here is 
understood to be a body-mind interconnection through bodily states of cognition, is a crucial tool 
in interactive art production, hi order to elaborate a spectrum of conceptions on how flow can be 
generated in interactive media artwork, this chapter suggests utilising the notions of qualities of
57 Spiritual-like experiences are comprehended here as activities that display a spectrum of body involvement 
aiming for a new state of consciousness. These practices produce states in the consciousness that is akin to 
spiritual experiences as opposed to normative everyday perceptions.
58 Csikszentmihalyi and Nakamura (2002, p. 92) identified lacunae, on which this thesis builds that there is 
'Relatively little research [that] has addressed the experience of flow when attention is trained on internal sources 
of information (e.g. in psychotherapy, life-planning, life-review, and other forms of existential reflection; fantasy; 
spiritual experiences).' Their discourse points out that the general interest of every-day life and its application of 
life improvement was much greater than the interest of understanding deep philosophical issues of religious 
activities, leading to the poor application of the concept.
59 To formulate a clear analogy between artistic and spiritual experience, it is necessary to first unpack how the 
expression of the 'spiritual' is understood here. The term 'spiritus' originated from the Latin word of 'breath' 
(Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles, Fifth Edition, 2002, p.2) which immediately refers to a 
quality that has a characteristic of continuum. In the context of spiritual practices, breathing serves as a medium, 
which through bodily actions (breathing) transforms cognitive states to non-common body awareness.
113
body involvement and body awareness (discussed in chapter 4) with reference to an immersive 
aesthetic experience.
The ecstatic state here is understood to be referring to its earlier described meaning of 
'stand to the outside', as one steps out of the reality of space and time (Lingis, 1998) and 
transcends the implicit limit of personality (Stutley, 2003). Franklin Merrell-Wolff (1994, p.29), 
mathematician and philosopher, described these states, in a similar way to Csikszentmihalyi, as: 
'...[a] fluid-like substance, which brings the sense of well-being [Merrell-Wolff terms it as 
'Current']... Along with it, a more that earthy Joy suffuses the whole nature'. He also described 
his personal experiences of a spectrum of crucial levels of consciousness, which might serve as a 
significant example of how flow can be characterised in the spectator experience:
One day, after the evening meal and while still sitting at the table, I found that, by 
gradual transition, I had passed into a very delightful state of contemplation... I made 
careful note of the state I was in and submitted it to close scrutiny, the quality of the 
state well impressed upon memory. My breath had changed.. .just a little slower than 
normal. The notable change was in a subtle quality associated with the air breathed. 
Over and above the physical gases of the air there seemed to be an impalpable 
substance of indescribable sweetness that, in turn, was associated with a general sense 
of well being, embracing even the physical man. It was like happiness or joy, but these 
words are inadequate. It was of a very gentle quality yet far transcended the value of the 
form of any of the more familiar forms of happiness. (Merrell-Wolff, 1994, pp.3-4)
Merrell-Wolff s ecstatic sensation, which was immediately linked to his spiritually developed 
practice of'mathematical yoga', exhibits a close analogy to Csikszentmihalyi's optimal 
experience and the heightened state of ecstasy. Correspondingly, Margaret Stutley (2003, p. 28) 
has treated ecstasy as an altered state of consciousness60, which is: '...a psychogenic reaction 
according to the dictates of the visionary's mind so experiencing the conscious and unconscious
60 Altered state of consciousness was introduced by Charles Tart (1969, p. 2) who defined it as where one '...clearly 
feels a qualitative shift in his pattern of mental functioning.' It explains states that are greatly different from the 
normal beta state. The terminology is often linked to the condition of trance.
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desires of the ecstatic shaman'61 . In a similar manner to the way Csikszentmihalyi referred to a 
potentiality for a new quality in consciousness as flow experiences, shamanistic rituals, 
according to Stutley (2003, p. 28), generate an ecstasy through which to gain 'new knowledge', 
which she characterised as a state of alteration of consciousness rather than a loss of 
consciousness. Gilbert Rouget (1985) proposed accordingly that the state of ecstasy is a process 
in which specific techniques are performed to achieve altered states. Besides the bodily 
involvement of the shaman he describes aids of the spiritual act that can be identified as being 
similar to aesthetic experiences in technology assisted artwork:
...the shaman, to sing and play the drum (or rattle), is to stimulate himself to 
dance...this dance takes on the proportions of the exhausting exercise, responsible, 
beyond doubt, for certain losses of consciousness. To shamanize, in other words to sing 
and dance, is as much a corporeal technique as a spiritual exercise. (Rouget, 1985, 
p.319)
In a similar way Christina Pratt (2007) acknowledged the importance of techniques such as 
dance which represent a spectrum of consciousness through their embodiment:
The dance, which connects the dancer to the inherited spirit, is improvisational. These 
dances often begin with familiar, formalized movements that imitate the behaviour of 
the helping spirit. As the dance progresses, the dancer moves deeper into an altered state 
of consciousness and the embodiment of the helping spirit deepens. In the embodiment 
trance, the initially improvised movement gives over to the spontaneous movement of 
the embodied helping spirit. (Pratt, 2007, p. 132)
In this she has portrayed the significance of movement that becomes internal by the driven act of 
impulsive actions. Thus, shamanistic rituals perform an established choreography of actions that 
step into the flow experience in order to achieve ecstatic states. It can be summarised that 
spiritual practices frequently use various technologies as acts of repetition, such as speech
61 Stutley (2003) exemplified this as 'flight', 'riding' or 'speed'.
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(mantra in meditation), music (drum in shamanistic rituals) or body movement (Islamic prayers), 
which are highly similar to artistic interfaces that also aim for a body-mind affection in the 
aesthetic experience.
Elaborating on this crucial concept of ecstasy, the chapter here suggests applying the 
already introduced notions of embodiment and disembodiment (introduced in chapter 4), 
concepts which occur in technological- and, as Shore (1996, p. 145) has claimed, also in 
spiritual-driven experiences. As it has been suggested in chapter 4, these notions refer to the 
quality of experience in VR, which: '... is a kind of total immersion in computer time and space' 
(Shore, 1996, p. 145), or they refer to spiritual practice as a phenomenon which provides: 
'...symbolic resources for the construction of alternative realities and promotes actions directed 
at breaking through to those realities' (Yamine and Polzer, 1994, p.l 1). In this respect, the 
particular interconnection between bodily and mental actions is the major perspective of a 
potential application for art. Applying Csikszentmihalyi's concept of flow, embodiment and 
disembodiment can be understood to be phenomenological evaluations62 where embodiment is: 
'...an existential condition in which the body is the subjective source of inter-subjective ground 
of experience' (Csordas, 1999, p.181). In Heidegger's understanding, as elaborated on in chapter 
4, using the tool is an embodied action which leads to a disembodied cognitive state of the tool. 
Thus, body awareness produces the phenomenon, similar to VR experiences, in which the tool 
becomes part of the body. In this respect, embodiment stands for a quality of human experience, 
which through particular bodily acts, triggers particular states of consciousness thus changing the 
characteristic of body awareness.
62 Phenomenological understanding, such as in Csikszentmihalyi's flow theory, provides a situation where body and 
consciousness are in unity. As such, the embodied consciousness means interconnectivity between the bodily 
states and states of consciousness.
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As such, the body awareness of the person is immediately linked to the physical reality 
and how the body is in this world. The argument here understands disembodiment as a state of 
consciousness in which body awareness produces a novel articulation, such as drawing away of 
the common sense of the body or the phenomenon when the entity of the body (body awareness) 
is allocated outside of the body63 . As such, disembodiment is a state that is not placed in the laws 
of the physical external world but a virtual word of imagination that may be technologically 
induced. According to the model of VR as introduced earlier, the two major qualities of 
interaction regarding body awareness have been characterised as 'active' ('tactile' is considered 
as an active bodily involvement) and 'passive'. As Csikszentmihalyi's theory of flow departed 
from a unity of body and consciousness, the passive and active characteristics do not stand for a 
division, but a means through which the unique experience is generated.
In order to apply this to spiritual experiences it has to be pointed out that the active and 
passive terminology relates to diverse schemes of interaction; whereas active interaction uses the 
body for interaction, passive interaction is produced only through technological methods (such as 
reading bio-data). However, although the stimuli of interaction are technologically induced, the 
control of the flow is, instead, based on the individual decision making, which Csikszentmihalyi 
described as one's intentional drive. In this sense, technology, similar to a drum in a religious 
practice, is only a trigger of the flow; the experience is individually diverse.
Active interaction in technology can seemingly be linked to spiritual practices that use 
bodily involvement in their rituals; they produce disembodiment of the consciousness through 
body performance. Zeljko Jokic (1996, p. 19) described the disembodied state in spiritual
63 In Virtual Realities this entity is termed an 'avatar7, which is a Virtual body' through which a person acts. 
Disembodiment is often characterized as an embodiment into virtuality that produces a disembodied state. This 
view, however, is not shared by scholars of embodied interaction (such as Paul Dourish, discussed earlier) as they 
interpret virtual entities as manipulative, as they are not linked to physical presence (see chapter 3).
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practice (particular in shamanism64) as an experience where: '.. .unity of the body and ego- 
consciousness become fragmented, whereby the ego-dissolution contains the experience of body 
dismemberment'. He depicted consciousness as highly 'fragmented' with regards to a 
spectacular state; that the real body is in action but the consciousness only fragmentarily aware 
of it. Thus, a particular action of the body produces new states of consciousness shifting 
awareness and, along with it, creates the crucial knowledge.
The form of passive interaction produces more challenging application of art, as only the 
technology provokes the interaction that is described to: '...manipulate sensory stimuli to focus 
their participants concentration' (Neitz and Spickard, 1990, p. 22.), which is comparable to 
spiritual practices where disembodiment is produced by inner changes of consciousness as forms 
of meditation (O'Connor and Robb and Heil, 2003). According to the featured characteristics of 
creative or spiritual ecstasies, which are based on active bodily involvement and passive bodily 
involvement of interaction, it can be claimed that, similarly, both acts produce a perception 
alteration and inwardness in the participant. In spiritual experiences, besides the external 
technological stimuli, an internal aspiration might drive the person towards new states of 
consciousness coupling with learned techniques. In aesthetic experiences, similar phenomena 
may occur when the interactor, using the learned rules of interaction (mastering the tool), 
achieves new knowledge. It also has to be also noted that there is an overlap between active and 
passive formulations, although the division produces a useful analogy to art for application in 
artistic context. Both modalities of active and passive are able to generate a shift in body 
awareness in a form that does not exist in the every day encounters of life. Understanding
64 Piers Vitebsky (1995) describes shamanistic rituals as a metamorphosis of the human body into a cosmic body, 
or what the thesis terms the 'corporeal cosmo-genesis'.
118
aesthetic interaction as an immaterial encounter means to applying technologies for a production 
of ecstasy.
iii. Application of Active and Passive Modalities of Flow: Potential Application for Artistic 
Experience
As practices of flow were acknowledged as potential schemes for an artistic tool accommodating 
the novel layer of the spectator's experience, in the following, particular examples will be 
examined, based on the established matrix of disembodiment and body awareness. The active 
and passive modalities are presented in order to display patterns of interconnectivity between 
states of body and mind through the use of technology; in other words how creative ecstasy can 
be produced through an aesthetic flow experience. Two potential practices are presented, both 
claimed by Csikszentmihalyi as ecstatic experiences. These are Sufi and Yoga. The former 
stands for an 'active disembodiment' created through bodily actions. In the latter, more passive, 
practice, a limited bodily action produces meticulous states of consciousness.
An active bodily involvement will be exemplified in this chapter's discourse through 
Csikszentmihalyi's (2002) example of Sufi practice. In his view, the Sufi 'whirling dervishes' 
(Figure 5.02, 5.03) are one of the most unique religious practices which, through bodily and 
mutual repetition, produce a flow-like experience. He claimed that their practice is based on the 
bodily involvement of turning in circles, resulting in states of ecstasy.
Lynne Hume (2007) explained that Dervish means 'doorway', which in Sufi philosophy 
refers to the transfer from material to spiritual. She argues that the whirling dervishes are a ritual; 
a constantly repeated spin around one's own axis, accompanied by repetition of words in order to 
experience expanded awareness:
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Figure 5.02 and 5.03 Turkish whirling dervishes (Wright, 2007)
Ordinary consciousness, with its thoughts, emotions, sensation and memories, is swept 
aside in order to experience transcendental states of awareness... a direct experience of 
the Reality or Truth, al haqq, or Allah. Whirling enables the participants to focus their 
attention through one -pointed concentration on the one reality, and to lose themselves 
in it. (Hume, 2007, p. 67)
The Sufi practice of body involvement' 65 produces an experience of flow through conscious 
control of the interconnection between body and consciousness. The phenomenon is 
characterised as the unity of body and consciousness which becomes fragmented by the body 
awareness, producing an interim quality between being controlled and forgotten (being 
immersed). The particular choreography and its symbolic meaning in the ritual aim for a 
transformation of consciousness, which explains Sufi practice as a profound scheme of body- 
mind interconnectivity and, therefore, displaying great similarity to experiences of VR. As such, 
the active modality provides an important application for disembodiment and body awareness 
and suggests that the artist is a choreographer of the spectator's movements through the 
interface. Thus, the artist designs the interface so that the created feedback and affection of the 
spectator transform their perception towards a disembodied engagement and immersion. This 
means that the spectator produces an immersive state through the symbolic means of bodily 
interpretation, in which (the same as in a spiritual ritual) the interconnection between 
consciousness and body become fragmented. Thus, the body is still in control of the action but
65 Lynne Hume (2007) described the physical act through which the unity of body, heart and mind produces the 
immersion into divinity. As was pointed out earlier this spiritual act has an exact choreography as well and all 
elements have symbolic considerations. It starts with a eulogy to the Prophet of love followed by the drumbeat of 
the 'kudum', which stands for the divine command of 'Be'. The dance begins with 'Suktan Valed Walk', the 
circulation three times in the space where they bow to each other to symbolise the salutation of soul to soul. It 
follows four various dances ('selams') using various rhythms to represent the journey of man into spiritual validity. 
The stages of 'selam' include the one entering into the truth, one's rapture of God, one's fusion of love, and 
condescension from the journey. The journey symbolises the interaction with God which prepares the worshiper 
for the knowledge of truth (Hume, 2007). The bodily involvement has an exact procedure; the right hand is raised 
up to the 'heavens' to connect with God and the left situated towards to earth to conduct the knowledge of truth. 
The movements are structured and controlled. The ritual's aim is to produce a disembodiment that produces the 
most effective level of consciousness for fusion with God.
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consciousness has already started to build up novel states. The modality of the Sufi practice, 
which shapes knowledge through the alteration of perception by body actions, is a significant 
scheme which artists can apply in experience design for the spectator.
The other characteristic of interaction, which was described as passive, is non-bodily 
immersion. This modality is more akin to a non-interactive technological experience, such as the 
cinema, in which the bodily status stays passive and so produces a mental involvement of the 
spectator. In interactive systems this scheme is often formulated by reduced spectator activity 
and limited tactile interaction, or more specifically the interaction produced by the reaction 
measurement of the spectator, such as face analysis, pulse or galvanic skin response. Through 
technological applications (for example, cameras or sensors), the system collects data from the 
person's behaviour or properties, and through the analysis of this data the system affects the 
spectators' perception (for example, systems working with cognitive feedback loop, see later in 
chapter 7). By this particular means of interaction, the artistic production relies on the spectator's 
cognitive action-reaction measurement, suggesting a cognitive-based interaction. Throughout, 
the artist's task is to produce inwardness via technology, which usually occurs intentionally in 
spiritual techniques which drive the spectator (or worshiper) to ecstatic states. As this modality 
suggests a higher integration of cognitive processes of interaction, and, therefore, may produce 
more effective means of interaction, the thesis has chosen to explore this passive body-mind 
form in its practice (see the artwork of the Mind Cupola outlined in chapter 7).
One of the examples of how passive immersion works is the stimulation of one's 
perception where the processes of inwardness produce a meditative state in the participant. The 
intention of the worshiper, through limited bodily actions (such as breathing and eye-movement: 
'makyo' in Zen meditation; Austin, 1999), is to enter into altered states of consciousness. In this
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type of interaction the body and consciousness is not fragmented but unified (consciousness and 
body are fused), which is formulated through the desire to turn off every stimulus of the body, 
generating a focused state of body awareness. In a similar manner, Theodule Ribot (1890) 
insisted that ecstasy occurs by a full fusion of body and consciousness, which is a very rare 
phenomenon:
Do there really exist cases of absolute monoideism, in which consciousness is reduced 
to a sole and single state entirely occupying it, and in which the mechanism of 
association is totally arrested? In our opinion, this we meet in only a few, very rare 
cases of ecstasy... (Ribot, 1890, p. 10)
Edward Maupin (1969, p. 180) described meditation as:'.. .a deep passivity combined with 
awareness'. The passivity describes a bodily condition in which the awareness of the body is 
transformed as a virtual phenomenon of consciousness serving inwardness. Nigro Sansonese 
(1994) described this 'outside of the body' experience in the following way:
In yoga, ecstatic trance has been distilled into enstasy (sublime trance), a trance needing 
no fetishes - objects in which a desired power inheres - a trance from which an entire 
shamanistic jargon, for instance, 'leaving the body' or 'magical flight' has been 
jettisoned. The transition is a consequence of the realization, over time, at once obvious 
and mysterious, that all experience occurs solely within the body. (Sansonese, 1994, p. 
26)
Similar to this, Csikszentmihalyi (2002) has asserted that (Sanskrit) Yoga endeavours to achieve 
a unity of body and consciousness through the actions of the body. His interest focused on one of 
the great resonances between flow and this meditative practice as: '.. .both try to achieve a 
joyous, self-forgetful involvement through concentration, which in turn is made possible by a 
discipline of the body'. Through this, Csikszentmihalyi acknowledged that the body has to be 
under order of the consciousness. Contradictory to active interaction, where the body is the tool 
to control consciousness, in meditation, beyond the bodily preparation, the inward focus or self-
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actualisation is what produces transcendence. The self-transformation in meditation as a process 
of disembodiment is described vividly by Eugen Herrigel through the example of archery:
...the contest consist of the archer aiming at himself- and yet not at himself, in hitting 
himself- and yet not himself, and thus becoming simultaneously the aimer and the aim, 
the hitter and the hit. (Herrigel, 1971 [1953], p. 20)
Thus, passive experience is a constant change and fluctuation in which the body, the 
consciousness and its part of body awareness inter-reflect each other in producing a crucial 
quality of ecstasy. Even though the body can never be detached from mental processing, in this 
practice the bodily awareness is transformed into a lower degree of 'body recognition' and 
therefore it does not have control over bodily actions. In this particular method the perception is 
blocked out.
Through the establishment of passive and active interaction this chapter's argument 
suggests a new treatment of interactivity. It has been proposed that particular techniques of body 
movement and choreography in religious practices provide a meaningful application for an 
external and internal body-mind interconnection, as it displays strategies for the production of 
subjective experiences. As it was shown, bodily participation displays a spectrum of body 
awareness based on the fragmentation of the body-consciousness relationship. The quality of this 
relationship relies on how far the person is aware of his or her body actions, how automatic the 
action is and how far one is in charge of control of the particular body involvement. Drawing on 
these various methods, this chapter suggests that active interaction works within symbolic means 
of bodily movement with the artistic consideration of how active body awareness may influence 
the received affection and meaning. Passive interaction of technology is cognitively reflective as 
it captures the triggered perception alteration of the affection. The modality of meditation, which
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represents inwardness, is applied on the technology in the way that it produces external stimuli in 
the artistic system that can then produce inwardness. In this respect, it attempts to collect data of 
automatic response and biological data, which, based on intentional formulations, reflect a 
controlled cognitive level of the spectator. In this sense, passive interaction produces a different 
body awareness; the artist might, for example, create a scene, where in a similar way to 
meditation practice, the self-realisation produces an inwardness. This interface could be designed 
to trigger affection towards an inward experience. In this way, the artist aims to create perceptual 
alterations of the spectator producing meditative states; thus, the disembodied state is created not 
by the body awareness that produces a 'virtual body', as seen in active modality, but by an 
imaginative and meditative quality of the consciousness. From a phenomenological perspective, 
in passive interaction, the body and consciousness are indivisible, as they produce a similar 
bodily response to that which every externalisation of consciousness produces. The displayed 
variety of body awareness in the immersive experience explains various methodologies of 
ecstatic experience in VR, which provide a spectrum of artistic implementations for interaction.
iv. The Creative Ecstasy in Interactive Media Art
Corresponding to the previous models of spiritual practices, Diana Gromala's and Yacov
Sharir's (1994-99) virtual environment of Dancing with the virtual dervish: virtual bodies 
(Figure 5.04, 5.05) displays an interactive environment which attempts to produce experiences 
akin to spiritual practices. This artwork provides a significant example, as it exhibits a concept 
which applies the established modalities of spiritual practices emphasising a body-mind 
interconnection. The discourse here builds upon this acknowledgment and discusses this early 
work of interactive art that underpins an ecstatic dimension in the spectator's experience.
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Figure 5.04 Diana Gromala 's and Yacov Sharir 's virtual environment of 
' Dancing with the virtual dervish: virtual bodies ' (1994-99) with interactor
(Hansen, 2004)
Figure 5.05 Screen shots of the visualisation of 'Dancing with the virtual dervish: virtual bodies ' (1994-99)
(Gromala, 1994)
The media artist Diana Gromala (1996) applied the method of self-reporting, previously 
mentioned as vital to subjective experiences (see in chapter 4), to create the primary concept of 
this work. Emerging from her personal experience she observed a perception alteration by the 
special bodily state of pain, which she evaluated as a spiritual-like experience. Her 
phenomenological investigation of pain led her to create an artwork which reproduces these 
experiences resembling the ecstasies of dervish dancers. She used the technological potential of 
VR to produce an audiovisual environment with virtual 3D visualisations of particular 
representations of the body. Her aim was to generate a unique interconnection between the 
aesthetic of the virtual bodies and the moving physical body. The body pain causing the 
consciousness alteration was articulated by medical technologies (X-rays, MRI, sonograms, 
fibber-optic, and micro-camera) which were transformed into virtual bodies. The particular 
aesthetic of the body and its textual layers of sensual meaning attempted to convert the mental 
representation of pain into an ecstatic pleasure. Gromala depicted the conceptualisation of the 
user's experience in the following way:
...I instead (of Western medical practices) draw on certain Eastern traditions, where 
meditative states can lead to a sense of inward expansiveness and a newly informed 
connectedness to our bodies. VR seemed to offer quite similar sensations...the extreme 
pleasure associated with open-ended textuality, the loss of bodily boundaries and a 
diffused or fragmentary subjectivity. (Gromala, 1996, np.)
A similar characterisation of the disembodied experience is described by the co-creator of the 
artwork; Sharir refers to the transformation of body awareness caused by the mirrored-body of 
the virtual environment:
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...I move through and within the organic space of an enormous torso [virtual 3D body]. 
Within the architecture of this torso, I also find digitalised images of myself dancing, 
again distributing and multiplying my own body and experience. This mirror effect, this 
dancing a duet with myself, provokes a sense of heightened anxiety, caused by the 
doubling of my own body image. Further, my actions initiate caused-effect relationship 
in all worlds; (Gromala and Sharir, 1996, p. 284)
Both creators described an experience which, through a transformation of body awareness and 
disembodiment, led to an ecstatic experience. In the way that consciousness alteration was 
described earlier as out-of-body experiences (in chapter 4), when one loses feeling through the 
reproduction of their own body, in this case also one loses feeling and creates the sensation of 
being outside of the body. Gromala applied VR as an essential part of consciousness-altering 
bodily responses based on its immersive and subjective qualities.
Drawing on similarities between technological and spiritual interaction the discussion 
provided insight into a means of generating a spiritual-like experience. In this respect it was 
pointed out that technological and spiritual interaction produces a subjective experience as both 
enter a 'virtual reality' within a variety of cognitive schemes regarding bodily involvement and 
its reflection in body awareness. Csikszentmihalyi's notion of flow has characterised an 
important account towards a phenomenological understanding of action, producing a 
conceptualisation of immersive experience and its qualities regarding consciousness. As flow is a 
crucial state of consciousness that emerges in special noiseless conditions of man, 
Csikszentmihalyi determined this as inner states in full harmony (an optimal state). He argued 
that religion was one of the primary approaches of flow, producing crucial experiences with a 
potentiality for ecstasy. Based on this observation, the thesis identified the ecstatic state as a 
heightened quality of flow, which in accounts of spiritual rituals, is often described as the state of 
pure knowledge.
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Proceeding from this proposal, this chapter situated Csikszentmihalyi's notion of flow in 
a framework of artistic cognitive processes and argued that experiencing flow occurs not only 
between artist and artwork but also in the processes of spectator experience in the artwork. The 
argument emerged from a novel quality of technology-based art that allows for the production of 
experience based creation, which may therefore enable the production of a flow between the 
processes of artist-artwork and artwork-spectator. This model helps to account for the aesthetic 
quality of interaction, as the artist not only focuses on the production of the artwork but also on 
its affection on the spectator. In a similar manner, the spectator is not only experiencing the 
artwork but rather reflecting the artist's experience through the artwork. Thus, 
Csikszentmihalyi's controlled experience is, in this interpretation, a creative formulation of the 
artistic control which leads the spectator to an altered state of consciousness.
To achieve this, the artist's implementation of various schemes of spectator involvement 
through the particular technology of VR, produces an immaterial level of the artwork. The 
similar qualities between the experiences produced by interactive technology and those produced 
by religious rituals identified a shared aspiration of immersion into a 'virtual reality', which 
extends human sensation with the possibility of entering novel states of consciousness. The 
discussion also displayed that flow emerges through a unity between body and consciousness 
which, in the artistic context, signifies the quality of the technological affection or control 
through an artistic intention. Depending on whether the flow happens through active or passive 
bodily involvement, various qualities of 'self-realisation' in VR might be produced, which can 
help the artist to build a model for particular content. Although a phenomenological division 
between body and consciousness is not possible, it is argued that various degrees of body 
involvement might help the recognition of various artistic strategies.
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Overall, Csikszentmihalyi's positive psychological model produced a novel and 
contemporary approach to describing subjective experience. The concept is important to the 
argument, as it builds an evidence-based model upon a non-materialistic conceptualisation66 of 
cognitive processes. Significantly, this chapter introduced equivalence between the concepts of 
flow, aesthetic experiences and spiritual experiences, concluding that technology-based artwork 
produces spiritual-like experiences. The idea of artistic flow was also revisited for 
technologically-mediated creation and experience, supporting the aesthetic interconnection 
between artist and spectator. Through this the argument of this thesis has characterised an 
immaterial model of art.
66 Csikszentmihalyi's critics (such as Marr, 2000) have targeted the lack of empirical methodology as his theory 
relies on a phenomenological model within metaphoric understanding. Primarily, criticism is formulated on the 
fact that flow does not provide a somatic representation in the nervous system and its claims are not set to a 
pragmatic logic. Marr's investigation is extensive and sets the empirical single process model of learning against 
the contemporary multiple models, assuming a proof of Csikszentmihalyi's insufficiency towards a psychological 
model of flow: 'The decomposition of flow into mere lists of real and hypothetical processes underlines its 
weaknesses as a scientific construct. Primarily, the theoretical explanation for flow has poor syntactical structure 
because of the uncertain way its defining terms are related to each other. Flow is generally described as a loosely 
integrated collection of mental or motivational states or processes that are validated primarily by self reports' and 
more specific: 'Ironically, Csikszentmihalyi was correct with his identification of flow with focused attention. His 
error was in defining attention in literary metaphor rather than grounding it in actual neural processes. The flow 
response is a discrete event because its metaphors are discrete (psychic energy, order in consciousness). But as 
defined as an actual neural process, flow becomes an indiscrete event, and becomes more pleasurable or intense 
as the relative salience and number of cognitive precepts increase in time.' (Marr, 2000, np.) These criticisms do 
not affect the manner in which flow is handled within this thesis.
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Chapter 6
The Transparent Act: Towards a New Aesthetic of Art
i. The Aestheticisation of the 'Artist-Artwork-Spectator' Triangle: Transparency
As the 'artist-artwork-spectator' triangle is a crucial cognitive interconnectivity that produces the
backbone of new immaterial understanding to interactive art, this chapter suggests examining 
what impact this has on aesthetic and whether it validates a new artistic approach. An 
aestheticisation of the 'artist-artwork-spectator' interconnectivity in this argument means 
producing a philosophical account of art production and evaluation, which determines an 
aesthetical framework for emerging and interactive technology. In this respect, instead of an 
aesthetic study of materialistic approaches of art, the thesis attempts to establish new aesthetic 
understanding, based on phenomenological claims, which here are detached from any aesthetic 
claims of earlier art production. Importantly, this chapter points out that this is a rediscovery of a 
lost dimension in art that had been forgotten through the materialistic approach of aesthetic. The 
re-discovery of this dimension in this thesis' core intervention suggests that it is not only the 
artistic/technological implementations (invisible tool, transparent medium) that bear a cognitive 
quality but that the aesthetic itself can be comprehended through the phenomenology of 
interaction. This is what is termed in this thesis as the transcendental layer of the artwork.
This key intervention of the thesis draws on the concept of 'dematerialisation', which 
emerges through a new conception of immateriality. Dematerialisation is closely related to the 
processes which occur through the application of technology in artistic creations, producing a 
cognitive-driven understanding. Numerous accounts of dematerialisation (which will be 
discussed later) have previously only focused on physical disappearance, whilst others have
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looked at the phenomenal aspects of communication as for example in teleportation and wireless 
interaction. Both of these approaches remained within a materialistic conceptualisation; they 
delivered undeveloped claims of immateriality, which therefore were not able to reveal their 
potential for an aesthetic model for art and technology. This chapter is intended to fill the gap left 
by an ill-considered contextualisation of immateriality and to suggest ways in which 
dematerialisation produces a new aesthetic approach for technology-based art.
The notion of dematerialisation has been broadly considered to be an affect of 
technology, as initially determined by El Lissitzky, thus something that is triggered by 
'digitalisation' (Lillemose, 2005). In a similar manner to the way in which Krueger claimed it, 
disappearance of the physical occurred not through the craftwork in art production but through 
technological implementation in the artwork itself. Some accounts of the invisible tool were 
applied to these claims, which saw technology embedded in the environment and disappearing in 
physical objectivity (see chapter 2). Although this conception argued for immaterial qualities, it 
stayed within a materialistic framework, which tended to apply an invisible physicality instead of 
a cognitive quality.
Dematerialisation in art was re-introduced by the theorist Oscar Matta (1976), who 
contextualised it as a creative means of communication. Building upon Matta's claim, Lippard 
and Chandler noted an 'obsolete objectivity' in art aesthetic which emerged from craft-like 
productivity:
As more and more work is designed in the studio but executed elsewhere by 
professional craftsmen, as the object becomes merely the end product, a number of 
artists are losing interest in the physical evolution of the work of art. The studio is once 
again becoming a study. Such a trend is provoking a profound dematerialization of art, 
and if it continues to prevail, it may result in the object's becoming wholly obsolete. 
(Lippard and Chandler, 1968, pp. 31-32)
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Lippard and Chandler argued that aesthetic questions of art reside not in material but immaterial 
formulations 7 and instead of a formal implementation of materiality it uses a conceptual 
understanding of new materiality. Jacob Lillemose (2005), in particular, has taken the 
materialistic view of immateriality, viewing it as a material condition. For Lillemose, the 
aesthetic of immateriality was the socio-sensitivity of technology, which created the critical 
approach and contemporary view of digitalism formulated in art. He argued that technology- 
based art should address a lack of understanding of technology that he saw as an immaterial 
dimension of the artwork. Lillemose's aesthetic of interactive media art rejected spiritual-like or 
cognitive approaches to new media, pointing out that:
The aesthetic of immateriality I suggest opposes the aesthetic of various kinds of techno 
cults and techno transcendentalisms where immateriality represents an otherworldly 
ideal created by the great computer God. A materialistic understanding of immateriality 
in new media art on the other hand, sees immateriality as an actual material and thus 
also politically charged reality predisposed to continuous reproduction - socially, 
culturally and economically. (Lillemose, 2005, np.)
Lillemose argued for a 'conceptual aesthetic', which proposes an art not through fixed visual 
properties but through 'abstract actualisations' that are constituted by the cognitive processes of 
novel meaning creation. He suggested that meaning arises through the aesthetic quality of 
materiality, which does not characterise physical properties but rather communicative relations and 
the means of information exchange. He (Lillemose, 2005, np.) argued that technology-based art 
creates an ultra-conceptual approach that: '.. .emphasises the thinking process almost 
exclusively', with which art forms are able to return to a 'non-reducible multiplicity'. In this
" In 1973, Lucy R. Lippard's Six Years: The dematerialisation of the Art Object, 1966-1972 explains 
dematerialisation as a shift of the art as a value of object to its political-aesthetic contextualisation, which is the 
immaterial level of art. She concludes this from the fact that the creative process itself is mechanised and that it is 
the concept that generates the artistic meaning and not how the artist chooses their motives or techniques.
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respect, Lillemose treated immateriality as a new material condition produced by aesthetical 
processes:
This aesthetics suggests a new interdependent and open exchange between the 
conceptual and material dimension of art: In setting materiality free from the object - 
and the philosophical discourse, power structures and aesthetic paradigms of pure 
visuality surrounding it - the notion allows us to comprehend materiality as a potential 
predisposed for continuous conceptual coding, organization, distribution, 
contextualization and interpretation. Instead of attaching materiality to specific and 
finite forms, media or institutions, conceptual art conceives materiality as virtuality and 
places it in a broad aesthetic - multi-, inter- and post-media - field of continuous 
abstract actualizations.... In other words, conceptual art questions materiality - the 
material condition - by subjecting it to abstract actualizations in the mental and not the 
visual sense; questions in the sense of opening it to new expressions and meanings. 
(Lillemose, 2005, np.)
He pointed out that immateriality is one of the formulations which can break down the 
technologically focused aesthetic in technology-based art. Lillemose's approach is particularly 
important to the thesis as it comprehends a critical approach to technology-based art. However, 
his approach is only based on the critique of fetishism and 'technological attraction', which has 
been identified in Krueger's work, providing no solution to how immateriality might be used as 
an artistic conception in creation. Lillemose established an aesthetic where immateriality 
emerges only in evaluation processes, justifying art creation based on conceptual contents. The 
thesis suggests that Lillemose's model is a significant modality of dematerialisation of aesthetic 
but it is still contained in a materialistic framework, which ignores experience as being crucial to 
the aesthetic. In this respect, Lillemose's concept bares a similarity with Eco's original concept 
of openness (see chapter 2, discussed as semiotic openness), where meaning creation did not, 
crucially, account for interaction, but produced the essential quality of the experience through the 
meaning creation. Whereas Lillemose's approach argued for an immateriality in the creation of a 
balance between technology and art in artistic creation, immateriality in this thesis question:
what is the affective impact of this potential aesthetic on the spectator. Lillemose situated his
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view of immateriality in the old dualistic model of artist-artwork and artwork-spectator, in which 
he conceptualised the artistic creation in terms of concrete artistic intent.
What Lillemose ignored (ie. the process of art creation and experience as an aesthetic 
dimension) Jean-Francis Lyotard (1985) - the creator of the Les Immateriaux6* (in English: The 
Immaterial) (Figure 6.01) - described as a flow-like process. Lyotard, however, discussed 
artworks in general (not implicitly with reference to technology), which he did not see linked to a 
material object but to a time-based stream of immaterial sensation. More explicitly and 
unambiguously resembling Csikszentmihalyi's psychological account of flow, David Ryan 
(2002) described this non-physicality of human cognition as the extension of flow in the system:
In virtual reality, where technologies splice human subject into a cybernetic circuit by 
putting the human sensorium in a direct feedback loop with computer data banks, flow 
becomes the operative concept: 'the flow of information within systems is more 
determinative of identity that the materiality of physical structure. Lunging into the 
river of information implies recognizing that you are the river'. (Ryan, 2002, p.44)
As such, the flow as a cognitive quality (Csikszentmihalyi, 1975) is the agency of 
interconnectivity, which in art is the fulfilment of dematerialisation.
Through this, the flow can be understood as immateriality in art which uses the metaphor 
of the circulation of blood flow in the human body serving as a regulator of interconnection and 
generator of more complex phenomenon, hi this analogy the centre of the creation is the artwork, 
which functions as an organ creating a meta-level in the system. The heart of this system is the 
generator of the flow, which creates, through other agencies, consciousness, while the flow itself
68 Les Immateriaux was an emblematic exhibition in the Pompidou Centre in Paris in 1985. Jean-Francois Lyotard 
and Thierry Chaput co-organized the event, which proposed a new approach to art, bringing science and high- 
technological aspects into consideration. The intention of the exhibition was to explore how technology might 
change aspects between human and materials and how the information society might have an impact on human 
perception.
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Figure 6.0lThe poster of the exhibition of 'Les Immateriaux'
in Centre Georges Pompidou 
(Ed. Lyotard and Chaput, Editions du Centre Georges, Pompidou, 1985)
is not productive but indispensable for the organism. The intensity of flow is regulated by the 
'heart'( in this context the artwork) controlling the quality of generated phenomenon. To be 
aware of the body means to be able to regulate the blood flow. This is how spiritual techniques 
create meta-levels in the body. In a similar manner, creative processes focusing on the 
conception of the flow might create a meta-level in the artwork.
Dematerialisation has previously been acknowledged in technology-based creation; 
however, its articulation has either stayed within a materialistic conception of immateriality or it 
was not applied as an aesthetic modality. Also, the investigation has revealed that there have 
already been conceptions of immateriality as flow-like qualities in art; however, they did not 
acknowledge its potential for a new aesthetic in interactive media art. In order to produce the 
immaterial model for art, the thesis' argument suggests an aestheticisation of the flow as the 
cognitive quality of the 'artist-artwork-spectator' triangle. Working towards an immaterial 
aesthetic quality means that the artists create their artwork to produce immediacy to the 
spectator, manifested in a meta-layer of the artwork that is produced through the effective 
application of invisible tool and transparent medium.
The notion of transparency was earlier implemented, declaring a quality of technology 
that is both artistically reflective and functionally invisible. To accommodate the quality of 
interconnectivity between artist and spectator, this chapter suggests applying the previously 
discussed terminology of transparency (see chapter 4). It is proposed that, as transparency is 
considered a cognitive quality of technology, in the same manner it can be applied to the entire 
creative process between artist and spectator. This emerges from investigations in earlier 
chapters, which concluded that the artist creates experiences and not representative attributes 
through technologically-mediated collaboration and, as such, the artistic vision of the chain of
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events (the design of experience) ideally needs to match the spectator's cognitive processes. 
Thus, the qualities of the creative flow in artistic creation are analogous to the qualities in the 
creative process of the experience. This is how the artist and spectator interconnection is 
assembled in high intimacy, as both creative processes ('making art' and 'experiencing art') 
work towards cognitive models within the interactive process. Recognising collaborative 
processes - interaction with generative tools, interaction with organic tools (programmers) and 
interaction with artistic interface - as the main objective of creation and experience, it will be 
proposed that the cognitive flow between 'artist-artwork-spectator' is the framework through 
which technology creates the quality of transparency. It links two subjective experiences (artist 
and spectator) together and suggests an epistemological phenomenon in artistic processes. The 
heightened quality of flow between artist and spectator makes their relationship intimate as it 
creates a meta-cognition by seeking new knowledge; they have similar cognitive qualities in the 
interactive processes of creation through artistic intention and the interactive processes of 
experience through shaping consciousness. The crucial interest in mapping these two processes 
onto each other, or better to draw an instant link between the cognitive processes of artist and 
spectator, is the generation of a model for artistic practice, which, through implementation, sets 
up a 'direct' access to the audience's cognitive modification. It is argued that to achieve this, not 
only the qualities of spectator consciousness need to be considered, but also the qualities of how 
the artist produces transparency with the applications of the invisible tool/transparent medium 
and the collective collaborative processes.
The matching of the 'making art' and 'experiencing art' processes has been demonstrated 
by contemporary art research. For example by Lizzie Muller and Ernest Edmonds' project 
entitled Beta space. In this project the artistic creation was immediately tested by the spectators;
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they claimed (Muller and Edmonds, 2006, p. 149): 'It is in such cases, where the public meets 
the interdisciplinary creation of the artwork, that production and presentation are drawn 
together'. With their concept of living laboratories' they elaborated on an experimental model 
in which artist and spectator work closely together to produce an affective modality for 
interactive art production.69 This conception is particularly important as it emphasises an 
immaterial-based creation process in which interconnectivity, and not physical qualities, 
determines art creation. With this, Muller and Edmonds introduced an artist-spectator immediacy 
in which the audiences' experiences could be immediately tested and as such the artistic 
experience was embedded in the creation process.
ii. Degree of Transparency
Numerous accounts described in this thesis suggests cognitive model of technologically- 
mediated art, claiming an uninterrupted experience (openness, immersion, flow). Most 
significantly, the philosophical examination in chapter 4 brought forward the crucial concept of 
Heidegger's readiness-to-hand, which described an embodied property of the human with regard 
to a cognitive continuum. Through the established concept of transparency this design of 
experience can be formulated as a desire for an undisturbed flow between the artist and spectator. 
As the flow is mainly based on the artistic formulation of technology, errors occur when artists 
do not efficiently apply technology as invisible tool and transparent medium. Applying the 
experience-based account of transparency, which provides an aesthetic dimension of technology-
raThis entanglement between the immediate responses by the audiences with the artist's performance has already 
been exemplified in Jackson Pollok's action paintings (Friedman, 1995).
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based art, the errors can be reduced through the aesthetic aim of producing immediacy. The aim 
is a transparent experience at the highest level of responsiveness. The factor of deficiencies can 
be called noise, referring to the earlier examination of information theory in art where the 
distorted signal was declared to be an undesired element of exchange.
A 'transparent experience' means that the artist affects the spectator with the technology, 
by transmitting a new, cognitive quality. As the artworks: '.. .are somewhat akin to portraits, 
reflecting aspects of the interactors, transformed so as to express the artist's point' (Rokeby, 
1995, p. 153), the quality of the flow serves to describe the immediacy mediated by the artwork. 
As such, the notion of transparency stands for a quality of the flow, which includes the 
implementation of invisible tool (making art), the quality of transparent medium (experiencing 
art) and at the end the novel layer formulated in the spectator's consciousness. Rokeby has 
outlined the task of artistic production as reducing the probability of distortion, which here is 
called cognitive transparency:
The less distortion there is, the easier it is for the interactor to identify with the 
responses the interactive system is making. The interactive artist must strike a balance 
between the interactor's sense of the control, which enforces identification, and the 
richness of the response system's behaviour, which keep the system from becoming 
closed. (Rokeby, 1995, p. 148)
The quality of the transparency shows how successfully the artist has produced an experience 
that is crucially reflected in the spectator's cognition. Noise is a cognitive property which arises 
through the faults of the aesthetic implementation in the artwork. Noise in the cognitive flow 
refers to that the work of art cannot bring the artistic intention into presence. This error would 
mostly lie in the quality and combination of artistic conceptions in the artwork, which are 
openness, responsiveness, invisible tool and transparent medium. As shown earlier, openness 
describes the artistic notion of meaning creation, responsiveness describes the quality of
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interaction within the artistic system, and the notion of invisible tool draws out a crucial 
phenomenological understanding of an interface. The artistic system is a collaboration of these 
concepts. Openness has shown that, for the creation of effective meaning, the notions of 
multiplicity and spectator involvement should be considered. That is to say that the balance 
(through the elements of the artwork) between the provided knowledge (artwork) and the 
acquired knowledge (spectator) generate the effective meaning of art. To achieve this, the 
applied technology has to be re-evaluated in the context of meaning and its relationship to the 
spectator experience. In this respect, noise occurs through a high amount of information or 
through reduced quality of involvement. As such, the low degree of openness produces noise; 
thus, the artist is not able to exhibit their intention through the artwork. The invisible tool, or 
more specifically the revision of this idea of transparent interface and the notion of 
responsiveness, describes the quality of the interaction. Noise is created when the interface is not 
transparent but visible. Visibility means that the person interacting is not able see through the 
interface, thus the artistic content and the meaning creation is blocked.
Goertz' investigation (as discussed in chapter 3) evaluates interactivity (the degrees of 
choice, modifiability, the available selections and modifications and linearity/non-linearity) in 
terms of the abundance or scarcity (invisibility) of those applications that do not offer continuous 
translation between the spectator's intention and the acquired content. Immersion is a significant 
contribution to this as it describes the cognitive quality that the system produces. It was 
suggested earlier that immersion is a quality that enables a continuous flow; hence, the lack of 
immersion means noise. Yet there are other, more specific, domains, like artistic content itself, 
which can produce noise. A common misinterpretation is the meaning creation through 
metaphors of interface, which leads to the visibility of the technology. Common misapplication
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appears in interactive artworks when the emerging characteristic of technology becomes the 
artwork itself, only providing novelty without mapping out an aesthetic. As such, noise in the 
system means disturbance in the flow between the artistic intention and the spectator's 
experience; hence the meta-level of cognition cannot be created. As such, the notion of 'degree 
of transparency' will be established in the following section of this chapter, depicting the level of 
noise in the artwork. Noiseless flow means the highest degree of transparency.
The way in which noise occurs in the artistic system is enormously complex, as it 
emerges not only through the elements of the system but also in their collaboration. Suggesting 
the notion of noise as a negative form of transparency, it can be pointed out that meaning 
creation is the noiseless flow between invisible tool and transparent medium. The quality of 
noise creates the degree of transparency, which describes the quality of interconnectivity 
between artist and spectator.
iii. The Lost Dimension of Art: Transcendent Experience - The Poetic Level
It is argued in this thesis that an immaterial quality of the artwork can be evaluated by the degree
of transparency (Figure 6.02). An uninterrupted flow between the artist and spectator produces a 
heightened transparency which is most crucially formulated in the spectator experience. Through 
the acknowledgement of the flow-like capacity of creative processes, which might produce 
ecstatic states of consciousness, it can be shown that this meta-cognition of the spectator can 
produce a transcendental layer. This transcendental layer of the artwork is the outcome of an 
aestheticisation of the artist-spectator relationship producing a spiritual-like dimension in the 
perception, which is constituted by the uninterrupted cognitive processes and transparency. This
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Figure 6.02 Conceptual draft: The 'artist-artwork-spectator' triangle: 'making art'and 'experiencing art'processes 
in the Transparent Act and their evaluation through the degree of transparency (Zics, 2007)
unique quality, as it is argued in this thesis, produces a new, poetic knowledge through the 
spectator's aesthetic experience.
To understand the application of a transcendent layer in interactive media art, this chapter 
will now characterise its meaning in this particular context. In order to establish a cognitive 
noiseless flow between artist and spectator, the terminology of 'transcendent' is treated here as a 
unique outcome which, in a similar manner to spiritual practices, which might produce unusual 
cognitive qualities of consciousness, described earlier as ecstasies. In this sense, the thesis 
allocates transcendence not as an external indescribable force70 but as a possible unique quality 
of human cognition, which is produced by the aesthetic experience; it is a transcendental level of 
consciousness which is produced by the noiseless flow and achieves a new knowledge creation.
Illustrating the way in which this unique quality can occur in technology-based art 
production, the chapter introduces accounts which claim a transcendental quality of artwork. One 
of these is Char Davies' enigmatic VR-based artwork Osmose (1995) (Figure 6.03), which 
Laurie McRobert referred to as a unique spatial experience that would evoke transcendent states 
of consciousness through affection:
70 Numerous philosophical accounts explained transcendent qualities with an agency of supernatural forces. The 
word transcendent (-al) was described initially by Greek philosopher Plato and can be defined as meaning 'beyond 
sense experience'. With this term Plato affirmed an indescribable phenomenon that is known only by intuition. 
Plato's terminology was applied in many religious tenets (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) to describe a spiritual 
characteristic of the reality. The most known account of transcendence is from Kant who introduced the dual 
semiotics dividing 'transcendental' from 'transcendent'. Kant (1855 [1781], p.16) described the more commonly 
used transcendental as :' I apply the term transcendental to all knowledge which is not so much occupied with 
objects as with the mode of our cognition of these objects, so far as this mode of cognition is possible a priori.' 
Whereas transcendental is more linked to a phenomenon of knowledge that does not appear instantly from the 
experience itself, 'transcendent' means beyond the limits of human experience (not immanent).
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Figure 6.03 Screen shot of the 'Subterranean Earth ' in 'Osmose ' 
(Davies, 1995)
Why does the experience of transcendence occur at all? The most obvious reason is that 
we float in a novel sense of spatiality, an experience that differs from the three- 
dimensional spatiality we live in. Another reason is that in Osmose/Ephe'm'ere, the 
translucent, semi-transparent art forms appear to be dressed in a skeletal essentiality, a 
framework which gives them a formal, unearthly air. (McRobert, 2007, p. 64)
He pointed out (2007, p. 64) that this emerged not through: '.. .an encounter of magically 
represented nature' but rather as an artistic process of altering perception. Similar to the thesis' 
argument, McRobert further built an analogy to spiritual experiences, pointing out that iconic 
paintings which represented a faith evoked similar experiences to those seen in Davies' special 
spatial experiences:
Still, the icon's [painting] dynamics, coupled with belief, with faith, can also evoke 
transcendent feelings in the worshipper, making her feel as though she had travelled to 
some heavenly spatiality. In this respect, both the icon and Davies virtual art, do, 
indeed, tempt the worshiper or immersing to embrace God or nature as an Ideal form. 
(McRobert, 1997, p.65)
McRobert's notion of 'heavenly spatiality' referred to a cognitive introspective experience more 
like an extraordinary perception of an unknown world. In this respect a revisit of Gromala and 
Sharir's (1994-99) technology-based dance performance Dancing with the Virtual Dervish: 
Virtual Bodies is inevitable (see earlier in chapter 5), as it also aimed to provide a spiritual-like 
experience. In this sense, it immediately draws out a potential of transcendent qualities which 
Sharir (1996, np.), the dancer of the performance, formulates as follows: 'Could the transcendent 
state of a dervish be at all expressed or alluded to? Was the experience of so-called 
disembodiment in any way related to other transcendent states?' In a VR environment, as it was 
described in chapter 5, the artist-choreographer collaboration intends to generate an experience 
in which they recall various states of body awareness combined with sacred meanings of text. 
Johannes H. Birringer (1998) also described a vivid sensation of transcendence in Gromala and
Sharir's work through the fluctuation between consciousness and body:
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The notion of 'disembodiment' in technological immersion is resisted here for its 
perpetuation of the transcendent metaphysics of mind space over body intelligence. 
Indeed, the thinking and sensing body empowered by technology offers up, in reverse, 
visceral languages of bones, organs, fluids, and even of seeing inside a movement. 
(Birringer, 1998, p. 127)
With the various layers of perception of the dancer and spectator their work attempted to build an 
analogy to the spiritual practice of whirling dervishes. The extraordinary perception, evoked 
through the formulation of body transformation and flying into an inner-self, is analogous to the 
repeated actions of the dervish worshiper, who transformed his body awareness into an ecstatic 
state. As such, the characteristics of transcendent layers are immediately linkable to the earlier 
established notion of immersions, disembodiment and most crucially to spiritual flow 
experiences. Whereas in spiritual experiences a particular intentional 'body-mind ritual' leads to 
a transcendence, in technology-based art the characterisation of the spiritual does not link to an 
unsubstantiated phenomenon (for example seeking supernatural entity); it rather aspires to 
awaken knowledge towards a spiritual layer of reality. Although art does not produce holistic 
practice models as spiritual means, it illuminates qualities and phenomena which might change 
or underpin ideas towards the nature of man. The spiritual level emerges from the aesthetic, 
therefore it serves the artistic intention and not vice versa.
Through the analogy of the transcendent layer to a spiritual-like experience, the thesis 
suggests that the transcendence produced by the flow is not only a crucial process in the 
spectator perception but the producer of a new knowledge with regards to Csikszentmihalyi's 
claim. Similarly, Imants Brauss described the entering into an inner knowledge which carries a 
potential to characterise new knowledge:
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In the mystical experience [transcendent experience] that I had, I spontaneously entered 
a transcendent state of consciousness in which I had the sense that I knew everything 
that I ordinarily knew, but saw that it all fit together in a harmonious pattern with 
everything else in the universe. Coincident with that noetic realization I had a deep 
sense of emotional well-being that was not characterized by excitement, but rather by 
profound groundedness. (Brauss, 2007, pp. 122-123)
Brauss' notion of self-transformation (which relates to the earlier discussed flow experience) 
emphasises a 'noetic' experience, is an indescribable phenomenon but also emphesis the 
produced knowledge, which makes visible not-yet-known qualities. Brauss argued that this 
rediscovered knowledge is the greatest challenge of science and probably the greatest potentiality 
of technology-based art. In this respect, the knowledge-seeking in artwork emerges through a 
transparency which is produced by the artistic meaning creation of interaction. Meaning creation, 
as introduced by the concept of openness, produces the aesthetic layer of the transcendental 
experience. The argument here describes this significant layer as a poetic level of the artwork, 
which is significant as it allocates the artistic characteristics of the transcendental experiences. 
The notion of a poetic level in the context of this argument does not suggest a poetic knowledge 
but rather a sensory-emotional experience of the artwork. Poetic means an experience through 
senses which, however, might exhibit the same metaphoric sense as poetry does. It can be said it 
is conflicting with a scientific knowledge. Taylor (1998) expresses the poetic matter as in the 
following way:
Poetic experience indicates an encounter with reality that is non-analytical, something 
that is perceived as beautiful, awful (awe-full), spontaneous, mysterious...poetic 
knowledge is not strictly speaking a knowledge of poems, but a spontaneous act of the 
external and internal senses with the intellect, integrated and whole, rather than an act 
associated with the powers of analytic reasoning felt... It is, we might say, knowledge 
from the inside out, radically different from knowledge about things. In other words, it 
is the opposite of scientific knowledge. (Tayler, 1998, pp. 5-6)
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The transcendence of the poetic level is what in artwork generates novel knowledge and 
immediacy, which is here defined as the degree of transparency in the artwork. In a similar 
manner, Whalen (2000, np.) describes the poetic level as triggering new knowledge which 
emerges in the transcendence: 'Poetic Knowledge skilfully excavates an essential mode of 
human knowledge. It is a mode as proper to our intelligence as it is redolent of man's 
transcendence and the value of knowledge for its own sake'. As such, the thesis explains the 
poetic level as a meta-layer of the artwork which is necessary to a transcendent experience.
The argument of this thesis now arrives at one of its most crucial declarations, which 
claims a re-discovery of knowledge that was already existent in modalities of art but had 
disappeared due to a materialistic development. This novel knowledge works towards a non- 
materialistic artist-spectator immediacy in art creation but has shifted into a hidden dimension of 
aesthetic preservation. This forgotten aesthetic principal was the result of scientific knowledge 
impacting on creative processes, which focused on the improvement of object-based properties, 
rather than on the original intentions of art, to produce an intimate communication between the 
artist and spectator. The lack of conceptualisation of this metaphysical quality arose from the 
increased scientific-based application of techniques in art (for example linear perspective). 
Implementing mechanical methods served representalist doctrines, which can be considered as a 
key turning point in the development of art practices.
It follows that the 'immaterial act' can be characterised as latent knowledge and it can be 
claimed that technology not only displays scientific knowledge but also produces transcendental 
qualities. Immateriality in the creation processes focuses on cognitive processes which engage 
with non-replicable phenomena that are not measurable. As such, the lost dimension of the
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artwork can be seen as the rediscovery of a novel spiritual-like process, which through the 
potential of technology might reproduce forgotten cognitive qualities of art. As such, the 
immaterial approach of art reverses the dualistic understanding back to ancient aspirations that 
the artist builds an intimacy through a spiritually-driven creation. It is argued in this thesis that 
the Transparent Act might return this lost dimension of art, providing a sophisticated framework 
for technology-based art.
iv. The Transparent Act
By focusing on a philosophical investigation of interactive media art, a new model has been 
determined, termed the Transparent Act, which is an immaterial encounter offering a 
transparency in cognitive processes. The Transparent Act is a process of flow between the artist 
and spectator in which interactive technology enables a new immediacy between them. This 
immediacy is the crucial meta-layer of the artwork, which is characterised in the spectator's 
transcendent experience. The poetic knowledge produced through these immaterial interactions 
suggests a rediscovery of a lost dimension in art, breaking down the legacy of materialistic 
approaches to aesthetic. As such, the Transparent Act might provide a novel aesthetic approach 
to technology-based art for practitioners and critics, and also an educative model as well.
Until now the process of artistic creation and the process of 'experiencing art' have been 
approached as isolated activities and their impact on the interconnectivity of creative processes 
was ignored. It has been argued in this thesis that interactive technology requires an active 
spectatorship through which both the artist and spectator have the same generative role in the 
artistic creation. The artists create the work not based on physical properties but as a chain of 
sequenced events. This generative act is the spectator's experience design; thus the artist creates
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the work as if they would experience it themselves. From another point of view, the spectators 
experience a cognitive quality based upon the artists' act. As such, the spectators' experiences 
reflect the artistic intention distributed by the generative act. Therefore, the Transparent Act is a 
two way action of creative processes because not only does the artwork affect the spectator, but 
the spectator's action also affects the artwork.
Based on these claims, the 'artist-artwork-spectator' triangle has been substantiated, 
which suggests that the cognitive quality of the artistic creation and the spectator's experience 
can be mapped onto each other, which leads, to the aestheticisation of the artist-spectator 
interrelationship. From this perspective, the novel aesthetic driver of the creation is, instead of an 
object-oriented creation, a cognitive-based design of the experience. Through this, the intimate 
processes between artist and spectator are declared as a main objective of art creation, seeking a 
noiseless flow between them. The quality of this cognitive flow relies on the cognitive 
immediacy of the artist and spectator, which is a collaborative application between the meaning 
creation of the artwork (openness) and technological potential of the interaction 
(responsiveness). The transparent application of these concepts means seeking a transparent 
medium in creation that produces the flow that characterises not only the artwork-spectator 
interaction but also the artist's cognitive application.
A productive application of the transparent medium is a balance between the artistic 
novelty and technological functionality, which is also the equilibrium between the artistic 
content and mastering the tool. This produces the transparency in the creative processes and the 
noiseless flow between artist and spectator. Therefore, whereas the quality of transparent 
medium describes the success of the artistic conception of technology, the degree of transparency 
describes the cognitive quality of interaction which is how far the process can be considered as
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noiseless. The 'transparent experience' is a heightened degree of transparency which arises when 
the artistic formulation stimulates affection in the spectator's consciousness, enriching it with a 
novel knowledge. This perceptual knowledge is grounded in the conception of the cognitive 
flow, which is akin to spiritual experiences and characterised by similar cognitive outcomes. 
Seeking transparency frequently generates meta-cognition, the crucial experience produced in 
the spectator's perception. This transcendental layer is the ecstatic state of consciousness where 
the flow between the creator and spectator is noiseless.
As such, in the Transparent Act there are two qualities of transparency: one as the quality 
of interface, the other as the process or act that is presented as a flow in the triangular 
interconnection of'artist-artwork-spectator'. As classified earlier, transparency is a powerful 
attribute of creativity, which provides subtle layers of meaning in the artistic interface. 
Transparency as a cognitive quality (the act) of the entire process of 'artist-artwork-spectator' is 
based on the aim of the artistic act, which implements tool and medium in such a way that the 
spectator might experience the artist's intention. Transparency is not invisible since it reflects 
back the artistic message of the medium, which technology in an artistic context carries as a 
layer of meaning. Therefore, the Transparent Act is a creative flow between artist and spectator 
through the artistic reflections of the work of art.
In this respect, through the thesis argument, significant notions of interactive art 
production have been elaborated on (such us openness, responsiveness, invisible tool, transparent 
medium, body-awareness - immersion, ecstatic state, transcendent dimension and poetic layer), 
which can be seen as the pillars of the Transparent Act. The earlier revision of numerous 
theories, which had been applied in diverse contexts, served as a potential tool in a new aesthetic. 
The argument provided a network of significant conceptualisations offering a holistic
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understanding towards a new aesthetic. The quality of the application of these concepts was 
provided by the notion of transparency, which depicts how all these attributes work together and 
what qualities they can provide in order to create a noiseless flow. As the artist is the producer of 
the chain of events in the spectator's cognition, they have to apply these modalities so that it 
produces an optimal experience. In this respect, all of the pillars have their original contribution 
in the Transparent Act, interconnected through the immaterial approach of Heidegger's invisible 
tool. It has been argued that technology in art has two different applications according to the 
quality of how cognitive flow is produced. Through Heidegger's notion of readiness-to-hand it 
was claimed that technology should be invisible in the artistic creation process, which is similar 
to technology-driven design processes. Technology as artistic medium, however, should be 
reflective and create a fluctuation between ready-to-hand (invisible) and present-at-hand 
(visible), which in this thesis is termed as transparent medium. The visibility or reflectivity of the 
transparent medium in creation means not an error in functionality (as it would be comprehended 
by design applications) but an artistic layer of novelty. Therefore, in the transparent medium the 
technology itself becomes the content and with its emerging character contributes to meaning 
creation. Interactive technology becomes a transparent medium through the meaning which is 
attached to its quality of responsiveness and the artistic interaction produces the quality of 
transparency, which is an aesthetic formulation of the invisible tool.
Through artistic cognitive modelling, the artist aims to produce a unique experience 
termed immersion, which means a perceptual fusion between the artwork and spectator. 
Immersion in the Transparent Act is the basis of transparency; it determines openness through 
the body awareness and its role in the artistic interaction. Body awareness is the powerful tool of 
art production that supports artistic decisions of meaning creation, describing the cognitive status
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of the body in the experience. As this thesis provided a classification based on particular bodily 
activity of interaction, the passive and active characteristics afford a spectrum of body-mind 
interconnection as artistic meaning creation. In this respect, the involvement of the spectator 
immediately determines the type of transparent medium and also the type of immersion. The 
thesis laid down that full bodily immersion is likely to create a different disembodiment than 
bodily involvement, which relies more on the symbolic comprehension of interaction. Through 
understanding the interactive act as a body-mind application, the argument draws out a crucial 
resonance to spiritual practices, describing immersion as a possible state of ecstasy. The ecstasy 
is the result of optimal cognitive qualities according to Csikszentmihalyi's definition, which in 
creative processes are the success of the invisible tool and the transparent medium, by means of 
body awareness and immersion. Comprehending the concept of flow is significant for the 
Transparent Act., as it not only describes the immersion and an ecstatic state in the transparent 
medium but also the effectiveness of the invisible tool in the 'making art' process, which so 
determines the 'artist-artwork-spectator' triangle as the poetic layer of the artwork. What was 
recognised in the analogy between spiritual practices and creative processes is a transcendence of 
the experience that most crucially produces a new state of consciousness. In this respect, the 
poetic level of the artwork provides an aesthetic meaning of the cognitive flow and so produces 
the essential knowledge of the interactive artwork. Thus, a philosophical framework of revisited 
conceptions produces a new form for aesthetic which provides the model of the Transparent Act.
The emerging concept of the transparent medium provides a novel perspective on 
technology, representing both a cognitive-based modularity and an aesthetic meaning. 
Technology in this respect is not a mechanistic application of a scientific approach but a radical 
concept of transcendence. Its essentiality lies not especially on the cognitive qualities which were
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already recognised in interaction design (see Dourish's account in chapter 3) but rather in the 
cognitive quality that produces a poetic quality generating an aesthetic meta-cognition of the 
artwork. The technology in creative processes is used as an instrument of affection to human 
consciousness; the artistic system is a collection of elements for affection to the spectator. As 
such, technology is not an object in the Transparent Act but a cognitive affection in the 
experience which, with its particular characteristics, is able to shape consciousness with a 
potential for new knowledge creation. This transparent medium reconciles the lacunae through 
which technology was, for a long time, seen as only an application of scientifically describable 
knowledge.
This suggests that artists, in this way, state their artistic intention in a novel experience by 
means of technology, which is formulated in the spectator perception, generating a new 
transcendent knowledge. Therefore, the new essence of the creation means being focused on 
human purpose and drive. Consequently, in interactive media art, artistic representations are 
considered to be human-centred rather than object-centred. This is a significant shift from the 
classical model of art where the work itself was in the centre and not the spectator's perception. 
The artist's task is to understand human cognition and the human itself. The new conception, 
now, is to gather profound information about humans using high-end technological 
achievements; this data, after analysis, then serves to influence humans (the spectator) in a 
crucial way. The human being experiences novel knowledge in a unique artificial environment 
(such as VR) which is the new scene for artistic expression. These responsive environments, or 
transparent media, are crucial artistic formulations of technology, exhibiting a cognitively 
sensitive surface of physical interfaces. Through these visible and invisible surfaces a creative 
flow is established through which the artist attempts to produce an affective experience, as it sets
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up an encounter of human perception and behaviour. The effectiveness of this experience design 
is based upon the transparency that determines the degree to which the spectator can influence 
the work, whilst still being provided with comprehensible and comprehensive artistic knowledge 
that demonstrates the artist's integrity in the execution of the artwork; how far the proceedings 
(spectator's experience) reflect the intentions of the artist (art production). Thus, the Transparent 
Act is a cognitively responsive system in which the 'artist-artwork-spectator' triangle reflects 
upon their experiences in the creative flow and in doing so produces transcendence.
As such, the model of the Transparent Act formulates a revolutionary understanding 
towards artistic creation and evaluation. It breaks with former beliefs that technology is a product 
and an accomplishment of a mechanistic view. The Transparent Act claims that technology has 
materialistic boundaries but its affection on human cognition might amplify unique spiritual-like 
content. As such, this emerging model of art resituates mechanistic encounters of interactive 
technology that focused on the power of responsiveness, providing a phenomenology-based 
understanding towards science. At the same time, it suggests a novel aesthetic interpretation of 
technology, which might transform the old dualistic model of art. In this respect, science brought 
a powerful tool to art which enabled a rediscovery of an immaterial dimension that is rooted in 
the acknowledgment of artist and spectator interconnection. The new model is essential as it 
produces an abstraction for practical and theoretical application. The model does not claim to 
provide a universal solution of an aesthetic in interactive media art but rather establish a model 
which might produce a more effective application towards a technologically-mediated aesthetic. 
Importantly, it describes the paradigmatic change in art making and provides new methodologies 
for the creation process. The Transparent Act claims a rediscovery of lost knowledge of art that
151
was always there as an immaterial encounter but was rarely recognised as an ultimate solution to 
aesthetic.
Proceeding from the claim, above characterised, the Transparent Act makes an 
innovative step towards immaterial art. Linking the previous dualistic models of artist-artwork 
and artwork-spectator, the potential of cognitive interconnection between artist and spectator has 
been established, which in this way determines the art production. In this respect, art plays a 
crucial role in the identification of a lack within traditional mechanistic models of interaction, 
which understood art as a changing manifestation of the work and ignored the aesthetic value 
itself. The aestheticisation of interactivity allows access to a novel, transcendental layer; the 
affects which are embedded in the spectator's experience. From the intimate communication of 
artist-spectator emerges a transcendental knowledge as a result of a rediscovered dimension of 
art. This is the potential application to contemporary interactive media art.
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Chapter 7
The Practical Application of the Transparent Act: The Affective Environment of
the Mind Cupola
i. Application of the Transparent Act: The Fractal Structure of the Mind Cupola
In the previous chapter, this thesis established the new concept of the Transparent Act that 
moves towards a new aesthetic of interactive media art. In this chapter the thesis will outline a 
practice-based application for the model built upon the previously established interdisciplinary 
framework. This particular artistic application is based on the conception of passive interaction, 
which emerged from a critical investigation of interactivity and produces a further development 
of the earlier artworks of the author. The new artwork attempts to provide a proof of the 
philosophical model of interaction outlined in the thesis and exemplifies one possible approach 
applying it in practice. This chosen practical application of the Transparent Act aims to produce 
a technologically-mediated artwork that has a potential to display a cognitive transparency 
between the artist and spectator.
One key characteristic of a possible application to fulfil this aim is the concept of 
cognitive feedback loops, which is here defined as fractal structure. Following the outline of the 
fractal structure, this chapter will introduce an affective environment termed the Mind Cupola 
that aims for a technology-generated unique experience of the spectator. An affective 
environment is as Pask (1971) suggested an 'aesthetically potent environments' (see in chapter 
2) which instead being only 'responsive environment' (Krueger, 1977) attempts to produce 
meaningful interactions based on cognitive analysis and responses of the spectator. The artistic 
challenge of an affective environment is the experience design which is identified in the
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determination of potential technologies of responsiveness, which, through the artistic conception, 
creates an aesthetic meaning, shaping the spectator's consciousness.
By applying the model of the Transparent Act in practice, as in the Mind Cupola, there is 
an exemplification of the cognitive modelling of the spectator's experience that creates a 
transparent medium. The transparent medium is the unique conceptualisation of technology that 
produces an interactive system of affection. It applies the significant conception of meaning 
creation, which provides the poetic layer of the cognitive chain of responses. The chain of the 
actions suggests both a cognitive development of the spectator and a new state of the system, 
since every response follows on from another. The feedback suggests that both parties, the 
system and the spectator, produce a new state after the action-reaction chain. The step-by-step 
actions of the experience describe how an artist builds upon an aesthetic of action-reaction 
capacity as every new meaning relies on the earlier created meaning. As such, the repeated 
actions71 of meaning creation produce a feedback loop, which is a chain reaction of 
responsiveness (feedback) - meaning creation - flow. The outcome is an immersion that, with its 
aesthetic 'wonderment', leads its spectator to a spiritual-like experience. In this respect, scientific 
concepts implemented in the artistic creation process are potential tools that amplify an aesthetic 
experience independently of their function in their scientific concept. In this way the artwork is 
an interactive system, which has the potential to produces the Transparent Act. This model 
elaborates on a repeated action in a closed up circulation that can be compared with the 
mathematical formulations of fractals, which the thesis terms as a 'fractal structure'. A fractal
71 The repeated actions here describe the embodied knowledge or mastering the tool, which implements the same 
learned action to produce the desired outcome. Previously, it has also been characterised as spiritual experiences 
applying agency of repeated action through which they produce the flow experience and transcendental level. As it 
was argued earlier in the thesis, this method can serve as a meaningful application for technology-based art.
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(Latin world: fractus72) is a pattern that repeats the same design and constituency at a range of 
scales. The recurrence generates a pattern of smaller elements which results in a complexity. 
Fractals are representative forms of mathematical feedback loops, which may be best 
exemplified in the effect of the broadcast of a camera directed at a television (as exemplified in 
Peter Weibel's artworks later). The fractal structure, sometimes referred as a 'world within 
world', is expected to appear in irregular repetition in the Transparent Act or more specifically in 
the artwork and its triggered experience. The recurrence of similar characteristics makes the 
outcome complex, which may serve the study of unpredicted patterns in the generated 
experience.
Mandelbrot's (1982) recognition that fractal geometry gives a fundamental insight to the 
phenomenon of nature (contrast to Euclid's geometry) brought revolutionary concepts to science. 
One of the most widely known patterns of fractal geometry is the 'apple-man'. The structure 
displays a complexity of infinite repetition of a particular form of apple, which is a repeated 
pattern on different scales. By zooming into the border of this pattern, new structures come into 
presence until the structure of the apple-man itself emerges. Since this, Mandelbrot and other 
scientists have noted that fractal structures can be observed in many phenomena of nature - such 
as clouds, river systems, mountains, plants - and are also represented in various experiments on 
growth - such as crystallisation, electro deposition of zinc, and viscous fingering (Vicsek, 1989). 
The claim that cognitive qualities might involve similar characteristics (Goldberger et al., 1990) 
can set up a meaningful artistic conception towards the established transcendent dimension. To 
underpin the artistic approach to fractal structure, it should be noted that scientists recognised
"The world 'fractal' is rooted in the Latin word of 'fractus', meaning 'break into irregular fragment'. However, the 
mathematical form of fractals existed from long ago, whilst the inventor of the graphical fractal is Benoit B. 
Mandelbrot (1977).
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analogous patterns in human bio-data as neural structures (Goldberger et al. 1990), in for 
example Electroencephalogram (EEG) (Gordon and Alexander 1996, Waiters 1998), rapid 
involuntary eye movements and the range of timing in the heart beat represents fractal laws 
(Woods and Grant, 2003)(Figure 7.01, 7.02). As such, the notion of fractal structure attempts to 
describe the quality of being in a feedback loop, a repeated affection of the technology that 
occurs in spectator's consciousness.
The fractal-like characteristic of the repetitive interaction is not only meaningful to 
picturing the repetition that the interaction might represent but also the complexity that emerges 
in the process, which is explained by Ning Lu as follows:
Fractals challenged the assumption of rectifiability with the hypothesis of self- 
similarity. It declares that instead of assuming zero complexity, it is much better to 
approach the magnified world with the same complexity as the current world we have 
known. This is where fractal, as new philosophy and methodology, differs from other, 
conventional technologies. (Lu, 1997, p.52)
Considering Lu's approach in artistic conceptions, his notion of self-similarity might be applied 
on the pattern of action and reaction (cognitive feedback loop), which minimally modifies the 
next pattern (in the same way as by the fractals) and over time will develop a complexity of 
phenomena in the spectator's consciousness. In this respect, the Transparent Act applies the 
fractal as a possible method producing novel levels of consciousness. The Transparent Act builds 
upon the claim that evolution of a simple dynamical system over a long period of time produces 
complexity, which means the repetition of simple affection generating novel experiences through 
the artistic system (Forrester, 1968; Lorenz, 2000 [1972]). Applying the 'fractures' (Mandelbrot 
terms them patterns) in technology-based art, the act declares that artworks can be understood as
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Figure 7.01 Fractal produced by the software application of 
'Apophysis 2007' (Zics, 2007)
Figure 7.02 Fractal-like tree fern fronds, 2006 
(Morgan, 2006)
time-based (non linear) systems that generate complexity within dynamicity (Crutchfield, 
Farmer, Packard and Shaw, 1986).
Proceeding from this, the notion of fractal structure stands for an artistic technique of the 
feedback loop that is designed in order to generate a complex phenomenon of cognition, 
producing spiritual-like experiences for the spectator. Thus, the fractal structure provides a 
potential artistic application of responsiveness with the affective quality of a dynamic system. 
Previously, interaction in technology-based artworks have mostly been characterised with 
responsiveness as technological effectiveness and every interactive artwork exhibits a certain 
amount of feedback loop through a continuous circulation between input and output data 73 . From 
this perspective it has been discussed Goertz' model which evaluated a technological quality of 
feedback. Instead, this thesis suggests creating a 'cognitive feedback loop' that produces a fractal 
structure in the spectator's perception. This model describes a particular method of feedback 
creation, which, instead of using common interfaces that only provide limited data of the 
spectator's cognitive states, suggests implementing affective technology that cognitively 
monitors the spectator's responses. This new model, one of the core interventions of the thesis, is 
based on methods of 'affective computing' 74 , which has been utilised in experimental 
psychology under the conception of 'third force' (Popper, Wandersman and Riks, 1976) for 
evaluating human judgment by analysing emotional representations in action. As such, in this 
context the cognitive feedback loop stands for an artistic conception based upon cognitive
73 In terms of technological function, feedback loops have the ability to account for the spectator's actions 
(responsiveness). When the spectators enter into an interactive environment they operate through the 
technological response which produces a cognitive feedback. The system tasks offer cues (navigation or metaphors 
as control) to communicate to the spectator which actions are required, which kind of interaction is appropriate 
and what impact the interaction has on the system. As such the spectator is able to embody the system smoothly, 
generating an effective interaction.
74 Affective computing attempts to capture and process cognitive phenomena; more particularly attempts to 
record and analyse emotional states of humans (Picard, 1997).
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analysis where the artistic system is analysing the real-time actions of a spectator for the creation 
of an experience. The artistic meaning emerges from the analysis of the spectator's feedback 
based on methods that attempt to capture behavioural, emotional and other unique personal data 
(eye movement analysis, head tracking, etc.), which are useful for capturing cognitive changes. 
The artwork uses the potential of technological feedback to produce a cognitive feedback that 
results in a fractal structure constituting the crucial transcendent layer of the experience. The 
created phenomenon can be comprehended as a system, which through the feedback loop 
between the participatory agency of the spectator (who is there as the 'reflector') and the 
interactive technology, creates a novel phenomenon in the spectator's cognitive faculty. The 
research also applies the fractal structure as an aesthetic methodology for visualisation (see later 
in this chapter the description of the Mind Cupola). The visual language of fractals attempts to 
explore the potential of this mathematical pattern for the affection of the spectator's perception. 
Comparable to the model of fractal structure introduced above is the pioneering work of 
artist Peter Weibel, which focused upon the conception of feedback loops in the artwork- 
spectator interrelationship. In the same period of time as when Krueger had started to consider a 
feedback system that was enabling an active spectatorship, Weibel introduced a conception that 
focused more on questioning the role of spectatorship, through which he aimed for an immediate 
affection of the spectator's consciousness. Through his work it can be interpreted that he 
suggests that the mirroring experience of video feedback might produce a phenomenon of a 
reflected consciousness. In his initial work on this concept, Weibel broadcasted, through a 
television, the phenomenon of 'world within the world' (briefly mentioned earlier), which 
endlessly repeated a picture of a spectator. In the Endless Sandwich (1969) he represented a 
phenomenon of a closed-circuit system in which the chain of replication produced a
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representational feedback loop of'observer [spectator] observation' (Figure 7.03). As such, the 
chain of multi-universes ended in a 'real reality', with the TV spectator creating immediacy 
between real and technological repetition. A feedback of the spectator was triggered when the 
replicated realities do not reflect the real reality back anymore; namely errors occur at the end of 
the spiral that has effects on the other modalities of reality as a chain reaction, until the action 
steps out into the reality. Weibel depicted this as follows:
An error happens in the first Universe. The person has to get up to correct the error, and 
while he does so, it jumps to the next Universe. In the end, each Austrian TV viewer 
had to get up to readjust his own TV. So this is on of the first model of Multi-universes 
and how the information exchange and transformation works. You can see very clearly 
that the TV is treated as a kind of interface. (Weibel, 2001, p.272)
Following on from the concept of fractal structure, Weibel's work impacts through a 
representational fractal structure of the spectator's reflected picture produced by video 
technology, using a television as the interface. For Weibel, the fractal loop is a conceptualisation 
of self-observation that, as he suggested, can never be totally fulfilled (Weibel, 2001). With the 
self-representational loop he describes the distortion that occurs through every interface but also, 
most crucially, in the spectator consciousness. As such, the installation of Endless Sandwich 
attempts to model a self-consciousness that is able to experience only itself, since no one else can 
enter this vision. Therefore, all of the other 'selves' are interpretations of the first 'self (the 
spectator's consciousness), replicas that draw out patterns of feedback in forms of fractal 
structure. In this respect, Weibel's primary artistic conception profoundly characterises an 
affection of the spectator's consciousness through a feedback loop, which, in every single 
fragment, produces a different distortion of the self. Other works of Weibel further developed the 
idea of feedback loops as an interface by using similar self-representations to produce a
distortion in the receiver's consciousness. The closed-circuit video installation called
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Figure 7.03 Screen shots of Peter Weibel's TV performance 
of'Endless Sandwich' (Weibel, 1969)
Observation of Observation - Uncertainty (1973) produced a self-image of the spectator that 
mirrored them from a different point of view but never through the laws of physical mirroring 
(Figure 7.04, 7.05). In a similar manner to his previous work the 'distortion of the self through 
the self-representation, or more particularly the diverse expectation and novel observation of the 
self, generated a shifted self-consciousness. Overall, Weibel's work provides crucial examples of 
a primarily artistic conceptualisation of fractal structures, which through their affection aim to 
alter the spectator's self-knowledge by suggesting that consciousness might itself be an endless 
repetition of self-perception.
ii. Affective Environment: The Unique Interface of the Mind Cupola
This section of the chapter introduces an interactive artwork called the Mind Cupola, which is 
based upon a passive modality of interaction (see chapter 4). This artwork creates an affective- 
interactive environment where the devices directed at the spectator generate mental 
transformations in its spectator (Figure 7.06). The aim of the Mind Cupola bio-feedback device 
(Figure 7.07) is to produce the flow experience of the spectator for a potential state of creative 
ecstasy. Modelling new means of interaction, this device attempts to generate a cognitive 
feedback loop in the spectator's experience. Its intention is to apply special technologies that are 
unique in the affection of human perception and effective in capturing behavioural changes in the 
human condition.
As the fractal structure is one of the suggested applications of the modality of passive 
bodily interaction, the Mind Cupola applies this method in order to generate the spectator's 
subjective experience. As discussed in chapter 4, this modality of interaction produces an artistic 
meaning not by the symbolic interconnectivity of bodily activity and content but rather by means
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Figure 7.04 'Observation of Observation - Uncertainty' in Kiinstlerhaim, 
Graz, 1973 (Ed. Weibel, 2005)
Figure 7.05 Reconstruction of the 'Observation of Observation ~ Uncertainty' (1973) in the framework of
'ctrlfspace]' exhibition at ZKM, Center for Art and Media, Karlsruhe
(Weibel, 2001)
Figure 7.06 Conceptual representation of the 'Mind 
Cupola's' affective environment (Zics, 2007)
Figure 7.07 Conceptual representation of the 'Mind Cupola ' (Zics, 2007)
of behavioural-emotional states. The investigation through art practice attempted to find 
particular technologies, that on the one side, are unique in the affection of spectator's perception 
termed in the thesis as 'instant affection technologies', and, on the other side, are effective at 
capturing behavioural changes in the human condition, referred to in the thesis as applications of 
affective computing. This has resulted in a focus by the project on the characteristics of the 
human face as it displays most evidently the changes of human cognition. Therefore, the 
practice-based research was divided into these two fields; technologies which directly affect 
human cognition (audiovisual, mechanical) and technologies which monitor and analyse 
affective states of the spectator. The feedback loop is generated when the two technologies of 
affecting and monitoring are coupled; thus the analysis of the monitored data influences the 
chain of affections of the spectator (Figure 7.08). The visualisation, which is considered as an 
affection technology, has a unique role in the feedback process, as it most profoundly reflects a 
feedback to the spectator, and therefore will be handled as one of the main aspects of the 
interface. In this respect, the technological feedback loop is the basis for producing the cognitive 
feedback loop, which this chapter referred to earlier as the fractal structure of the spectator's 
perception. Modelling new means of interaction, the spectator's role is not only a reactor to the 
technologically triggered affection but also a generative contributor who controls the experience. 
Therefore this chapter notes that the spectator in this cognitive feedback loop is not analogous to 
cinema spectatorship, where the spectators receive affections but are not able to influence the 
structure of the medium. In the passive bodily interface the interaction is produced by 
cognitively representative bodily states through an intentional communication between artwork- 
spectator and, so the artist. In retrospect, it can be said that whereas in Weibel's work a fractal 
structure was established through the technological repetition of the self-image, the Mind Cupola
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Figure 7.08 Conceptual draft of the 'Mind Cupola's 'feedback system (Zics, 2007)
consists of a feedback system, which incorporates certain cognitive readings of the spectator into 
its affects. This specific application aims to affect the spectator's states of consciousness and 
impacts on the intentional decision making.
Reflecting on this, the artistic challenge was to produce a surface for these technologies, 
the artistic interface in which the aesthetic decision-making would produce the link between the 
technological functionality and artistic meaning. As the interaction would not demand any bodily 
movement of the spectator and the selected technologies were based on a condition of stable 
spectator, the artistic approach to the interface development was to design a special environment 
that is representational, underpinning a passive aesthetic experience of the spectator. As such, the 
interface here is a device which not only generates the spectator's experience but also carries the 
layer of artistic meaning creation, the balance between artistic content seeking and technological 
knowledge transfer (see chapter 3). The aesthetic form of the interface as an artistic object serves 
the transparency of the experience.
The Mind Cupola is placed in a dark environment that invites the spectator to enter into 
the illuminated area under the cupola (Figure 7.09, 7.10, 7.11; see also earlier: Figure 1.05, 1.06, 
1.07). The aesthetic surface of the cupola was inspired by the dome-shaped religious golden 
lantern (such as that found within Islamic, Byzantine, Orthodox Christian or Indian architecture) 
(Figure 7.12), which provides an expressive metaphor for a sacral and also immersive place 
(Bloch, 2000 [1915/16], p. 14), whilst its shape and look act not only as a functional gadget but 
also a science fiction tool. As the cupola produces an immersive quality of encircling, generating 
a perceptual sense of being in the centre, the Mind Cupola is a novel interpretation of this 
meaning, which, in this case, is the mind that is embraced by its apparatus. The Mind Cupola 
aims to create instant affection of the spectators through its particular aesthetic to prepare them
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Figure 7.09 The 'Mind Cupola's' illuminated environment (Zics, 2008)
Figure 7.10 Spectator in the 'Mind Cupola' (Zics, 2008)
Figure 7.11 The activated thermal stream in the 'Mind Cupola' 
(Zics, 2008)
Figure 7.12 The 'Mind Cupola's' copper lantern in the test environment 
at the University of Plymouth (Zics, 2008)
for the unique experience. In this sense, the appearance of the Mind Cupola is the first step in the 
chain of events that the artist has prepared for the spectator in a journey of immersion. Another 
meaningful inspiration derives from an exclusively produced machine called 'Psychograph' 75 
(1931), which used a cupola-like device to measure qualities of the human head to process a 
psychoanalysis of the person (Risse, 1976) (Figure 7.13, 7.14). The machine built upon the 
pseudoscientific conception of phrenology76 , which is based on the belief that the brain, as an 
organ, characterises the potential of the mind and therefore the 'bumps' in the head can 
characterise the person. The artistic conception of the Mind Cupola also emphasises a unique 
approach of measuring qualities of the mind, so the Psychograph provides an inspiration of how 
to construct a device that aims to interact with the consciousness and subsequently the brain. In 
this matter, the phrenology machine is ultimately a reference for a device that surrounds the 
person's head and not for its functionality.
In the Mind Cupola's sensory deprived environment the spectator is subjected to 
audiovisual and mechanical affects for several minutes until a cognitive transformation occurs 
(Figure 7.15, 7.16; see also earlier: 1.7, 1.8). During the stream of novel events the spectator's 
face is analysed and this new information will be used again to affect them visually (by real-time 
visualisation). The spectator is advised to stand in a particular position in front of the camera.
75 The phrenological cupola was used to read the contour of the skull and generate a profile. Henry C. Lavery, 
developed a machine called the 'Psychograph' (patented 1905), which has three main parts. The base units are the 
chair, the printer machine and the holder of the cupola. The metal helmet is the main part of the machine that, 
with the help 32 metal filters, locates the user's skull contours. The last part is the recording box which 
mechanically scans and prints out the results based on the position of the skull filters. The box includes a cylinder- 
driven hammer that reacts (stamps) if the electrical circuit is full, signifying that the user has been measured.
76 The Austrian physician Franz Joseph Gall's theory created the 'phrenological map', which distinguishes 26 
psychological departments on the surface of the skull. Every department describes a character (e.g. 'amativeness', 
'combativeness', 'constructiveness', 'idealist', 'imitation' etc.) and its shape determines the entire personality. Gall 
believed that departments that are in use represent a bigger effect than others. Therefore, he claimed to reveal 
intelligence or even murderous propensity from the shape of the bone skull (Heeschen, 1994).
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Figure 7.13 The 'Psychograph ' machine
(1931) developed by Henry C. Lavery
(Risse, 1975)
Figure 7.14 Illustration of an initial concept of 'Psychograph '
from Thomas Sewall's lectures showing the use of the
'craniometer cupola' (Sewall, 1838)
Figure 7.15 The sensory deprived environment of the 'Mind Cupola' (Zics, 2008)
Figure 7.16 The spectator's point of view in the 'Mind Cupola'
with the audiovisual system and camera-mover interface
(Zics, 2008)
Moving to the right position, the cupola and the camera-mover (see earlier: Figure 1.8, 7.16) start 
to locate the top of the head and the face, which, after positioning the spectators, stops the 
operation. Once, the capture position has been fixed, the spectator expected (through prior 
briefing) to be relaxed and to be focused on the events on the visualisation, which will take at 
least 3 minutes. The chain of affection starts with the frequency generators that produce a pattern 
of affections based on the initial signal of the face analysis, determining the first impression of 
the person's cognitive state. This immediately starts the visualisation, which so produces an 
endless feedback of frequency generators -face analysis - visualisation - frequency generators, 
and so on. The spectator can stop the events at any time during the experience by moving out of 
the cupola-covered area. A full immersion of the spectator is aimed for a minimum period of five 
minutes of time. Through the whole process, the spectators are advised to relax and produce an 
effortless experience that intends to feed the system with efficient data captured through the face 
analysis technology.
The practical creative process of the Mind Cupola implemented the methodology of 
'evolutionary collaborative process' (Fischer and Nakakoji, 1997), which suggests a co-operative 
process between artists, scientist and programmers. The artistic process of production involves 
the whole team and applies this new strategy of creative work. Thus, all of the processes aim 
towards a fulfilment of the artistic concept through cooperative processes, where the artist is 
finalising collective decisions rather than drawing on hierarchal production. This collaborative
77 The project behind Mind Cupola was set up through collaboration between various universities and individual 
programmers to complete tasks based on specific programming skills. The projects main collaborators are the 
University of Wales, Newport, the School of Computing, Communications and Electronics at the University of 
Plymouth. The framework for the face analysis software, experiments on thermal imaging and the software of 
visualisation were completed with the help of Dr. Phil Culverhouse. The main collaborator on the cupola's 
hardwere and controlling software was Andor Gaudia, a robotic specialist based in Hungary. Dr. David Cristinacce 
provided the face detection software developed at the University of Manchester for the Toyota Car Company, and 
Dr. Julian Tilbury customised this software for thermal imaging technology.
164
form provides an effective strategy for working on complex, technology-based projects, as it also 
allows the team members to bring up and integrate their innovative, discipline-driven ideas into 
the project. Thus the team work allowed a much higher complexity of technologies, which would 
not have been possible by a single production process, because of the interdisciplinary nature of 
the project.
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The system of the Mind Cupola constitutes three main interfaces: 1, frequency generators (which 
are also referred to as the A series of technologies: Al, A2, A3, A4, A5), 2, the real-time 
visualisation (C series technologies) system based on facial analysis and 3, facial and emotional 
evaluation and thermal imaging by a camera-mover interface (B series technologies: Bl.1.1, 
Bl.1.2, Bl.2.1, Bl.2.2, Bl.2.3, B2). This three-part system, of which parts 1 and 2 form the 
instant affection system of the Mind Cupola, is interlinked together and each port communicates
165
to each other in order to produce the cognitive feedback loop. Chronologically, the affection of 
the frequency generators is measured by the face analysis, which feeds back to the visualisation 
and, thus, again to the frequency generators.
For an application of the instant affection system the concept of the Mind Cupola has 
incorporated technologies that attempt to influence not only by means of perception but also by 
human biological factors observable in human cognition. As the affection of human 
consciousness has remained in sciences as an unexplored field (mostly due a lack of scientific 
analysis of investigations), the investigation took on board concepts that are not or not yet 
scientifically proven, but most importantly provide the potential for an aesthetic experience. This 
chapter points out that studies on the threshold of scientific and 'non-scientific' methods78 might 
provide new perspectives for artistic production. The methods that are embedded in 
technological devices produce both concrete results as well as less definitive ones. Underlying 
this, the discourse here emphasises that hybrid (scientific and non scientific) conceptual 
applications can serve as a potential approach for examining the scientifically indefinable 
characteristics of cognitive processes. Therefore, the research discussed here is not committed to 
proving scientific data but rather to representing findings that can build an artistic interface 
concept. Suggesting that this hybrid methodology could provide a more complex or different 
comprehension of human cognition by applying the model of the Transparent Act, this artistic 
framework establishes an effective tool for a unique experience.
78 The non-scientific methods in the thesis refer to technologies which can be claimed to have a specific impact on 
the human condition and consciousness but whose quality of triggered-affect is not scientifically proven. One 
example the Mind Machines that are claimed to produce meditative states by electronic affections (which will be 
discussed later).
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As such, the main part of the instant affection system is the 'frequency generators' 
(temperature, visual, binaural-auditory, tactile) (Figure 7.17) that are embedded in the physical 
form of the cupola and are specifically developed small gadgets that produce a spectrum of 
affection in the spectator. The term of frequency generators refers to the artistic conception of the 
Mind Cupola that produces affection through electromagnetic phenomena (Figure 7.18). The 
development of the frequency generator interface was a response to the demand for a device that 
instantly (and mainly mechanically) could influence the spectator's perception. Since the thesis' 
artistic interest identified that there are no comprehensive scientific descriptions of an 
interconnectivity of bodily cognitive states and mental states that could be applied for artistic 
systems, it includes non-scientific conceptions that might provide meaningful approaches for an 
aesthetic experience. From this perspective, the major objective of the investigation is to allocate 
technologies that are able to produce an essential impact on a human being according to the 
modality of body-mind interconnection. Consequently, five different methodologies and 
technologies based on non-sensory stimuli have been allocated in order to create the instant 
affection system of the cupola interface. These frequency generator devices are built in the 
cupola interface and are formed of LED lights (Al), binaural sound (A2), thermo stream (A3), 
air stream (A4), and vibration (A5) (Figure 7.19, 7.20). The frequency generators always work 
together and their affection is united. The generated patterns, which determine the particular 
timing, how long and with which specification (frequency, speed) the frequency generators are 
activated, are based on the measurement of the face analysis. The generative pattern attempts to 
affect the person in order to achieve the optimal state79 .
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Figure 7.17 The functional draft of the 'frequency generators' in the 'Mind Cupola'
(Zics, 2007)
Figure 7.18 Conceptual representation of the 'Mind Cupola's' affective 
environment (Zics, 2007)
o
Figure 7.19 and 7.20 Details of the 'Mind Cupola's' interior: LED matrix (A I), 
coolers (A3) and an infrared bulb (A4) (the so-called frequency generators)
(Zics, 2008)
The LED lights (Al) and binaural sounds (A2) are applications that use external physical 
waves to instantly influence brain waves in order to produce an alteration of consciousness. The 
lights and sounds are based on the principal of 'frequency following effect' 80 (Walter, 1953). 
This is based upon an observation that the brain tends to follow the external light flashes on 
alpha and theta frequencies, mimicking inward extraordinary visual patterns and generating 
states of relaxation or even meditative states (Smith, Marsh and Brown, 1975). In a similar 
manner, sound produces a frequency following effect through the method of binaural sound81 
(Rumsey, 2001). The binaural beats use 'sine tones' that send diverse signals of frequencies into 
each ear, producing theta and beta frequencies in the brain through the process of re-balancing 
the frequencies from the ears. Although there are headset and spectacle-like devices such as 
Mind Machines82 that are used for the generation of meditative states, these methods could not 
be scientifically proven. As such, in the Mind Cupola, the various patterns of light and sound 
serve to drive the person into inwardness, which is part of the aesthetic experience.
80 William Gray Walter (1953) was the first researcher who, in the 1940s with a new version of EEG machine, 
recognised that the theta (4-8 Hz) and delta (1-3 Hz) waves of the brain are usually only observable in states of 
deep relaxation, meditation and deep dreamless sleep. During his exploration he lays down the principle of 
'frequency following effect'.
81 The sonic concept of binaural sound aims to alter mental states.This method allows sound enter the left and 
right ears on different frequencies (normally it is on the same frequency), which will then be balanced by the 
brains 'superior olivary nuclei'. The slightly different frequencies, through brain processes, will be consolidated and 
generate a third frequency. If the right ear is 360Hz and the left ear 370Hz, the distinction is 10 Hz (the third 
frequency) that generates a binaural sound in the brain. The phenomenon is based on dissimilar sensitivity 
between the brain and the ears. Whereas the ear is not able to analyse any waves under 20 Hz, the brain senses 
very small differences and this is why the binaural beats are identified not as apparatus of the ear but of the brain. 
The binaural sound appears on the frequency of the brain's alpha waves, which produces a relaxed, meditative, 
but still conscious, state of mind.
82 Mind Machines utilise eyeglasses with small lights and a head set for sound impulses. Their process of affection 
is described as follows: first, the personal sub-consciousness is developed (individual memories, wishes) and then 
the collective sub-consciousness (significant collective experiences). Finally, the essential elements of 
consciousness are developed. This process follows as: 1. Low stimulation, hardly noticeable. 2. Light and sound 
effects separated by stereo phone. The attention is directed from the outer effects to the inner effects. 3. 
Rhythmical impulses are played, which suppress all impulses. Only an 'inner spectator' position remains. With this 
basic pattern comes the individual experience under influence, which thus can reach the different layers and 
depths of attention (Kapellner, 1990).
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The third application of frequency generators is thermo convection (A3) and cooling 
mechanisms (A4), which heat up or cool down particular parts of the head causing 
thermodynamic alteration to the brain. The concept of the Mind Cupola takes interest in the 
thermodynamic concept of brain83 as it is proposed, based on both scientific and unproven ideas, 
that there is a cause and effect relationship between emotional/behavioural changes and brain 
temperature changes and vice-versa84 . Experimental science-produced outcomes examining brain 
temperature changes by synthetic drugs and their produced consciousness alteration have 
determined a relationship between consciousness and temperature changes85 (Smith, 2006).
83To understand the brain's thermodynamic characteristics and how this might effect mental states, the best 
example to provide is the sleeping state which dispalys a decrese of almost 2 degrees (to app. 35 degrees C). This 
suggests that the activity of the brain is observable by temperature changes. There are various stimulators and 
drugs that can achieve the same changes. Drugs such as caffeine and synthetic drugs like Ecstasy are commonly 
known as 'uppers'; these agents raise attentiveness or consciousness and increase brain temperature. The 
opposing class of drugs, 'downers' such as heroin, morphine, opiates or even alcohol, decrease the temperature of 
the brain (Smith, 2006). In the brain the thyroid gland controls the temperature, based on the feedback from the 
circadian rhythm centre of the hypothalamus. The brain's set temperature determines the body's thermobalance 
as well. The thyroid gland is located in the throat behind the 'Adam's apple'. This organ measures enviromental 
temperature via the bronchial tube and compares blood temperature through the carotid arteries that lead from 
the heart to the brain. A rise in temperature causes the thyroid gland to produce hormones, making the lining of 
the lungs more porous for the water in the blood. The water passing through the lungs secures the cooling of the 
system. If the outside temperature changes, the gland acts upon the skin and opens blood vessels to reduce heat, 
the sweat glands are activated taking water from the blood and excreting it, while breath rate increases to 
evaporate heat. Cooling down the environment will have the opposite effect on the body. The thyroid stops the 
water supply to the lungs, constricting all the blood vessels on the skin and producing heat by muscle work. All 
these mechanisms control and protect brain temperature as its temperature changes are more sensitive than the 
body's.
84 It is interesting to note that persons who exhibit fast emotional changes are considered 'hot heads' and persons 
who are more able to control their thoughts are 'cool heads'. This old observation of personalities and emotional 
attributes might be supported in the usage of Mind Cupola.
85 Marshall Smith (2006) began experimenting with ways to artificially alter the thyroid gland and shift circadian 
rhythm. Smith used his own body, modifying the circaian rhythm by taking Synthroid, a synthetic drug. Measuring 
brain temperature changes he was able to capture the chemical effect of the drugs. Smith's experience showed 
that synthetic drugs cannot change the actual rhythm of the body, just frequently modify it. As such, he concludes 
that holistic rhythms of metabolism have to be controlled from a higher gland, probably in the hypothalamus. This 
is the reason why local modification cannot achieve long term effect. From an artistic point of view, Smith's idea 
was crucial, as it proved that chemical and temperature modification are connected to consciousness. Smith (2006, 
np.) points out: 'Since I am the first person to notice the relationship between consciousness and brain 
temperature, nobody has done any research in this area.' Contradictary medical-scientific research, which is 
mostly based on investigation of brain injury patients, has been unable to build a clear correlation between brain 
temperature and the level of the consciousness (Mellergard, 1995). Although clinical methods ususally focus on
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Further research claimed that, by stimulation of various parts of the brain, such as the visual 
cortex, it produces local temperature changes through the brain's oxygen consumption86 
(Yablonskiy, Ackerman and Raichle; 2000). The cooling of the brain is often used for medical 
purposes to activate biological functions producing new mental states, such as to raise the 
production of testosterone87 or in using the brain cooler device88 (2005) that helps trauma 
patients in recovery. Based on these observations, the Mind Cupola applies the thermodynamic 
capacities of the brain to affect the biological functions of the spectator by environmental 
changes. Short-term temperature change puts the body into distress, whereas long-term change 
has an impact on the speed of mental functions; these conditions stimulate mental activities and 
emotions. The long-term influence may be too subtle to cause discomfort or conscious affect but 
may be perceptible in unconscious emotional expressions. Through this, the concept of the Mind 
Cupola suggests that this method might be a way to direct the spectator to an optimal experience. 
The Mind Cupola does this by generative means, thus it captures both behavioural patterns and 
the heat of the spectator's head and according to the determined artistic methodology heats or
physical changes of consciousness such as awakeness and activeness, they have generated no results into subtle 
quality changes in consciousness.
86 The heat is produced by oxygen consumption; however, local brain activity and metabolic functions 
automatically respond by cooling off the whole brain, which means an increased blood flow. This proved that the 
brain could undergo a temperature lowering as well. The intention was a prolonged passive stimulation of the 
visual cortex with a data valuation of Magnetic Resonance (MR) analysis, with the visual stimuli source being light- 
emitting diodes mounted in specifically designed goggles. The method was a four-minute subjection to an 8Hz 
visualisation, a four-minute rest time and then repeats. The test found modifications up to two degrees centigrade 
in temperature, which were evaluated as follows: 'Hence, our data suggest that a substantial role in maintaining 
tissue temperature belongs to heat transfer within the tissue between the area(s) of high activity and surrounding 
areas of low activity. For long periods of stimulation, local perturbations in the temperature can trigger 
temperature changes in remote areas of the brain because of high heat diffusivity and heat transfer with blood 
flow. Such 'heat waves' were previously observed on the brain surface during functional activation in a rat model 
by infrared mapping (Yablonskiy, Ackerman and Raichle; 2000, p.7605). It concludes that brain temperature can be 
effectively modified by directed visual, auditory and somatic stimulation. The stimuli trigger is not just mental, but 
physical, links to thermodynamic processes.
87 For example, male pattern baldness is often treated by cooling brain temperature to raise the production of 
testosterone.
88 The brain cooler device (2005) developed at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute Troy helps head trauma patients in 
recovery. The cooling serves to reduce heat caused by the great quantity of blood flow that perfuses brain tissue.
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cools the person down. Thus, these frequency generators (A3, A4) instantly operate and 
interconnect with the thermo imaging face analysis through the spectator's responses.
The last application of frequency generators is the vibration generator (A5), which was 
created for a mechanical effect on the skin. The phenomenon of vibration is a well known 
clinical application for the relief of pain, increasing blood flow or generating relaxation (Ryan, 
1981) and also considered as an agent for undoing damage to stress hormones (Benson and 
Klipper, 1976), whilst vibration also has short term affects more akin to touch sensorial events. 
Vibration as a touch like effect can stimulate real-world sensory experiences and is therefore able 
to generate emotional changes. Both relaxation and touch sensory outcomes are able to rouse 
mental changes.
The second part of the system is the face analysis constituting the software (Bl: B 1.1.1, 
Bl.1.2, B1.2, Bl.2.1, Bl.2.2, Bl.2.3) and the hardware (B2) that is located outside of the cupola. 
The camera-mover89 (Figure 7.21) is a motor-driven device that fulfils the function of locating 
the spectator's face for a comprehensive facial analysis. The face analysis software is activated 
when the frequency generators initially affect the spectator. It has a major role as it feeds data 
back to the frequency generators and then to the visualisation, enabling the cognitive feedback 
loop. The face analysis in the Mind Cupola is an application of affective computing; an emerging 
concept in computing that focuses on cognitive responses of humans with an attempt to display 
that activity (Pickard, 2002). The face analysis' functional demand is to produce efficient data of 
the emotional and behavioural characteristics of the spectator in real-time. Based on this demand, 
functions were selected that can be measured in real-time and produce a sufficient data with the 
aim collecting the emotional and behavioural changes of the person. To monitor the complex
89 For further technical details of the camera-mover see Appendix.2.2.
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Figure 7.21 The camera-mover has been designed to be 
assimilated into its dark environment (Zics, 2008)
patterns of affection on the face, it was aimed to use a flexible and stable face analysis 
technology that serves as an effective function in order to monitor basic changes in facial 
information. During the investigation of potential technologies for facial emotion analysis it was 
revealed that a technology had not yet been produced that was robust and simply applicable in its 
method. As a result of this, the Mind Cupola face analysis technology implements already 
existing face detection software developed for the automobile industry90 (Figure 7.22) that is 
specifically customised to the features according to the Mind Cupola's artistic system, so as to 
provide sufficient feedback but not to be overly complex in its application.
The methodology for analysing the emotion and behaviour data applies a hybrid system 
that blends standard image processing with face detection and analysis and thermal imaging 
technology, which measures temperature changes of particular parts of the face. The technology 
of thermal imaging91 is based on infrared technology92, which enables the capturing of the
90 Developed by School of Medicine, University of Manchester and later implemented in different high-definition 
software, such as that developed for the Toyota car company to capture driver's behaviour.
91 Thermal imaging is a scientific technique that uses infrared radiation (900-14.000 MHz of electromagnetic 
spectrum) of objects to produce a thermo-graphical picture. The infrared radiation is proportional to the subject's 
temperature on the surface, which is why it is possible to display the object's thermal map. The radiation 
furthermore is influenced by the emission of the object and its absorption of the environment or reflected 
radiation. Consequently, an object's thermal image captures not just the characteristic of the objects but other 
influences as well, which could be seen later as a methodological issue to facilitate distinctions (object's qualities - 
environment's qualities). Viewing by the special thermal camera enables the infrared wavelength to be 
transformed into visible light waves. The camera can generate an image with or without visible light on the object. 
The obvious character of the recorded picture is that warm-blooded humans and animals stand out from their cold 
environment. As such, the high-end thermal imaging is likely to be used for security purposes, military surveillance, 
by building construction to monitor thermal insulations or by fire fighters in locating survivors. Infrared satellite 
imaging is used to measure ocean temperatures, recording climate changes and observing signs of destructive 
storms. This technique is not only used in airborne and space systems where they are tracking life patterns of 
vegetation, rocks, and minerals but also in archaeology to capture footpaths or roads of ancient cultures. The most 
crucial implementation of thermal imaging is the special data collection by thermal technology of the human body. 
The special infrared electromagnetic wavelength is able to provide a human body and face 'somatoinfra map'. The 
thermal camera detects signs of infrared invisible radiation from body, which through analysis is able to capture 
biological processes and information.
92 The technology was built upon the discovery of Sir William Herschel in 1800 (Smith, Jones and Chasmar, 1957). 
The invisible infrared radiation was discovered accidentally when he wanted to capture the heat of the separate 
colours of a prism splitting sunlight into a rainbow. The first machine was named the Pyroscan to capture arthritic
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Figure 7.22 Screen shots of the face detection software
developed at the University of Manchester
(Zics, 2007)
thermo-dynamic changes of the human body as it radiates various wavelengths of infrared 
according to its condition93 (Figure 7.23, 7.24 and Appendix 2.6). Current scientific technologies 
using thermal imaging, such as CTHERM94 or Somatoinfra systems95 , provide high resolution 
imaging with heightened speed that greatly increases the affectivity of thermal imaging in bio 
data analysis. Whereas thermal imaging as a method of diagnosis produces very effective data, it 
has shown low efficiency in real-time face applications. The great diversity of outcomes based 
on methods from medical data analysis require highly sophisticated techniques formed from the 
'body atlas', full records of a patient's circumstances and human decision making96 , which for a 
real-time artistic application is impossible. Although the investigation acknowledges this
joints. For many years the technology could only be used as a supplement to radiology as the grey tones based 
measurement was not able to give a sufficiently sensitive imaging. In the 1960s and 1970s there was significant 
improvement in the thermal technology. The oscilloscope display and the electronic isotherm technology enabled 
finer results. With the appearance of colour multiple photography, digital image analysis and digital storage the 
technology finally could be used more broadly (Ring, 2004). The technology has also been used for inflammatory 
analysis, rheumatology, forensic medicine and drug therapy.
93 A collection of thermal pictures can bee seen in Appendix 2.6.
94 Francis Ring, currently the Head of Medical Imaging Research Group at the University of Glamorgan, and his 
research group have developed software called CTHERM, which supplies a mask of every region of the body. The 
software is part of a study that aims to generate an on-line reference system of thermal imaging. The technology 
has recently been used for treatment of inflammation.
95 A research group was started in 1984 working on special thermal technology at the Thermo-dynamical 
Laboratory, Faculty of Natural Sciences, Technical University of Budapest (Hungary). After more than 20 years 
research it has developed a Somatoinfra system that claims to be a world leader in complex systems in human 
infrared diagnosis. Or. Szacsky Mihaly, leading scientist of the patented technology, established that the system 
has been recently developed to a level where it may be broadly implemented by hospitals.
96 To be able decode the image of alteration, the Somatoinfra system has launched a huge data base called the 
'Body Atlas' (similar to the CTHERM technology been used to develop an online reference system) that was made 
by 260,000 individual investigations. According to Dr. Mihaly Szacsky (2007), the system requires long term 
experience and knowledge and thus without human control it cannot be operated. Therefore, it is not a 
comprehensive method of diagnosis and the result needs to be confirmed by further tests and specialists. The 
following steps have to be undertaken for an efficient thermal analysis: the sufficient psychophysical preparation 
of the patient, suitable examination room to support the preparation process, standardised environment, technical 
calibration and an entire test of the system, measurement of the investigated body part and a data archive. 
Furthermore, Szacsky pointed out that the somatologiest (the investigator: at the Technical University of Budapest 
there are established courses in somatology in which investigators are qualified specialists for implementing 
thermal imaging in medical use) has to record all of the circumstances of the patient, including a detailed 
description of psychological influences and medical influences.
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Figure 7.23 Thermal image showing the variety of
temperature in the kitchen environment
(Vogel, 2007)
Figure 7.24 The thermal-map of the human face with temperature scale (Zics. 2006)
restricted quality when compared to medical applications, it also suggests a great potential for 
the technique to unveil previously unknown, not yet implemented data of the human condition.
In order to find the most effective application for affective capturing in the Mind Cupola 
this chapter has examined a variety of scientific concepts and the success of their application that 
produced the particular method of thermal imaging for artistic application. The discourse here 
has identified that, although a limited amount of scientific research has been undertaken that 
claimed infrared and thermal imaging can be used for capturing emotional changes, there is also 
a great potential for assisting applications efface detection, recognition and tracking (Eveland et 
al., 2003; Kurse, 2001; Mcgimpsey, 2000; Ogasawara et al., 2001; Sugimoto et al., 2000; 
Yoshitomi, 2000). Some of the applications indicated that musculature movement of facial 
expression, according to the thermodynamic of blood flow, generates recognisable changes in 
temperature. However, this requires much more extensive research97 (Khan, Ingleby and Ward, 
2006). Another research interest of thermal face analysis was identified that produced more 
effective applications of polygraph testing, attempting to capture emotional changes in people 
who lie (Levine and Pavlidis, 2002, p. 35). The concept, similar to the earlier accounts, is based 
on the idea that if the subject tells a lie then the flow of blood in veins increases. In 1999 James 
Levine, a researcher at the Mayo Institute In Rochester, and loannis Pavlidis of Honeywell
97 Masood M. Khan (American University of Sharjah), Michael Ingleby and Robert D. Ward (University of 
Huddersfield) have been using infrared technology for 'automated facial expression classification' (AFEC) and 
'affect interpretation' (AAI) to evaluate emotional alterations. The concept built upon thermo-musculature activity, 
and the blood flow generated thermodynamically. There were facial points recognised (Facial Thermal Feature 
Points; FTFPs) that show significant changes dependent on facial expression. The experimentation with intentional 
facial expression has shown recognizable changes in temperature when using thermal images. It was a logical link 
to connect the thermogram's result with a musculature movement. The Thermal Intensity Values were measured 
with different facial expressions and compared based on the FTFP grid generated thermo pattern. However, the 
system could not generate adequate classifications with the application of the thermogram as it was based on 
special circumstances and how the system was trained. The system was tested with simulated facial expressions 
and conversantly it cannot be guaranteed that the same operation would work in natural conditions. It can be 
concluded that skin temperature can be evaluated based upon affective states and emotional changes; however, 
the methodology requires further examination, improvement and data collection.
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Laboratories demonstrated, with a thermal camera, that a person is influenced by their 
environment, displaying measurable changes in face temperature maps while blood was rushing 
to the periorbital area. Importantly, these latter observations and those of the polygraph test show 
that measurable stress factors could be tracked by thermal imaging. It can be concluded that there 
is a requirement for further research investigating the potential use of the technology; however, 
this may rely on the further development of thermal imaging with an aim at developing more 
detailed data and providing greater accessibility to this costly technology.
Contemporary approaches to thermal imaging suggest that a person's thermo map is 
based on multiple circumstances and that, for an effective application of this technology, it is 
necessary to understand the pre-knowledge of the analysed person. However, it can also be 
suggested that emotional analysis does, not need such a level of adequate information as medical 
analysis does, as it focuses on changes and not states, in a similar manner to that which the 
artistic system of the Mind Cupola will suggest. Therefore, in order to gather useful data that 
serves the real-time based artistic concept, the investigation suggests capturing changes of 
emotional-mental states that analyse a particular condition as seen in medical applications. As 
such, this investigation suggests applying a hybrid face analysis system (Bl) that uses both 
thermal imaging (B 1.1) as well as standard image analysis (B1.2). The hybrid face software is 
based upon standard face detection and analysis of changes on the face, the results of which are 
enriched with the unique thermal imaging analysis; thus the thermal imaging serves as an 
additional source of gathering data for face analysis, enabling the capture of novel cognitive data 
of the person. Thus, the system of the Mind Cupola suggests a design solution that is efficient for 
a real-time environment but still provides novel information of the spectator's experience. In
98 loannis Pavlidis is currently residing at the University of Houston, Computer Science Department in Texas.
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practice, face analysis implements the face detection software, which enables the capture of face 
physiology. The particular way of implementing thermal imaging in the face analysis of the 
Mind Cupola suggests applying it similarly to Levine and Pavlidis' manner in their application 
called Stress Cam" (Puri, Olson, Pavlidis, Levine, Starren; 2005) (B 1.1.1) (Figure 7.25, 7.26). 
The application of Stress Cam uses the frontal vasculature of the forehead and corrugators 100 
(frowning muscle), rather than the method of studying the periorbital area that was discussed 
earlier, which is the same method of thermal analysis utilised in the Mind Cupola. Through the 
measurement of this particular area the face analysis attempts to capture temperature changes 
during the spectator's experience, using the data as a reference for the production of a mental 
profile of the spectator.
The Mind Cupola's thermal imaging measurements also implement the 'Brain 
Temperature Tunnel' concept (BTT, 2003) (Bl.1.2) developed by Marc Abreu, a scientist of 
Yale University (Figure 7.27). He claims that it is possible to measure brain temperature 
instantly on the skin. The application is meaningful to the concept of the Mind Cupola as it is an 
instant affection device built upon thermodynamic theories of human consciousness. It was 
suggested earlier that brain temperature might provide information on the state of a person's 
consciousness; therefore, this measurement might be used as supportive information to capture 
the spectator's quality of cognition. According to Abreu, BBT is placed near to the eyes and
99 Stress cam investigated 12 subjects and compared the results with the established method of real-time 
measurements of Energy Expenditure (EE). The investigation outcomes have shown that Stress cam greatly 
correlated to the laborious EE technology.
100 The selected area is named as the 'Region of Interest' (ROI) as only this section is investigated. With this 
methodology the 10% hottest pixel is selected and this generates a temperature signal from the forehead. The 
results are calculated with the bioheat model (Levine and Pavlidis, 2002), which evaluated the blood flow. To 
assess the results of the bioheat model the Strop Color Word Conflict Test is used, (a stress generator concept) in 
which a user's response is represented through color and text content. The indicated stress was measured by the 
metabolic analyser of EE as an adequate data system and compared with the outcomes of thermal imaging.
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Figure 7.25 Left: The initial approach of thermal face analysis which measures the perfusion levels in the periorbital area. 
(Levine and Pavlidis, 2002) Figure 7.26 Right: The later concept of 'Stress Cam'focused on the frontal vasculature of
forehead. (Puri, Olson, Pavlidis, Levine and Starren, 2005)
Figure 7.27 Brain temperature tunnel and the developed glasses which enable athletes to measure brain 
temperature during their activity (Abreu, 2003)
nose, where the skin is very thin and contains high light energy. He claims that this area is 
connected to the brain's 'thermal storage centre' (Abreu, 2003, np.). Abreu sees his tool as a 
significant step for temperature monitoring that can be used not just for determining illnesses but 
also improving human capability and safety, such as using it for military or sports purposes, 
providing a permanent response about the condition of the body. It measures the temperature on 
that particular area of skin ('Brain Temperature Tunnel') and compares it with a normal state 
temperature. Similar to the Stress cam, the implementation will note temperature changes during 
the process and evaluate these for a certain level of cognitive state. The system analyses the 
Cupola's affection, which might cool down or heat up the person's head and thus so the brain, 
and in doing so will be transformed into a possible emotional change. This suggests that 
affections on the body produce certain reflections in cognition.
Another part of the face analysis is regular image processing (B1.2), which is developed 
within a framework of established methodologies. As it was mentioned earlier, the face analysis 
software attempted to apply methodologies that are efficient and provide obvious feedback of 
one's behaviour. Therefore, it has been decided that measurements such as eye-tracking (Bl.2.1), 
position of mouth (open or closed - happiness or sadness) (Bl.2.2), and the amplitude and 
intensity of head movement (nose tracking) (Bl.2.3) were to be used. The measurements will all 
be linked to behaviour and emotional analysis, which, through the system, produces the 
visualisation and influences the patterns of the frequency generators.
In totality, the face analysis functionalities of the temperature analysis on the forehead 
(Bl.1.1), temperature analysis of BBT (Bl.1.2), eye tracking (Bl.2.1), mouth position (Bl.2.2), 
head position (Bl.2.3) and movement analysis, and have a particular task in the Mind Cupola's
processing. The data of (Bl.1.1) (Bl.1.2) are fed back to the frequency generators and influence
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that processing. The data of (Bl.1.1) (Bl.1.2) (Bl.2.1) (Bl.2.2) (Bl.2.3) generates the changes in 
the visualisation. The interconnection between analysed data and its representation in the applied 
system is a crucial concept that generates not just the technological feedback but also 
conceptually serves to achieve the cognitive feedback loop. Therefore, it should be noted that the 
adequacy of the analysis, the efficient application of the information and a technological stability 
is essential for a successful aesthetic application. The application of eye tracking (Bl.2.1) creates 
the most obvious feedback for the spectator as it interlinks the spectator's quality of attention / 
awareness / concentration with a visual response. This application is used to formulate the 
'attention play' that was described earlier, in which words, in the visualisation, follow the eye 
movement of the spectator and, at a particular moment, disappear to draw the spectator's 
attention to other visual affection. The BBT (Bl. 1.2) measurement and its constant monitoring 
activate the cooling and heating system in the Mind Cupola. Other temperature measurements 
(Bl.1.1) are used to capture the changes (in the forehead) and the evaluation of 
happiness/sadness, whilst Bl.2.2 is responsible for an emotional evaluation of the spectator that 
affects the quality of the visualisation. The head tracking (Bl.2.3) produces a simple behavioural 
pattern of the spectator and is used to determine the type and speed of the animation of the 
visualisation. The applications and its feedback loops produce a collaborative affection on the 
spectator, which is conceptualised as the fractal structure of the experience.
The final element of the artistic system is the visualisation101 (C), which belongs to the 
instant affective technologies and has the same functionality as the frequency generators but has 
a crucial role in producing an obvious feedback to the spectator's action. It is a 2D animation 
system that is built upon the visual language of fractals (Figure 7.28, 7.29). The visualisation
101 For further technological details and documentation see in Appendix 2.4.
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Figure 7.28 Screen shots of the 'Mind Cupola's' visualisation; 
Equilibrium and Meditative states (Zics, 2008)
Figure 7.29 Screen shots of the 'Mind Cupola's' visualisation; 
Chaos and Equilibrium states (Zics, 2008)
follows a demand, set within the conception of the Mind Cupola's affection system, that it must 
influence the spectator through perceptual means. The fractal, as mentioned earlier, is a 
representation of the feedback loop, which, in a visual form, is illustrated in the Mind Cupola. 
The system is built upon sprites and particles of which particular attributes and behaviours are 
controlled by the spectator's reactions. The fractal-like structure, motion, colour and created 
semiotics play together, which form words that appear and disappear, and attempt to drive the 
spectator to a crucial cognitive state. The visualisation forms an aesthetical contribution to the 
concept of affection, which the Mind Cupola applies as the demand for the Transparent Act.
In summary, the artistic idea of the Mind Cupola (Figure 7.30) is based on the proposal 
that the human body is a surface of affections and reflections through which the specialised 
technology enables us to filter new information about human consciousness. It suggests a body- 
mind interconnectivity that can be used as a meaningful application for a cognitive flow 
production. The artistic conception of the Mind Cupola proposes methods for affecting human 
cognition by a spectrum of electromagnetic wave functions, which the technology makes visible 
and accessible, such as EEG technology. In this context the human brain is also a receiver that 
attempts to make sense of the mass of unintelligible waves and information. From this 
perspective, the Mind Cupola can be explained as a device, which approaches qualities of human 
consciousness through an aestheticisation of these processes. It uses a collection of affects that a 
person might normally experience in their everyday environment; however, its amount is 
multiplied in order to instantly affect the person. As this proposes that the human 'apparatus' is 
not only effected by perceptual but also by invisible or mechanistic forces, the thesis suggests 
that this approach might generate an effective encounter of body and mind relationship in 
interaction. This proceeds from an understanding, applied in the Mind Cupola, that physical
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Figure 7.30 The 'Mind Cupola' at the test installation, Peninsula Art Gallery, 
Plymouth (Zics, 2008)
impact might trigger cognitive changes in the spectator and, conversely, that affection of 
biological processes of the brain/face might display cognitive changes. The interface of the Mind 
Cupola attempts to produce essential affections that are both biological and cognitive in the aim 
of revealing more about the body-mind interconnection, or more specifically about human 
consciousness. For this purpose, it created special devices based on scientific and non-scientific 
conceptions that produce a 'spectrum of frequencies', visible and invisible waves to produce a 
yet unknown impact on human cognition. The feedback loop of these electromagnetic stimuli 
might generate qualities of the human 'apparatus' that is a new or unique knowledge to the 
human condition. A spiritual-like experience might be achieved when the spectator is in 
cognitive control of the system and enters a fully immersive state. This is where the ecstatic state 
emerges, through the cognitive fractal structure and only the cognitive flow drives the spectator's 
actions. The Mind Cupola creates a new symbolic place for electronic meditations; an affective 
environment (instead of a responsive environment as was suggested by Krueger) through which 




The interdisciplinary research discussed in this thesis developed a critical framework for an 
investigation of technology-based interaction in artworks and proposed a new model, termed the 
Transparent Act, for the way in which technology should be implemented when considering for 
a new aesthetic. The Transparent Act most importantly provides a guide for artistic production 
and for a better understanding of interconnectivity between human and machine, and its 
potentiality for the transfer of novel knowledge and aesthetic experience. There is where the 
thesis' main intervention lies, as it introduces an aesthetic based upon the immediacy of'artist- 
artwork-spectator'. The thesis claims that the potential of technology in art has not yet been fully 
discovered, and this new model enables the artist to understand the immaterial qualities of the 
spectator experience, providing an instant communication between artist and spectator. This 
quality is based upon the ability of technology to affect human cognition, which the artist can use 
as an aesthetic tool. This is the thesis intervention of the transparent medium, which explains an 
immaterial application of technology that is in balance (in the 'making art' process) and 
oscillation (in the 'experiencing art' process) between artistic meaning creation and 
technological functionality. Thus, technology-based meaning creation is not only produced by 
the content but also through the artistic design of the technology or interface. From this point of 
view the integration of emerging technologies, which are often not embedded in the spectator's 
knowledge, produces an adequate connection to comfort the user with the technological novelty. 
Therefore, the aim of this research was to produce a transparent medium which exemplifies the 
immediacy between artist and spectator, with the aim to create an optimal state of consciousness 
or creative ecstasy.
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Drawing on the model of the Transparent Act, the artistic work of the Mind Cupola 
rediscovers a lost dimension of art. It has been shown earlier that pioneering technology-based 
works by Myron Krueger and their legacy could not offer an aesthetic solution for interaction 
since the framework remained in a materialistic understanding, ignoring a meaning creation 
through responsiveness. Most of the subsequent interactive media artworks, such as the earlier 
discussed Dancing -with the Virtual Dervish: Virtual Bodies (Gromala and Sharir, 1994-99) and 
Mirror_SPACE (Zics, 2004/05), produced by the author, were built upon the commonly applied 
active modality of interaction, proposing a meaning creation by bodily controlled interfaces. 
Revisiting these artistic applications, the thesis claims that an immaterial approach of interaction 
that focuses on qualities between body and mind might be more effectively produced by the 
unique modality of passive interaction.
One of the practical solutions of the passive modality is the concept of fractal structure, 
which proposes applying technological feedback in a cognitive feedback loop, as it has been 
applied in the pioneering works by Peter Weibel. As such, the unique bio-feedback interface of 
the Mind Cupola includes both the technologies that affect human condition by frequency 
generators and visualisation, and the technologies which measure the results through face 
analysis. The spectator's role here is much more based on embodied reactions and intentional 
decision expressed through a spectrum of states of cognition, which enables a condition of 
inwardness to be led to heightened immersion (Figure 8.01, 8.02). As the spectator operates with 
cognitive qualities such as emotion or behavioural changes in the artwork, the concept of the 
Mind Cupola proposes that it is possible to regulate the spectator's experience to an optimal or 
new state (Figure 8.03, 8.04). It aims for unique body awareness, reducing motor-driven 
involvement of the body and focusing upon qualities of consciousness that aim to create fully
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Figure 8.01 and 8.02 The Premiere of the 'Mind Cupola ' (Zics, Pope, Ford, Prof. Weibel
and Prof. Smith) (Zics, 2008)
Figure 8.03 and 8.04 Thermal stream activated by the 
spectator in the 'Mind Cupola' (Zics, 2008)
immersive experiences, generating a new pattern of body-mind interconnection. The fractal 
structure, which is most evidently characterised in the spectator's experience as a complex 
phenomenon resulting in new knowledge through consciousness, is produced by the particular 
appearance of the device and the interconnectivity of the affection and capturing technologies 
generating the aesthetic meaning. The mechanical operation of the Mind Cupola provides a 
unique sequence of experience that has an aesthetic chain reaction based upon the data feedback 
to the system. The generative quality of the Cupola (i.e. the system continuously recreates itself 
according to the spectators) never allows the same pattern of actions and therefore the experience 
is specific to each individual spectator. The fractal quality emerges in the spectator's cognitive 
processes as they immerse themselves and perpetuate their own experience. In doing so, the 
spectator might achieve an ecstatic state through the simple repeated affection processes of the 
Mind Cupola's technology, resulting in the complexity within the user's cognition.
The Mind Cupola represents the qualities of the Transparent Act as it attempts to produce 
a flow in the spectator's experience, building upon cognitive-based interactivity. The cognitive 
flow is the optimal state of consciousness that the Mind Cupola produces by the instant affection 
of consciousness combined with artistic formulations of the hardware, and learning the laws of 
the interaction, thus mastering the tool. The direct and instant affection of consciousness drives 
the spectator towards a subjective experience with the incorporation of an aesthetic that is 
produced based upon the spectator's decision making, according to the artistic content. The Mind 
Cupola produces the immediacy between the artist and spectator, as the spectator recognises the 
characteristics of the interaction according to the anticipation of the artist. As a result the artistic 
creation process is linked to the spectator experience, which according to the quality of the 
artistic content creation and the spectator's involvement, achieves an uninterrupted creative flow.
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A Heideggerian perspective on the Mind Cupola is the readiness-to-hand of embodied 
knowledge of the spectator and presenters-to-hand of a novel aesthetic message. Readiness-to- 
hand in the Mind Cupola is produced by the instant affection system, creating, in the human 
environment, familiar changes around the spectator's head. The changes of temperature, light 
and sound can be seen as familiar information to the spectator that he or she must link to a 
meaning in the system in order to be able to interact with it. This aesthetic of the interaction 
represents presenters-to-hand in the Cupola, which is generated by the cognitively analysed data 
as both a visualisation and audio experience, enabling the spectator to be able to master the tool 
and seek new knowledge. The fluctuation between these processes (readiness-to-hand and 
presenters-to-hand) generates a poetic level of the Mind Cupola; the subjective, aesthetic 
experience of the spectator.
The Mind Cupola invokes not only artistic content but also the technological medium that 
is produced by the artist, building upon both technological design methodologies (explained as 
invisible tool) and the artistic contextualisation of technology (the transparent medium). The 
concept of invisible tool elicits a functional application of the human-computer interaction, 
ensuring an efficient and effective interaction for the spectator (such as the process of 
programming or application of face analysis software or data analysis in the Mind Cupola). The 
transparent medium provides an effective environment, the unique interface of the Cupola and its 
generative artistic system. The two hardware implementations of the cupola itself and the 
camera-mover interface situated at the front are a good example how the artistic system of the 
Mind Cupola fuses cognitive-based approaches of design and art. The cupola follows a particular 
aesthetic formulation; it is an exclusive place, which embraces its spectator. Whereas this cupola 
interface draws audience attention on the surface, promoting artistic meaning, the camera-mover
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interface at the front only serves for functional tasks, as it adjusts the camera to the height of the 
person; thus it is designed to be aesthetically invisible. The camera-mover with its low-key 
design and dark surfaces attempts to merge into the background, in contrast with the cupola, 
which with its design of lighting and reflections, is very visible and affects the perceiver. The 
production of a cognitive flow is achieved through the combination of perceptually visible and 
invisible interfaces that represent the thesis claims that interactive media art includes both 
effective design approaches and the artistic drive of pushing boundaries and reflecting on 
technology for a new artistic meaning. Therefore, the model of the Transparent Act, exemplified 
here by the Mind Cupola, is not only a proposal for a new aesthetic but also for effective design 
solutions for human and machine interfaces; the scale of the applications of the invisible tool and 
the transparent medium have been chosen by the artist according to the artistic meaning creation. 
Looking into future applications of the Transparent Act, the thesis draws out a framework 
for both an interdisciplinary model for artistic practice and an evidence-based critical approach 
for reviewing contemporary technology-based artworks. The practical application of the 
Transparent Act provides a guide for artists with regards to how technology can be meaningfully 
incorporated into creative processes that suggest active and passive modalities of interaction. It 
proposes that functional responsiveness has to be linked with the aesthetic openness in order to 
produce a cognitive-based interaction. The concepts of body awareness and immersion facilitate 
particular qualities of the artistic interface that provide a meaningful application of meaning 
creation for art production. The application of the Transparent Act also draws on Eco's 
openness; as an interactive artwork it is a communication system, which through 'ambiguity' in 
the oscillate characteristic between the mastering of the technology and the seeking of artistic 
knowledge, creates multiple meaning and subjective experience. The 'controlled disorder' (Eco,
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1989) in the Mind Cupola can be represented through the learning process of the spectator, in 
order to formalise their decision making; this is how s/he may be able to influence the 
visualisation in recognition of the cupola's affective processes. The process in which the 
spectator aims to comprehend the interaction produces noise in the information exchange, which 
only disappears when he or she is able to control the artistic system. Eco explained this through 
the example of the mosaic pieces that represent an ambiguity, as they are not perfectly 
interconnected but, as a whole, generate a clear response to the spectator in which this lack of 
clarity becomes part of the artistic message.
Drawing further on the characteristics of the Transparent Act, responsiveness in the Mind 
Cupola is characterised by two feedback sources: the visualisation and the cupola's instant 
affection system. The spectator's task is to make sense of the feedback the system creates, which 
is designed to achieve the optimal state for the user (Figure 8.05, 8.06, 8.07, 8.08, 8.09, 8.10, 
8.11). The chain of actions and affections are generative, based upon the spectator's behavioural 
decision-making and thus producing a unique subjective experience. As the Mind Cupola is an 
artistic medium, the applications of 'degree of choice,' 'modifiability', 'quality of modification' 
and 'degree of non-linearity' (responsiveness) do not have to attain the highest degree, as seen in 
the use of the invisible tool, to achieve transparency, but they rather have to produce an 
interconnection between these functionalities and the artistic meaning.
The immersive state is generated by the limited behavioural responses measured through 
changes of head and eye movement. As the argument here proceeds from the position that bodily 
states trigger certain states of consciousness, the immersive state is achieved through the 
cognitive process of mastering the system, generating transparency in the spectator's cognition. 
Heightened immersion is achieved by the equilibrium state, which means that the flow of
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Figure 8.05 Spectator in the 'Mind Cupola ' (Zics, 2008)
Figure 8.06 and 8.07 Spectator 's interaction in the 'Mind Cupola' (Zics, 2008)
Figure 8.08 and 8.09 Spectators in the 'Cupola' interface (Zics, 2008)
Figure 8.10 and 8.11 Visitors at the 'Mind Cupola's' environment 
(Zics, 2008)
experience takes control of the interaction. This flow may produce an ecstatic state when the 
cognitive oscillation between functional dealing and artistic content, in this case controlling the 
cupola's affection system through interaction with the visual display, turns to an aesthetic 
immersion that produces a spiritual-like experience.
Another implication of the Transparent Act is that it provides new perspectives on how 
an aesthetic can be evaluated in technology-based artworks. The immaterial approach taken by 
this model applies technology; in the context of art as tools for cognitive modelling of the 
spectator's subjective experience. It looks at how the artwork provides content through the 
quality of the interaction with technology, how the emerging quality of responsiveness is linked 
to an aesthetic claim. Through this the artwork can be efficiently evaluated for both: artistic 
quality and technological capacity through the application of Goetz' model. The previous 
discussion also introduced the modality of experience-based evaluation of artworks: an 
application of the matrix of immersion that is factored into determining the degree of 
transparency. Thus, the quality of transparency explains how far the artist balances functionality 
with content production, which is the effectiveness of human-computer interaction for cognitive 
affection of the spectator. A particular application of this evaluation system would be for the 
assessment of technology-based media artworks. New media art festivals have a great pressure to 
evaluate emerging concepts which currently focus upon the qualities of technological meaning 
creation. The Transparent Act offers a scheme through which interactive artworks can be 
evaluated based upon their efficient aesthetic quality and not, as often occurs, by the quality and 
novelty of emerging technology, or by artistic content that is not meaningfully applied to 
technological responsiveness. Knowledge production in the Transparent Act is based on the 
experience design. Firstly, this is gauged by observing how far the artwork demands the user to
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engage with learning processes to develop new knowledge in interaction (rather than purely 
using their embodied knowledge), which allows for a mastering of the tool. Secondly, the act 
accounts for how far the artistic content produces a consciousness alteration, generating new 
knowledge. The relation between new knowledge of function and new knowledge of artistic 
content determines the critical analysis through the model of the Transparent Act.
As a future perspective, the Transparent Act can also serve as novel scheme of art and 
design education. Art and technology education may find this model useful for an innovative 
cross-genre application between art and design. A network of interdisciplinary theories, 
conceptions and applications can generate a new understanding for students who might approach 
technology by more critical, yet proactive, frameworks. Through the interconnectivity of 
concepts (such as openness, responsiveness, invisible tool, transparent medium, body awareness 
and immersion and flow) the Transparent Act provides a framework to encourage a broader 
understanding and straightforward applications. It offers a method that emphasises a dynamic 
creation process with a great interest in emerging technologies and how they can be used for 
design or artistic solution. The Transparent Act claims that, in an educational context, 
technological applications may be approached not only as art or design outcomes but rather as 
outcomes based upon how technology produces content. This suggests that students might apply 
the Transparent Act in more universal contexts, where the purpose of the project is to decide 
whether the technological application pushes boundaries such as art (transparent medium) or 
devotes itself for a more functional solution of technology (invisible tool); both approaches work 
towards an effective human-computer and aesthetic application.
Future perspectives on this research will come from a supplementary investigation of the 
experiences of the Mind Cupola, based upon methods of self-reports and case studies evaluating
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cognitive qualities, in order to comprehend the passive modality of interaction, and how this 
might be improved to produce a higher degree of transparency. This could be in the form of 
touring institutions with the Mind Cupola, with the aim to produce an audiovisual database of 
subjective experiences (via self-report or participant observation by artist), providing further 
material of the analytical applications of the Transparent Act or even an expansion of this 
modality. As the Transparent Act claims an ecstatic state with a tendency toward spiritual-like 
phenomenon, further research will be dedicated to the exploration of similarities in spiritual 
ecstasies and creative ecstasies. Based on these evaluations further practice could be undertaken, 
based on the self-report of the spectators of the Mind Cupola, with the aim of improving the 
immediacy between the artist and the spectator through more effective affection technologies. 
This might also result in a further exploration of technologies which directly change 
consciousness. New perspectives can also be identified in the application of tangible interfaces, 
which were defined in this thesis as active modalities of interaction, since they are built upon a 
completely different body-mind relationship. An investigation of knowledge-seeking in 
technologies that work through touch could extend views on instant affective technologies and 
might produce applications (along its particular quality of body awareness), providing a greater 
amount of adequate information exchange. This design application might serve as recognition of 
common computational devices, such as the keyboard, which, in this new proposal, would be 
integrated into a cognitive-driven method; thus an active mode would be extended into a passive 
mode.
The Mind Cupola is a product of a conceptual dematerialisation process that applies a 
philosophical model to re-introduce an aesthetic model of interactive technology-based 
applications. This proposal dissolves the dualistic interpretation of art, in which processes of
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artist-artwork and artwork-spectator were considered in a separate manner. The main argument 
in this thesis interconnects the artistic creative processes with the spectator's experience, which 
happens in the way that the artist anticipates the actions in a form of affection system producing 
repetitive actions of a fractal structure in the spectator's cognition. The Mind Cupola generates 
transparency as its artistic model of interaction is based on the dynamic processes of experience 
and its artistic content is based upon this result. Its concept uses emerging technologies from a 
critical distance so letting it produce not merely an object as a material outcome but rather 
serving as a tool for experience design. The Mind Cupola rediscovers the lost immaterial 
dimension of art as it aestheticises the spectator's internalisation process triggered by the 
affective environment. The Mind Cupola with its passive model of interaction recovers qualities 
in art experience that might have been present before in art history, but have been lost in the 
materialistic modality of art.
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Appendix 1
Context for the Theoretical Models of Responsiveness and Immersion
Appendix 2 





Lutz Goertz' (1995) four-dimensional model:
Goertz' dimension of'degree of choice available':
0 No choice available except a decision about when reception starts and ends...
1 Only basic changes available in the quality of the channel (such as: light/dark, 
high/low or fast/slow)
2 As in 1, plus the ability to choose between selections in one choice dimension; 
choices occur simultaneously (such as television or radio programs)...
3 As in 2, but the selections available within the choice dimension are not time 
dependent (such as newspapers or video-on-demand)
4 As in 3, but there are two or more choice dimensions for a user to choose from 
(for example video games with various levels of play, forms of presentation, 
forms of action and story lines to choose from). (Goertz, 1995, p. 476)
Goertz' dimension of'degree of modi/lability':
0 No modification possible with the exception of storing or erasing messages
1 Manipulation or 'verfremdung' of messages is possible (through the choice of 
sound or colour)
2 Modification to some degree of random additions, changes, or erasure of content 
is possible
3 Modification possible through random additions, changes in, or erasure of any
type of content (for example computer word processors or graphics software, and 
in most media as a means of communication. (Goertz, 1995, pp. 486-7)
Goertz' dimension of 'quantitative size of the available selections and modifications': 
0 No choice possible,
1 Some choice available (between 2 and 10 choices) within at least one selection or 
modification dimension (television reception via terrestrial frequencies),
2 As in 1, plus more than 10 choices within one selection or modification dimension 
(A reader can choose from several hundred newspaper articles and reviews, 
teletext offers more than 100 pages though no other choices are available),
3 More than 10 choices available in more than two selection and/or modification
dimensions (limited selection available as for example in branched choices or: an 
infinite or seamless selection available from one selection or modification 
dimension respectively (video games which allow the user to write in a random 
name at the beginning),
4 An infinite or seamless selection available from all selection and/or modification 
possibilities (applies to media uses which allow participants random messages, 
word processing programs, but first actually for all media which function as a 
means of communication). 
(Goertz, 1995, p.487)
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Goertz' dimension of'degree of linearity/non-linearity':
0 The time and order of the material is completely controlled by the information 
producer or the sender (television, radio, film),
1 The order of the material is determined by this information producer or sender, 
the user initiates the communication process and can stop or re-start it (video, 
records, other sound media),
2 As in 1, but the user determines the tempo of the reception (books),
3 As in 2, the user can select single elements of information which have little or no 
connection to each other (newspapers),
4 As in 3, the user can now retrieve elements of information which are highly
connected (references in an encyclopaedia or via hypertext functions on a World 
Wide Web site). 
(Goertz, 1995, p. 487)
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Appendix 1.2
Four-dimensional model of Immersion:
The following suggests model for measurement based on self-reports or observation carried out 
by the artist. This matrix applies the four-dimensional scheme of interactivity introduced by Lutz 
Goertz (see Appendix 1.1).
0 No immersion
1 Discontinues immersion (process of embodiment)
Learning process: (1) semiotics of the body movement
(2) symbolic evaluation
(3) comprehending perceptual knowledge
2 Fluctuation between immersion and embodiment
Understanding: (1) fragmental success in respond
(2) fragmental success in respond
(3) between comprehending and immersing 
(fragmental success in respond)
3 Controlled immersion
Effective interaction: (1) high effectiveness in control
(2) high effectiveness in control








Documentation of the Development of the Mind Cupola Interface
In collaboration with Andor Gaudia
Introduction
The aim of the project is to design and implement a 'Mind Cupola' which is able to do the 
following things:
• Locate user's head and change its vertical position to accommodate to the user's height
• Notify the camera holder about the user's height




Mind cupola will be a ceiling mounted cupola which is able to perform pre-programmed things. 
The cupola will be used together with the camera holder device. 
The cupola project contains 2 major hardware elements:
• Cupola
• Cupola lifter
Air, light and sound effects have the best efficiency if their source is as close to the user's face as 
possible. Since adults' height usually varies between 150 cm and 200 cm the cupola's vertical 
position have to be changed. This can be done using a lifter device.
2 distance sensors will be placed inside the cupola. The first distance sensor will be used to 
measure whether there is a user beneath the cupola or not. If the sensor tells us that somebody is 
standing beneath the cupola the cupola lifter will lower the cupola's vertical position until the 2nd 
sensor notifies us that we will reach the user's head soon. The cupola lifter is stopped as soon as 
the 2nd sensor gives a signal.
Cupola lifter will be driven by a geared DC motor.
Spotlights will be placed inside the cupola facing the user's face. Ambient lights can be also 
used. The exact number of the lights will be specified later but the maximum number can't 
exceed 10 independent light sources. If less air source is required then the number of light 
sources can be increased.
The cupola will include 2 small speakers and the with frequency throughput of 400-22000 Hz. 
The cupola won't include any amplifiers; it will only provide 2 RCA connectors on the side of 
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Figure 1 Draft of the 'Mind Cupola's' technical scheme, 2007
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Figure 2 /»///«/ Drafts of the 'Mind Cupola', 2007
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Figure 3 'Mind Cupola' Development: Work in Progress
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Figure 4 'Mind Cupola' on the arrival at the University of Plymouth
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Images used as sources for the development of the Mind Cupola's design:
Figure 5 Screen shoot of the movie 'Tron' (1982) directed by Steven Lisberger with the visual
design by Peter Lloyd
Figure 6 The 'Mind Cupola's' interior design applies similar 
cover pattern as Sony Ericson MSB-100 Bluetooth Speaker
201
Figure 7 Rooftop copper cupolas served as examples 
for the shape and design of the 'Mind Cupola'
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Appendix 2.2
Documentation of the Development of Camera-Mover Interface 
Mechanical, Electrical, Software Overview
In collaboration with Andor Gaudia
Short task description
The aim of this project is to design and create a camera leg which is able to adjust the camera's 
height using a computer controlled motor.
Specifications:
• Lowest camera position: ~1200 mm
• Highest camera position: -2000 mm
• Maximum camera weight: ~1.8 kg
• Total weight: ~10-15 kg
• Base dimensions: 200 mm x 300 mm
• Body dimensions: 150 mm x 250 mm
• Pipe diameter: 20 mm
• Precision: 0.5 mm/step
Parts, materials listing:
• Frame: Steel profile (1mm wall thickness). Joints are welded.
• Pipe: 20 mm diameter aluminium pipe.
• Guide wheels: Rubber wheels with ball bearings. Wheels are adjustable.
• Counterweight: Solid steel block. The counterweight is guided by two strained wires. The 
weight is connected to the lifting pipes using metal wire. The plastic pulley wheel is 
mounted using a ball bearing.
• Base: Metal plate with rubber foot. Will contain a heavy (3-4 kg) ballast to increase the 
frame's stability.













Figure 1 Schematic view of the camera-mover
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The frame, the counterweight and the pipes are painted to black. The frame can be covered with glass 
or plastic. All the cables needed to operate the camera can be hidden inside the pipes. The power 
connector, the fire-wire connector and the parallel port connector will be placed to the back of the 
base panel.
Electrical plans
The electrical system contains the stepper motor, signal amplifier and the power supply. 
Stepper motor characteristics:
• Model: Minebea 23LM-C004
• Coil type: unipolar, 6 phase
• Operating voltage: 6V
• Operating current: 1.2 A/phase
• Angle/step: 1.8 deg/step
• Amplifier characteristics:
• Interface: parallel port
• Maximum current: 2A/phase
• Power supply:
• Switching mode power supply
• Operating voltage: 100-240V/50-60Hz
• Output voltage: 7.5V DC
• Output current: 1.5 A
• Overload and heat protection
• The electrical system will contain 2 switches which report the top-most and bottom-most 
	position of the lifter.
Software plans
The software will contain a library which can be used in any other projects. The library will 
provide the following junctions:
• Initialize - Initializes the entire system. Calibrates the lifter.
• GoToBottom - The lifter will go down until it reaches the bottom-most position.
• GotToTop - The lifter will go up until it reaches the top-most position.
• GoTo - Moves the lifter to the specified position. The position can be specified in 
millimetres.
• StepUp - Instructs the stepper motor to turn 1 step up (about 0.5mm change in height).
• StepDown - Instructs the stepper motor to turn 1 step down (about 0.5mm change in 
height).
• Move — Instructs the lifter to start moving into a specified direction with a specified 
speed.
• Stop - Stops the lifter.
• GetStatus - Returns the current status.
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Documentation of the Face Analysis Software Development
Face Recognition and Feature Analysis Using Thermal and DV Cameras
In collaboration with Dr. Phil Culverhouse and Dr. Julian Tilbury, University of Plymouth
Introduction
This guide outlines the structure and function of a firewire camera-processing module that can 
identify facial features in real-time video stream from an IEEE1394 (Firewire) camera, called 
UoP_face.exe and UoP_thermal face.exe
The software puts wrapping code around proprietary facial feature recognition DLL from David 
Cristinacce at Manchester University. The wrapper is built upon the CMU IEEE 1394 camera 
driver project for camera interface control, and post processes the camera stream to extract 
dynamic and static facial features. Feature parameters are passed to other processes via sockets 
and can therefore be situated on any internet computer.
The IEEE 1394 interface and video stream analyser can be connected to a normal DV or Firewire 
camera, or optionally to a thermal camera. The Cristinacce facial feature recognition software 
must be called with the appropriate training-set, according to normal or thermal camera 
input.Data rates from a 25 frame per second camera drop to about 10 frames per second when the 
computer hosts one camera. This can be expected to drop to 5 frames per second for two 
cameras.
Camera processing
Cristinacce facial feature recognition software is reasonably robust to lighting and to face size, 
but deep shadowing, substantial face rotation in the camera plane and occlusion prevent its 
operation. This is particularly noticeable for thermal images where people with long hair cannot 
be recognised.
The DLL reports eye, nose and mouth position. The wrapping code adds a training facility to 
allow mouth open/closed and eyes open/closed to be analysed.
Feature messages comprise:
1. Camera type: T (thermal) or N (normal);
2. Nose x, y cord: N x y;
3. Left eye: Le O (open) or C (closed);
4. Right eye: Re O or C;
5. Mouth: MO or C;
6. Cheek temperature or Colour: L (RGB bytes), R (RGB bytes)
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Socket link
Data is sent via a socket link to another process, which may be on the same computer, or another 
internet computer. The connecting process is the socket master server, and the client is the 
UoP_face application.
Computer 1: Master socket server
Computer 2: UOP_face: camera 
facial feature processor
10 frames per second. Sends 
messages to Master Socket Server 
with face parameters
Computer 3: Camera height 
controller
Receives messages from Master 
Socket Server with height control 
commands. Adjusts camera height via 
the parallel port.
Computer 4: Visualisation 
processor
Receives socket messages from 
Master Socket Server. Message could 








Fig.l Block diagram of computer array for installation
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The simplest configuration for control of an art installation is through using 'sockets'. These are 
standard Internet protocol message passing methods that allow processes on one computer to 
communicate directly with processes on other computers in point to point pathways.
Computer array operation
1. Power up all computers
2. Run Msserver.exe on Computer 1 (Master Socket Server)
3. Connect cameras and on Computer 2 run UOP_face.exe (and UOP_Thermal_face.exe as 
required, ensuring the IP address of Computer 1 is defined correctly in the socket 
configuration file.
4. Connect height controller and pressure sensitive mat to Computer 3. Run height software 
on Computer 3, and ensuring the IP address of Computer 1 is defined correctly in the 
socket configuration file.
5. Run visualisation software on Computer 4, and ensuring the IP address of Computer 1 is 
defined correctly in the socket configuration file.
Then Computer 1 waits for a socket message from the pressure mat via Computer 3. If the 
camera processor receives no facial feature messages then the height controller is commanded to 
run through a height cycle. When the first facial feature tracking data from Computer 2 is 
obtained then the height controller is told to stop adjusting the camera height. The height is 
adjusted to keep the face in the centre of the camera field of view.
If the thermal camera fails to detect a face, then estimates of face position corrected by the 
known geometric relation between the normal camera and the thermal camera can be applied and 
feature data estimated. (Note this will not work and requires that the two cameras are placed in 
the same software loop, to allow camera pixel data to be shared for the two cameras.) Camera 
facial feature messages are processed to construct time-sequence data for all the 8 channels of 
feature data.
> fl client fron lloeAlhostl is connected?
I m:lnt.ilNi:tl: U N 265 118 Le 8 Re 8 M B Lc 9V 85 58 Rr. 128 185 82 F 181 II', '
I 111 122 88 Rt 158 136 112 line 11:13:33 
I <.U:]nr,tl!io:t I: U N 21,1 118 Le 8 Re 8 H 8 U. IBH (III 62 Re I83 98 ',5 F I85 91 I.
t 111 122 92 Rt 135 123 93 Tine 11:13:33 
I 'U:lm:,!llio,ll: U N 211 153 Lc 8 Re 8 n 8 Lr. 188 88 f,V Re 97 81 18 F 99 8V ',1
II9 189 84 Rt 131 115 80 line 11:13:33 
!I':U: Iric.ilhiKit I: U H 234 155 I.e 8 Re 8 M 1 l.c 99 98 65 Re 95 81 48 F 1H2 86 59
124 114 91 Rt 12V 111 86 line 11:IJ:J1
IKjUMotiilliost I: 0 N 21V 154 Le 8 Re 8 M B Lc 181 94 VB Re 97 86 49 P 188 88 V 
.1 1)7 125 92 Rt 131 121 93 Tine 11:13:31 
!K:t):lci,,ill>o';t I: U N 2I8 I56 l.e 8 Re 8 n 8 Lc 185 95 78 Re 94 82 45 F 89 77 51
116 121 96 Rt 128 116 88 line 11:11:31 
H:U:!f,i,illm:;tl: U N 22! 155 I.e 8 Re 8 H fl Lc IBS 94 67 Re 95 83 46 P 93 82 4V
I If, 124 91 Rt 135 123 93 tine 11:11:11 
K.U:l,».alho;t): U N 212 154 Le 8 Re B M fl Lt 184 94 V8 Re 99 8V 52 F 96 84 51
I IB II9 86 Rt I ID H8 98 line 11:13:31 
K:U:l,,i:,,llnr;t I: F 85/86/88
Output from MsClient - Face Recognition data output
« "N " « Points[NoseTipCnt] « " 
// Nose tip coordinates 
« "Le " « LftEyeOpen « " 
« "Re " « RgtEyeOpen « " 
« "M " « MouthOpen « " 
« "Lc " « CheekColour[Lft] « " 
« "Re " « CheekColour[Rgt] « " 
« "F " « ForeheadColour « " 
« "Lt " « LftTempleColour « " 
« "Rt " « RgtTempleColour « " 
« "Time " « string(timeStr,9};
Figure 2 Server socket window displaying data stream of the face analysis
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Appendix 2.4
Documentation of the Visualisation
In collaboration Chris Ford, University of Plymouth
Figure 1 Screen shot of the visualisation
I. Visualisation System - Emotional Stage Explanations
1. Chaos Stage 1 (Chaos Colours: Red <-> Orange)
• Kaleidoscopic Background (Colour Affected)
• CircleO 1 with Rotation (Colour Affected)
• CircleOS with Rotation and Scaling (Colour Affected)
• Mice Particles in Outer Ring area (Colour Affected)
• FractalSet2 On with Rotation - Shimmering State (Colour Affected - Initial Size 
.04)
• Rotation Speed Factor = .5f (Fast)
• Particles (mice) speed random between 12 and 22.
• NOTE: All other items are OFF
2. Chaos Stage 2 (Changes from Chaos Stage 1)
• Rotation Speed Factor = If
• CircleOS Scaling Off
3. Chaos Stage 3 (Changes from Chaos Stage 2)
• Rotation Speed Factor = 2f
• CircleO 1 Rotation Off
• FractalSetl On with Rotation - Shimmering State (NOT Colour Affected)
• FractalSet2 On with Rotation - Shimmering State (NOT Colour Affected - tint?)
4. Equilibrium Stage 1 (Changes from Chaos Stage 3)
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• CircleOl Off
• Circle02 On with Rotation (NOT Colour Affected)
• CircleOS On with Rotation (NOT Colour Affected)
• Mice Particles in Middle Ring area (NOT Colour Affected)
• FractalSet2 On with Rotation - Circular State (NOT Colour Affected - tint? - 
	Pulsing (.04-.!)
• FractalSetl On with Rotation - Circular State (NOT Colour Affected)
• Background On (NOT Colour Affected) - No Rotation
• Kaleidoscopic Background Off
• Particles (mice) speed random between 8 and 12.
5. Equilibrium Stage 2 (Changes from Equilibrium Stage I)
• FractalSet2 On with Rotation - Shimmering State (NOT Colour Affected - tint? - 
Pulsing (.04-.!))
6. Equilibrium Stage 3 (Changes from Equilibrium Stage 2)
• FractalSet2 On with Rotation - Shimmering State (Colour Affected - Initial Size 
.04)
• FractalSetl On with Rotation - Shimmering State (NOT Colour Affected)
7. Meditative Stage 1 (Med Colours: Bluel <-> Blue2) (Changes from Equilibrium Stage 
3)
• Mice Particles in Inner Ring area (NOT Colour Affected)
• Particles (mice) speed random between 2 and 4.
• FractalSetl On with Rotation - Circular State (NOT Colour Affected)
• FractalSet2 Rotation Off - Shimmering State (NOT Colour Affected)
• CircleOl Rotation On (Anti-Clockwise)
• Triangular Lights On
8. Meditative Stage 2 (Changes from Meditative Stage 1)
• FractalSetl Speed Slowed
• FractalSet2 On with (Anti Clockwise) Rotation - Circular State (NOT Colour 
Affected) - Speed Slowed - Initial Size .02
• Amoeba Light On
• Clock Light On
9. Meditative Stage 3 (Changes from Meditative Stage 2)
• Background Image Rotation On - Very Slow
• Circle03 On with Scaling (Very Slow)
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• All Lights Off 
NOTES:
Must create:
1. State Machine with control mechanism*
2. Multi Client IPSocket Server
3. Cupola Control elements
4. Foley Audio Elements 
* Priority for completion
fy; .b]
Figure 2 Brain Storm sketch cretaed by Chris Ford during the development
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o Display State (Fade In, Fade Out, Normal)
• Rotation On/Off






o Display State (Fade In, Fade Out, Normal)
• Rotation On/Off
o Rotation Speed 
o Rotation Direction




o Display State (Fade In, Fade Out, Normal)
• Rotation On/Off
o Rotation Speed 
o Rotation Direction
• Scaling On/Off (for CircleOS only) 
o Scale Min (for CircleOS only) 
o Scale Max (for CircleOS only) 




Position (1, 2 or 3) (in mouseStruct) 







o Display State (Fade In, Fade Out, Normal) 
Rotation On/Off
o Rotation Speed
o Rotation Direction 
Scaling On/Off
o Scale Min (for Set2 (Pulsing) only)






• System State (Idle, Running*)
• Stage Timer (Clock)
• Current Stage (Chaotic, Equilibrium, Meditative) *While Running
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ffl. Visualisation System - Stage Editing Instructions
To edit the Stage variables to change the asset details within each of the 9 sub-stages of the 
Visualisation System, you will first need to load the 'Brigitta' C# project code:
Open 'File Explorer' and move to the 'Brigitta.sln' file via the path - "My Documents/Visual 
Studio 2005/Projects/Brigitta", then double click on the 'Brigitta.sln' file.
File Edit View Favorites Tools Help 
Back - ' ] Search







Size Type Date Modified
File Folder 05/08/200814:08
1 KB Microsoft Visual 5tu... 03/04/2006 14:46
45KB Visual Studio Solutio... 05/08/200814:18













Xna. Framework. Audio; 
Xna. Framework. Concent; 
Xna. Framework. GamerServices; 
Xna. Framework. Graphics; 
Xna. Framework. Input;
using Hicrosoft Xna. Framework. Storage; 
' using System. Diagnostics; // For Process 
Q namespace Brigitta
///' This is the main type for your game
/ // ^/suntHiary:-
public class Game! : Microsoft.Xna.Framework. Game
GraphicsDeviceHanager graphics; 
SpriceBatch spriteBatch;
^ Solution 'Brigitta' (1 project) 
;-l .^'Brigitta
ffi --^ Properties 


















If the "Gamel.cs" file is not open, then double-click the "Gamel.cs" file in the Solution Explorer 
window to the right of the screen. (File name is shown highlighted).
215
Scroll to the bottom of the 'Gamel.cs' file to see all of the variables for stage editing, arranged in 
sub-stage order (i.e. ChaosOl to Meditative03). NOTE: The beginning of Meditative Stage - 
Sub-Stage 3 is displayed in the image below.
Ed* View Refactor Protect BuikJ Bebog Data Tools Wndow Cprwwrtty Heb
» Mug . XS6
bgdColor - tint3; 
bgdColorAlpha - 255i; 
bgdRotation = true; 
bgdBotationSpeed - 4f;
// Kaleidoscopic
keliedoBgdOn = false; 
keliedoBgdDisplayState » 0; 
bgdKeleidoColorOl   tint3; 
bgdKeleidoColor02 = tint3; 
bgdKeleidoColorAlpha = Of; 





// Kaleidoscopic Bgd Rotation Speed
// CircleOl On/Off
The variables within these stage functions are editable to enable changes in the display of the 
chosen sub-stage within the visualisation system.
Remarks have been placed next to each variable to explain the effect it has within the chosen 
sub-stage display.
u 
Once all changes have been made, click on the "Start Debugging' icon r to re-build the
project and run the new code to see / check the changes that have been made.
During system runtime, clicking on buttons 1, 2 and 3 will change the main Emotive Stage (i.e. 
Chaos, Equilibrium or Meditative respectively) that will be transitioned to upon completion of 
the current Emotive Stage (i.e. Sub-Stages 3 completed).
NOTE: Sub-Stages run from 1 to 3 (i.e. ChaosOl -> Chaos02 -> Chaos03) via a Timer which is 
currently set at 3000 frames for each sub-stage change, such that a new Emotive Stage is 
transitioned to (based upon that chosen via buttons 1 to 3) once the timer reaches a count of 
9000.
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Visualisation System - Data Inputs IP Address Setup
Currently we are taking two inputs via a Multi Client IP Socket Server, these being Face 
Tracking and Thermal data feeds. The IP Addresses of each of these feeds needs to be edited in 
the "ServerConfig.txt" file of the Visualisation software to access this data from the correct 
feed computer.
Within the "ServerConfig.txt" file the initial IP Address is allocated against the Face Tracker 
camera input, and the second IP Address is allocated against the Thermal camera input.
NOTE: This functionality also needs to be performed on each of the Clients, such that their 
"ServerConfig.txt" file holds the IP Address of the Server.
To find the IP Address of any of the computers in the network, click the Windows "START" 
button and choose the "Run" command in the bottom right sector of the menu. Within the 
dialog box that appears, type "ipconfig" and then click the "OK" button.
A command window will appear giving details of the network details of the PC you are running 
"ipconfig" on, including its IP Address.
Visualisation System - Stage Phrases Setup
Upon the user rolling over an invisible Hit Box within the Visualisation System, a phrase is 
graphically generated from the graphical "Particles" of the Vis Sys based upon the hit box 
affected and the main stage that the system is currently set within. There are three phrases held 
in each of three main stage phrase files, with three phrases held within each:
"ChaosPhrases.txt" - Chaos Stage (3 phrases)
"EquilibriumPhrases.txt" - Equilibrium Stage (3 phrases)
"MeditativePhrases.txt" - Meditative Stage (3 phrases)
When editing these phrases bear in mind that they have sectors of the screen defined that they 
appear somewhere within, such that the first phrase starts somewhere within the left-hand V3 
sector, the second somewhere in the middle l /s sector and the third phrase starts somewhere 
within the right-hand '/3 sector. Thus, the first phrase can be the longest, but the third phrase 
should be very short, generally one word in length, such that the final phrase will be displayed on 
screen and not cut across the right hand screen edge.
NOTE: Any phrase should be no more than 30 characters long (excluding spaces) as this could 
crash the system if more than the 500 particles were required to create the phrase, or it's noise 
based equivalents.
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Visualisation System - Cupola Matrix sub-stage display Setup
Near the top of the gamel.cs file the following Cupola Matrix Display Variables will be found:
// CUPOLA VARS
byte[] cupolaChaosMatrixOl = new byte [30] { 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1,
1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0,
0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0,
0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1,
1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0 };
byte[] cupolaChaosMatrix02 = new byte[30] { 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0,
0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0,
0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1,
1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0,
0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0 );
byte[] cupolaChaosMatrixOS = new byte[30] { 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0,
0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1,
1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0,
0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0,
0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1 };
byte[] cupolaEquilibriumMatrixOl = new byte [30] { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0,
0, I, 0, 0, 1, 0,
0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 );
byte[] cupolaEquilibriumMatrix02 = new byte[30] ( 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0,
0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0,
1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1,
0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0,
0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0 );
byte[] cupolaEquilibriuit\Matrix03 = new byte [30] { 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0,
1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1,
1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1,
1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1,
0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0 };
byteU cupolaMeditativeMatrixOl = new byte [30] { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0,
0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0,
0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 };
byte[J cupolaMeditativeMatrix02 = new byte [30] { 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0,
0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0,
0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0,
0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0,
0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0 );
byte[] cupolaMeditativeMatrix03 = new byte[30] { 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1,
1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1,
1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1,
1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1,
1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1 1;
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As is shown, each of these defines a 3-frame loop to be displayed on the respective left and right 
30-LED matrix on the Cupola.
Each byte matrix shows the LEDs that will be on (denoted by a * T) or off (denoted by a 6 0') for 
each of the 9 Visualisation sub-stages (i.e. Chaos 01 to 03, Equilibrium 01 to 03 and Meditative 
01 to 03) as denoted within their variable names.
The speed of the matrix display update is controlled by the "cupolaAnimSpeed" variable which 
can be found at the bottom of the Gamel.cs file at the head of each of the 9 sub stage functions 
(e.g. Chaos03Q). Note that lower numbers speed up the animation as this value denotes the 
amount of timer clicks before the next frame of the matrix animation is displayed.
DEBUG LIST
The following variables do not currently have any effect on the sub-stage display:
stdBgdDisplayState = 1; 
bgdColorAlpha = 255f; 
keliedoBgdDisplayState = 0; 
bgdKeleidoColorftlpha = Of; 
bgdKeleidoRotationSpeed = 2f; 
circleOlDisplayState  = 1; 
circleOlRotationSpeed = 2f; 
circleOlColorAlpha = 255f; 
circle02DisplayState = 0; 
circleQIRotationSpeed = 2f; 
circle02ColorAlpha = Of; 
circle03DisplayState - 1; 
circle03RotationSpeed = 3f; 
circle03Colorftlpha = 255f; 
fractalSetlDisplayState = 1; 
fractalRotateSpeedSetl = 2f; 
fractalSpeedSetl = 3f; 
fractalSet2DisplayState - I; 
fractalRotateSpeedSet2 = 2f; 
fractalSpeedSet2 - 3f; 
fractalSetSDisplayState = 0; 
fractalRotateSpeedSet3 = 2f; 
fracta!SpeedSet3 - 3f;
// standard initial Background State - Q-Fade In, 1-Normal, 2-Fade Out
// Alpha value for fade in / out processes
// Initial Kaleidoscopic Background State - 0-Fade In, 1-Normal, 2-Fade Out
// Alpha value for fade in / out processes
// Kaleidoscopic Bgd Rotation Speed
// Circled Initial State - 0-Fade In, 1-Normal, 2-Fade Out
// CircleOl initial Rotation Speed - Fast
// CircleOl Initial Alpha - 0 - Not shown ready for Fade In 
// Circle02 initial state - 0-Fade In, 1-Normal, 2-Fade Out
see Display State)
// Circle02 initial Rotation Speed - Fast
// Circle02 Initial Alpha - 0 - Not shown ready for Fade In (see Display State)
// Circle03 initial state - 0-Fade In, 1-Normal, 2-Fade Out
// Circle03 initial Rotation Speed - Fast
// CircleOS Initial Alpha - 0 - Not shown ready for Fade In (see Display State)
// n = JTrsrle Tr, 1 = Mi-ii-mal . 9 = Pa He Oiih// 0 Fad In, 1 Normal, 2 F d ut 
// Rotation Speed Variable for Fractal Set 
// Initial Movement Speed for Fractal Set 1 
// 0 = Fade In, 1 = Normal, 2 = Fade Out 
// Rotation Speed Variable for Fractal Set 2 
// initial Movement Speed for Fractal Set 2 
// 0 = Fade In, 1 = Normal, 2 - Fade Out 
// Rotation Speed Variable for Fractal Set 3 
// Initial Movement Speed for Fractal Set 3
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IV. Visualisation System - Key Press Control List
Key_ Effect
B Set particles to outer position and change their texture to miceTcxture4, CircleOl and 02 On
N Set particles to middle position and change their texture to miceTexture, Circle02 On
M Set particles to inner position and change their texture to miceTextureS, CircleOl On
C Toggle Circle3 display on/off
Toggle FractalSetl Collision System on/off
Set FractalSetl Motion State to Circular Motion
Z Set FractalSetl Motion State to Shimmering
X Set FractalSetl Motion State to Position Swap
Set FractalSet2 Motion State to Circular Motion
W Set FractalSet2 Motion State to Shimmering
Set FractalSetS Motion State to Circular Motion
R Set FractalSet3 Motion State to Shimmering (Outer Position)
T Set FractalSet3 Motion State to Shimmering (Inner Position)
Toggle FractalSetl Scaling on/off
U Toggle FractalSet2 Scaling on/off
I Toggle FractalSet3 Scaling on/off
Toggle FractalSetl Rotation on/off
K Toggle FractalSet2 Rotation on/off
Toggle FractalSetS Rotation on/off
O Toggle Kaleidoscopic Background on/off
Toggle Comet Particles on/off
A,D
W,S
Comet Particle direction control (DEPRECATED)
ALL LIGHTS On/Off (includes Triangular Lights as Standard)
Circle02 Lights On/Off (if ALL LIGHTS On)
D Clock Lights On/Off (if ALL LIGHTS On)
Toggle FractalSetl on/off
G Toggle FractalSet2 on/off
H Toggle FractalSet3 on/off
Toggle Circle03 Scaling on/off
1/2/3 Change Main Stage (i.e. Chaos, Equilibrium, Meditative)
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Appendix 2.5
Brain Storm Images for the system of Mind Cupola
Created with the contribution of Dr. Phil Culverhouse
Figure 1 System plan of the 'Mind Cupola'
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Figure 2 Draft of the 'Mind Cupola' system
222




L ; /^:' V
Figure 4 Structure of visualisation: The stages of visual representation
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Figure 5 One of the early sketches of the 'Mind Cupola' system
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Figure 6 Cos? awe/ time plan management of the 'Mind Cupola'
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Appendix 2.6
Pictures form the Thermal Imaging Data Base collected for the training of face analysis 
software
Figure 1 and 2 Thermal images with 'Rainbow' calibration 
with the temperature scale
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Figure 3 and 4 Thermal images with another colour calibration
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Figure 5 and 6 Thermal images with 'Rainbow' calibration
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Figure 7 and 8 Thermal images with 'Rainbow' calibration
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Figure 9 and 10 Thermal images with 'Rainbow' calibration
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Appendix 3.1
Research paper presented at the conference:
Consciousness Reframed, New Realities: Being Syncretic,
The Planetary Collegium's IX th International Research Conference, 
University of Applied Arts, Vienna 
Publication by Springer Vienna in January 2009
The Mind Cupola: towards a consciousness altering device
An immaterial model for interactive technology-based art production
By Brigitta Zics
This paper introduces a novel scheme of active spectatorship which suggests a cognitive-driven 
interaction. It proposes that although this new form is increasing in contemporary interactive art 
production it has not drawn attention to its potential as a new form of aesthetics. As such, the 
discussion provides an account for this interdisciplinary practical application of technology and 
suggests that an immaterial application of interactivity might revolutionise the previous 
modalities of interactive art. Exemplifying this, the paper introduces the unique interface "Mind 
Cupola" (2008), which is an affective artistic system with the aim of producing a new knowledge 
within the spectator's consciousness. Through this example it proposes that this cognition based 
approach might generate a more effective modality for human-machine interaction within a new 
aesthetics.
A cognitive-driven application of interaction will be understood here as a conception for 
technology-based art production which draws particular attention to the cognitive modalities of 
the spectator's perceptual processes. In order to comprehend this potential for interactive media 
art, this paper suggests investigating the notion of active spectatorship, which in the literature has 
been considered as the main objective for aesthetics of interactive art. An active spectatorship in 
this paper's context means not only an interaction on a mental level between artwork and 
spectator, as suggested by Umberto Eco's "openness" 102 (1989 [1968]) but also a participation in 
which both the spectator and the artwork reciprocally effect each other in the creative processes. 
These structural changes in the artwork, according to the activity of the spectator, produce 
meaning through interconnectivity between the states of the artwork and the reactively changed 
mental activity of the spectator.
102 Umberto Eco's well-known work "Opera Operta" (Open Work, 1989 [1962]) introduced the concept of 
"openness" to suggest that artworks produce an aesthetic through "meaning creation". Eco proposed that artists 
should work along a multiple semiotic creation process which generates an openness; thus every spectator creates 
his/her own subjective meaning.
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Applying a cognitive-based approach in the art production means that the artist works 
towards an intimacy of this artwork and spectator interconnectivity. This suggests that the artist 
applies technology in a cognitive action/reaction capacity; thus s/he anticipates an affection of 
technology in the spectator's experience. Through this approach, the technology-based art is not 
based on the production of an object of physical qualities but on the design of the spectator's 
subjective experience. The paper's investigation terms this as an immaterial creation process, 
because it replaces a material-oriented art production, which took an interest in the physical 
qualities of an artwork rather than in its impact in cognitive processes. A potential for 
immateriality occurs through a dematerialisation process that technology brings to art. El 
Lissitzky, later Lippard & Chandler (1968) and recently Jacob Lillemose (2006) illuminate this 
notion as essential for developing an new art aesthetic and instead of object production. Lippard 
& Chandler announced that the object became obsolete therefore artistic meaning emerges 
through non-physical processes of the concept. Lillemose applied this on technology-based art 
and argued that immateriality is a powerful application for a critical conceptualisation of 
technology; therefore artworks that apply technology should formulate an appeal against sheer 
attractions of emerging technologies. He sees that the spectator's "continuous abstract 
actualisations" of this approach produce the immaterial dimension of the artwork. Although 
Lillemose provides a sophisticated encounter of dematerialisation as he links the notion to 
perceptual processes, in a similar manner to Eco's openness (mentioned earlier), he ignores a 
cognitive evaluation of the processes and its impact on the spectator's experience. From this 
perspective, the paper argues that earlier approaches stayed within a materialistic encounter of 
art. This materialistic encounter claimed immaterial qualities only through an intellectual 
satisfaction of critical socio-economic messages, ignoring cognition-based evaluation of artistic 
meaning creation. The view taken here instead negates the idea that an immaterial aesthetics is 
only based on conceptual manifestation, and instead proposes the approach of "technology-based 
meaning creation" 103 , which is produced by technologies potential of cognitive affection 
contributing to artistic meaning.
To establish an immaterial aesthetic of technology-based art, this paper suggests an 
application of the contemporary psychological account of flow theory. The notion of flow 104 
(1975) applied by Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi concerns a phenomenological investigation of
103 A "technology-based meaning creation" in this discussion means an "openness" which is not only produced by 
the content, as traditional artworks suggest, but also through the artistic design of the technology or interface. The 
paper proposes that in technology-based artworks not only the content, but also the medium (artistic interface) 
contributes to the meaning creation; therefore the spectator's experience design provides a balance between the 
processes of "mastering the interface" and acquiring the content.
104 The flow theory was introduced in 1975 in Csikszentmihalyi's book "Beyond boredom and anxiety" which 
suggested that artists in their creative processes, gain optimal mental states associated with a total submersion in 
the artwork. He further states that during this euphoric state the artistic activity transforms into unconscious 
events with a strong emotional fusion between the artwork and the artist, producing a new spectrum of cognition. 
Csikszentmihalyi (2002 [1992] p.40) terms his concept as "flow" because many of the subject s he observed 
described the creative process as: "It was like floating" or "I was carried on by the flow".
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human experience, suggesting an optimal state of consciousness when one's intention matches 
the produced outcome. The flow-like capacity of immateriality is not a new approach. There are 
accounts of this, such as those by Jean-Fran9ois Lyotard's (1996 [1985]), the philosopher and 
initiator of "Les Immateriaux" 105 , or David Moos's "cybernetic circuit" (2002 [1995], p. 44). 
Lyotard's approach proposes a flow-like phenomenon as a new dynamic material for art 
production which is more adaptive to processes of communication. The other account by Moos 
describes the phenomenon as a direct feedback loop between human perception and information- 
flow in virtual reality. Csikszentmihalyi most crucially suggests that flow is created through 
one's intention but that there are states when the cognitive flow overtakes the control and 
produces new knowledge; he terms this as "ecstasy".
This paper proposes that the previously established artwork and spectator 
interconnectivity can be understood as an optimal state of cognition which is a substance of 
consciousness and through a meaning creation produces new knowledge. In this sense, the 
process of interaction is a chain of cognitive events, which through the spectator's cognitive 
interaction might achieve a novel state of cognition producing what could be called "creative 
ecstasy" 106 . This might happen when the artist applies the technology effectively and produces a 
balance between the creative processes of "mastering the interface" (acquiring functional 
knowledge) and "artistic content seeking" (acquiring artistic knowledge). Thus, a "creative 
ecstasy" means a fully immersive state, when technology produces an optimal human-machine 
interaction fulfilling the spectator's intentions. A new experimental knowledge or "ecstasy" can 
be understood in this way as the immaterial dimension of the interactive media artwork. 
Technology brought a potential to art which, together with the cognitive meaning creation, 
enables to produce this immaterial touch. This identifies a dematerialisation process as not only a 
responsive mental process but also as a technological affection through the particular meaning 
creation which impacts on cognitive properties that consequently produce new knowledge.
Since flow provides a phenomenological application - suggesting a modality of fused 
body and mind states - this paper proposes to investigate the aesthetic experience from the body- 
mind perspective, suggesting that this might provide a meaningful application for technology- 
based experiences. A body-mind interconnection here is understood as an examination of how 
bodily states might trigger a spectrum of states of consciousness through the interaction 
processes. This can be achieved by applying a cognition-based terminology of "body awareness"
105 "Les Immateriaux" was an emblematic exhibition in Pompidou Centre in Paris in 1985. Jean-Francois Lvotard. 
the writer of the famous "La Condition Postmoderne" (1979), in which he clamed the end of the Cartesian 
approach to human existence, in the exhibition produced a statement claiming an immaterial condition (new 
materials) by technologically- mediated processes in which art rather than physical qualities is an interactive 
process (not necessarily technological) between subjects.
106 "Creative ecstasy" is a term used by the author which is developed in her recently finished thesis. It refers to a 
heightened quality of flow in the aesthetic experience when the user is fully immersed in the interaction processes 
of the artwork. In this case the flow controls the artistic events. The thesis introduces the notion of "transparent 
act" which suggests an immaterial model for interactive technology-based art production.
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which refers to a particular state of representation of the body in the mind. The notion of body 
awareness helps to implement modalities of interaction in art (i.e. technological interface- 
spectator interconnection) which constitutes an aesthetic tool for experience design. Applying 
body awareness means that the artist works with the creative potential of body states, resulting in 
a spectrum of different modalities of body awareness. Through this, a matrix of interaction 
modalities can be established. These characterize the spectator's body involvement, according to 
a variety of proactive engagements with the interface, defined as two main kinds of modalities: 
"passive" and "active". It follows that an artistic choice of active or passive modalities means a 
selection of characteristics of triggered body awareness.
An "active interaction" refers to a bodily controlled interface (for example motion 
tracking) which produces the artistic meaning. This means that the artist applies body awareness, 
in response to bodily states as a tool of navigation. This type of interaction is special since the 
movement of the body is already an embodied knowledge of the users. However, there is often 
an artistic novelty, a semiotic system of control in interactive artworks which has to be learned; 
therefore the body involvement here is supreme. The "mastering the tool" process in this paper is 
a learning process of the symbolic interpretation of the bodily movement. This symbolic 
interpretation triggers a spectrum of events revealing the content through a meaning creation. 
The flow experience in this process establishes a balance between the innovation of the artistic 
interface and the quality of uncovering the artistic content; thus particular body awareness 
reveals particular artistic meaning. An example of "active interaction" is one of the previous 
works of the author in which an aesthetic experience was produced through a symbolic 
interconnectivity between bodily states and dynamic visual formulations. Although a spatial 
navigation of the user is common in virtual reality systems, Mirror_SPACE attempted to create 
an experience where the unique aesthetics and its efficient source of representation (face and 
dynamic data analysis) produced a novel knowledge in the participator's consciousness.
Whereas in Mirror_SPACE this novelty was focused on an active immersive involvement 
of the user through a bodily action that produced an interaction, the modality of "passive 
interaction" is a more unique form of active spectatorship as an interaction built upon cognitive 
responses of the user. The body involvement is very low since the spectator effects the system 
through representational states of cognition (for example emotion) and not through a motor 
driven involvement of the body. Although it might seem similar to a cinematic spectatorship, the 
difference is that the user still has an intentional decision expressed through a spectrum of 
cognitive-based, reduced bodily response which is captured by the system. Thus, body awareness 
is produced through much more introverted actions, whereby the functional bodily actions are 
reduced in order to produce inwardness through technological triggers. In this sense, technology 
is applied to measure the spectator's bio-data (blood pressure, emotional analysis, EEG, galvanic 
response, physiognomic analysis, behaviour analysis) in order to produce a response based on 
the cognitive evaluation of the feedback-loops.
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This paper proposes that although a passive bodily involvement of the spectator - which 
means a heightened cognitive evaluation - has been much more frequently considered in recent 
contemporary artworks than earlier, it has not been acknowledged as a potential model for a 
cognitive-based aesthetics. Therefore it is proposed - following an exploration of both modalities 
of interaction - that a passive interaction might produce a more effective way of human-machine 
interaction, since it models a cognitive interaction of the spectator. It applies technologies for a 
cognitive-based affection and evaluation; thus, an artistic interface to set up a feedback loop 
which is based on the spectator's response, triggered and measured ("affective computing" 107) by 
technology. This suggests that a more effective interaction might occur by a "cognitive feedback 
loop" which builds upon a system of technological feedbacks. The system operates by a dynamic 
action-reaction mechanism built upon the spectator's cognitive evaluation of changes over time. 
In this respect, a flow experience is created when the spectator recognizes and lives certain rules 
of interaction and also causes outcomes which match his/her intention. This paper suggests that 
such a system operating with simple processes might create complex phenomena over time, most 
crucially represented in the spectator's consciousness as the immaterial dimension of the 
artwork.
Through this, the paper introduces an interactive artwork by the author which is based 
upon this passive modality of interaction, entitled "Mind Cupola". The aim of this bio-feedback 
device is to produce the flow experience of the spectator for a potential of creative ecstasy. 
Modelling new means of interaction, this device aims to generate a cognitive feedback loop in 
the spectator's experience. Its aim is to apply special technologies which on the one side are 
unique in the affection of human perception; on the other side are effective in capturing 
behavioural changes in the human condition. Thus the applied technologies are divided into two 
sources: on one side those which affect human cognition and on the other side those which 
monitor and analyse reflections of human cognition. The project is so far focused on the 
characteristics of the human head and face, because they display the changes in human cognition 
through affections most explicitly. This investigation implements "affective technologies" which 
produce changes in the consciousness not only through perception but also by means of 
physiological-mechanical affections. Through this, devices called "frequency generators" have 
been designed, which produce a pattern of affections based on scientific and non-scientific 
conceptions of consciousness alteration. The aim of this interface is to instantly drive the 
spectator's perception towards a flow experience. When entering the aesthetically engaging 
cupola interface, the user's mind is surrounded with a special system which recognizes the user's 
presence. It affects him/her with various electromagnetic visible and invisible wave functions: 
binaural sound (1), LED lights (2), thermo stream (3), air stream (4), and vibration (5). To close 
up the technological system, the Mind Cupola captures this dynamic and feeds this information 
back to the "frequency generators" which consequently generate a creative flow. The system
107 "Affective computing" attempts to capture and process cognitive phenomena, more particularly emotional 
states of humans (Rosalind W. Picard, 1997).
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further applies efficient face analysis software which captures behavioural and emotional 
changes in the spectator. It deploys an application of hybrid facial analysis which at once 
analyses physiological changes as well as thermo-graphic (temperature) changes of the face. 
Whilst in Mirror_SPACE the person's face was analyzed for an emotional characteristic, the 
Mind Cupola's software recognizes features of the face and measures particular changes over 
time. It captures visible and invisible responses of the spectator which are evaluated according to 
cognitive states and fed back to the system. The data efface analysis, besides sending data to 
"frequency generators", also impacts on the visualisation based on fractal-like structures which 
produce a kaleidoscopic effect. This application derives from the cognitively affective quality of 
the unique visual language explored in Mirror_SPACE, and has been developed further in Mind 
Cupola for cognitive-based interactivity. Thus, the system continuously recreates itself according 
to the users' cognitive reactions and intentional actions which might lead the spectator towards a 
consciousness-altering experience. A passive modality of interaction in Mind Cupola is achieved 
through a dynamic application of technology-based feedback systems which produce a cognitive 
loop in the spectator's subjective experience. This is the immaterial dimension of Mind Cupola 
which constitutes anew aesthetic.
As a consequence, it can be concluded that an immaterial, aesthetic model of interaction 
means not only a critical conceptualisation of technology which might produce mental responses 
in the spectator - as it has been suggested in earlier modalities of immateriality - but also 
requires a new strategy which applies cognition-based approaches in order to design the 
spectator's experience with a potential to a novel knowledge in consciousness. Mind Cupola 
illustrates this model as it builds a dynamic artistic system which, through an intimate 
interconnection of artwork and spectator, produces "spiritual-like" 108 phenomena.
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Brigitta Zics: Out of Body Control
Interview by Julia Peck
Brigitta Zics discusses the development of a series of virtual reality projects with artist and writer 
Julia Peck. Zics reflects upon the different approaches she tool and outcomes generated within 
her 'Mirror_SPACE' and 'Out of Body Control' projects, comparing the experience of working 
with programmers to develop custom-made software with the opportunity to transpose pre­ 
existing high specification software.
Brigitta Zics, new media artist, discusses two recent projects and the collaborative process that 
facilitated their production with her colleague from University of Wales Newport, Julia Peck. 
Zics was born in Hungary and has studied in Germany at the Academy of Media Arts Cologne 
and Britain. Zics practice concentrates on virtual reality systems and responsive interfaces to 
provide an immersive and interactive environment for gallery and other audiences. Zics is 
currently a PhD candidate, researching interface development and real-time visualisation in 
creative artworks for which 'Out of Body Control' will be the final major work. Zics and Peck 
met in their course of undertaking their research projects and have used the interview to extend 
their discussions on Zics' creative output and her theoretical models.
Julia Peck: Brigitta, we're going to talk about two recent projects, 'Mirror_SPACE' (2004- 
2005) and 'Out of Body Control'(2004-2006) and the collaborative and conceptual processes that 
you go through to create these two pieces of art. I'd like to start with 'Mirror_SPACE', as you 
initiated the project and then located programmers who could help you realise the end artwork. 
Did you find that the way you thought about the project was quite different to the programmers?
Brigitta Zics: Actually to be honest, this was the first time I had this kind of artistic idea and I 
wasn't really sure which form of creative process I would choose or who I was going to work 
with. I wasn't sure how many programmers I would need or do I just do the concept for myself. 
For me, this project started a new form of creating. Before I was working by myself rarely using 
external help. During the project I realised the whole idea was really complex, therefore I 
decided to use people who have specialist knowledge. So as part of the process I was asking
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people to help me, and when I got these people, then we worked together and they provided 
ideas for the project but I had a very strong vision of how it should look, so I tried to implement 
the knowledge and I tried to lead them to this. But it is also important to say that these people 
were students not professionals, so I had to deal with problems such as they didn't have enough 
time etc. It also depended on the money because I just had a small budget for the project but I 
wanted to realise quite a complex thing. This was a new form of project management, a new way 
of expression. At the same time I have to admit that some of the naivety or freshness disappeared 
from the artwork.
JP: Apart from the difficulties of working through the practicalities, did the programmers affect 
the concept and the way it was visualised?
BZ: Actually I had a really strong idea of how it should look, so they, kind of, just gave me an 
idea of what the technology can achieve. I tried to work out for myself how I could implement 
this - my artistic vision. How can I say - OK, this is the right artistic tool (technology) to work 
with and it is worth developing further for my project? I just remember I was working with the 
programmer (Jerome Thoma) who was doing the visualisation for me, this was a really organic 
collaboration because we used to meet every two-three days and he was always showing me 
what he had achieved. And I can remember when I saw the first draft of the work or the first 
object we developed, I just thought - oh this is really not what I wanted, you know, the aesthetic 
and everything can't be realised through the computer, it's just, for me it's not enough. I used to 
work with drawing, or I was realising my ideas myself, but working with another person, it's just, 
kind of, difficult. Because the programmers have their own language and they cannot always 
understand what I want, and the other side is also the technological limitations. But then really 
through this process and with time, we just worked in symbiotic ways, so we could really 
understand each other, with time, we really developed a very strong aesthetic for the 
'Mirror_SPACE' visualisation. After that I was really happy about the working process. But the 
programmer doesn't give me the aesthetic idea, he just shows me what he can do and then I 
decide on which way we go. But there's a lot of limitation of course, so there is a big gap 
between what I imagine and what is realised. Generally, I understand that the programmer is also 




Mirror_SPACE Interactive installation, 
depicting the visual appearance of the mirror 
objects. The aesthetic qualities of the objects 
combine a microcosmic vision of networked 
existence with a reduced visual component 
(virus/nano vision). All visitors have one of 
these shadow objects, which they can control 
with their movements.
JP: But the project was visually successful.
BZ: Yes, it was. For me the visual is a very sensitive and sensual form of expression, every little 
detail is important. As in a spoken language a comma can change the meaning, in the visual 
language very fine differences can compact the outcome or disturb the aesthetic. So it's actually 
really important to have this very strong visual effect. Because it's a, kind of, a traditional way to 
understanding art as a visual thing, but also I wanted this object or this visualisation to get some, 
kind of, attributes, or some kind of, technological achievement that you cannot get from just a 
picture. This object has attributes contributed via the computer, new aesthetics and also...
JP: Its own nature?
BZ: Yes, its own nature, and kind of, artificial attributes. So, the spectator is not only touched by 
the visual experience but there is a computer generated life represented, in very simple form.
JP: Did it have a behavioural pattern?
BZ: Yes, exactly. If you just see on the wall this picture, you know, you don't have this living 
atmosphere; this is what time-based work can give you, interaction with this object. The 
movement belongs to the aesthetic of the picture. Without it the visuality is lacking. The best 
way to see this is if we look at the still pictures of the visualisation. Even if the aesthetic has 
some interesting effect the main attribute is missing, the image is not completed. So it cannot 




Mirror_SPACE, interactive installation. This shows the 
real-time scanning apparatus of the MIrror_SPACE 
project; the visitor is scanned by light and the facial 
features of the user are analyzed.
JP: OK. Once the programmers came onboard with you, did they see the project right through to 
the very end? I'm asking this as you see the projects as being finished only once the users are 
interacting with it and you get something out of seeing the way people respond to and interact 
with the actual thing that you've made. Do the programmers go that far, are they interested in that 
end response?
BZ: Yes, in 'Mirror_SPACE' actually these people were also my friends, so it was a kind of 
useful relationship. They also came with me to the exhibitions, and I can remember at almost 
every exhibition they were there so they could see what's going on. And even after exhibitions 
we sat down and discussed new ideas and technical needs and based on this we made some new 
developments. Most of the time the artist creates the interaction design without any real response 
from the user. He or she can never know how exactly the user will react. Thus, the artist has to 
see the feedback of the users in a live situation and also try different people and different kinds 
of situations. And after that you can choose to be more successful with the artistic vision and or 
program further.
JP: So they were interested in user interaction, it was really beneficial for them to also see that 
stage of the project?
BZ: Yes, of course, these people were really freelance so they were interested to do something 
else... something special and creative to see what else technology can provide.
JP: OK, so let's talk about your latest project, 'Out of Body Control'. I get the impression that 
you've adopted a different working method, locating programmers and other developers of
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technology who are already working on projects and asking them to contribute to your larger 
overall design. In what way has this changed your working method? Do the programmers and 
designers have a great degree of input into your project?
BZ: Yes, they have, because of the 'Mirror_SPACE' experience, when I didn't work with 
professionals. Now I try to get some very serious technology, like software developed for 
professional needs. I try to really achieve the artistic quality or the artistic notion on the same 
level as the technology. Because with 'Mirror_SPACE', I had a really strong concept and a 
really strong vision but I just had the feeling that the technology hadn't achieved what I really 
wanted, it wasn't always verified data or it didn't always provided the quality I wanted. In the 
new project the technology I'm using has been developed for many years, and this is what I will 
use. Of course the other side of this is I cannot contribute so much to the technological 
development because it's already there, I can just somehow change it for myself so it's not that 
flexible, my artistic vision has to be mapped on to this technology so I'm not developing my 
own. I wouldn't say this is a better way to work, this is just a different way and probably it's 
going to be another kind of outcome. I think the main emphasis lies on the balance between 
artistic concept and technological developments.
JP: So in 'MirrorJSPACE' the concept of the artwork was partly developed through the kinds of 
teams that you're using in order to realise that artwork. In 'Out of Body Control' instead of having 
a clearer idea at the outset of what it was that you wanted to achieve, you're using more of what's 
around you and cherry picking it and then designing a project to go with that.
BZ: Yes, yes, it's true, yes. These people actually, who I work with, in Hungary, Germany, 
Plymouth and also Manchester, they're really interested to work with me because they want to 
see what can be developed from this kind of technology, how can they achieve some other kind 
of outcomes, like creative outcomes, how it works - technology with creativity together.
JP: OK. Shall we talk a bit about the other people involved in 'Out of Body Control' and what 
their roles are within the project, because it's a massive team actually, isn't it, altogether? Shall 
we start with David Christinacce, he's at the University of Manchester, isn't he, so what's he 
doing?
BZ: Actually when I was starting to think about the project, I always knew I wanted to work 
with face analysis because I already used this kind of technology in 'Mirror_SPACE' but I 
wanted to have more serious software for this, and I started looking for people who were dealing 
with this very seriously. So I found him in a research group in Manchester and I think I went to 
visit him in 2005, and they were dealing with a lot of things based on face analysis and face 
detection. So he presented me with the software that they developed for Toyota, and I asked him 
whether I could maybe use this for my artistic project. And he was really, really useful, of course
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I had to sign a contract, you know, but still he was really useful and we developed this software 
for my project... this software was developed for a normal camera and in 'Out of Body Control1 
we're going to use thermal imaging, so this software was developed for this special equipment.
JP: Oh, brilliant. OK, what about Andor Gaudia?
BZ: He is in Hungary, he's a PhD student, and we actually just finished this interface, we 
developed a very functional interface, not really a creative interface but we really needed 
something very user-friendly so the user doesn't have to do anything, you know, in terms of to 
wear something or to move something, you just have to move in some particular place in the 
room. And we developed an interface camera-mover to find the face of the user.
JP: And Doctor Barna Takacs' virtual human interface group.
BZ: Yes, he's based in Hungary. I'm going to develop the visualisation of the project with him; 
it's actually my favourite part of it.
JP: I guess one of the things that's becoming clearer, listening to you talking about the different 
relationships that you have with the people that you're working with, is how much input you 
have into what they're developing, in the sense that they're actually developing things very 
specifically in relation to your project and what you want to achieve visually and creatively with 
this project.
BZ: Yes, but to be honest I really have to always also push them, because programmers like to 
just reduce everything, so the artist's task is always push them to try to develop something new.
JP: In 'Out of Body Control', you've set up a feedback loop that actually continuously feeds 
information from the face to stimulate the brain. So why don't you talk a little bit about inside 
and outside and how that conceptually underpins what you're doing?
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Brigitta Zics
Out of Body Control, 2004-2007
(work in progress)
Virtual Reality System.
BZ: Yes, actually this is really the main point of what I'm doing actually, because inside and 
outside is the general concept of artistic understanding. Artists are there to express their own 
sensitive internal world for the outside world so that others also get something from their special 
view. The artist is a medium, through his or her expression opens a new world for us with a 
totally new translation of our world. Because you have to externalise somehow that people, other 
people can contribute to your ideas. But if you try to externalise your ideas, there is always some 
kind of loss in the process because your whole idea in your brain or the whole complexity, 
cannot be externalised fully. So this process, this is actually the task of the artist, to just reduce 
the loss of information, the complexity of what is inside or better, find the right artistic tools and 
medium for that particular artistic notion. So, the extemalisation, we can say, is a way of putting 
artistic vision into the reality. The task of the artist is to make sure that his or her vision is 
represented in the artwork.
JP: Let's have a look at the importance of what you termed the 'transparent act' and the 'invisible 
tool'. Maybe we should start with Italo Calvino, because part of this comes from Italo Calvino's 
concept of the degree of openness, doesn't it?
BZ: The concept of openness, actually in my case relates to this concept for interactive artworks, 
how the interactive work works. So the openness of the work is also this kind of balance, the 
artist puts something into the artwork, to realise something and presents the idea to the viewer, 
also as Umberto Eco described, something that isn't finished yet, that's going to be finished 
through the user. So the user, with his or her interaction and with his or her contribution, finishes 
the work... this is actually the degree of openness, how much the artist allows the user to 
contribute to this work and how the far interactivity serves the expression of artistic notions.
JP: So how does the invisible tool enable this degree of openness?
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BZ: The invisible tool actually is also a very complex term, but generally invisible tools describe 
something that the artist implements in these artworks to get the users in the right position to 
interact. The invisible tool is something we can imagine as an interface, and the interface design 
is the task of the artist, it should be something that doesn't cause any disturbance for the user. So 
the technology, it should be somehow invisible, it shouldn't disturb the whole interaction - a 
user-friendly environment. But it doesn't mean the technology is not representable, it's just 
somehow the user can deal with what is represented.
JP: So this all intersects with your idea of the transparent act, can you tell us a bit about the 
transparent act?
BZ: The transparent act is a key term of my research, based on the concept of externalisation. 
The transparent act actually describes a two-way process. Both processes we can call creative 
processes, one is when the artist creates his or her work, the other when the viewer experiences 
the artist's creation. In the first process - the creative act - the artist develops the idea of what the 
artwork-user interaction should look like. Every other creative process is based on this 
interactive design. The second creative process is when the artistic notion becomes truth and the 
work is activated by the user. At this moment the artistic vision is tested by the interaction. In 
this test the two creative processes are mapped onto each other. This is a feedback circle when 
the artist through the user interaction sees a general response to his or her creation. The 
transparent act is a complex term which includes the different attributes of the artistic work. 
These attributes are degrees of openness, the invisible tool, the map of creative processes all 
generate the transparency of the work. The transparency informs how these attributes work 
together and how they achieve their quality. The main aim is the balance between technology 
and artistic notion, that the technology as tool or medium doesn't disturb the creative flow. 
Transparent act is the new form of artistic expression in which the generated experience stands in 
the focus.
JP: Shall we talk a little bit more about the thermal face imaging you're doing and physiognomy. 
On your website you deliberately reference physiognomy as a nineteenth century phenomenon, 
and it seems that you're being quite witty about this reference, that you're drawing a link to it, but 




Out of Body Control, 2004-2007
(work in progress)
Out of Body Control uses special 
technological implementation. The colour 
map of the face is based on thermal imaging 
application.
BZ: Yes, well I was thinking about how really could we analyse faces and what kind of concept 
we could use to detect information from the face. One of the possibilities was physiognomy, 
which is a pseudoscience from the Nineteenth Century, so it just described the shape of the head 
and what kind of personality is represented. But then I didn't go into this because my interest was 
more about the process, what kind of emotional changes occurred, what kind of consciousness 
changes were going on in the user. So I chose this kind of thermal imaging used for medical 
purpose - somehow this technology makes invisible things (such as conscious thoughts) visible, 
and I was hoping to get some really special data from the face because this provides a 
temperature map of the face and every person has a really different map. Generally we analyse 
the map of each of the users and also the changes of the temperature. This is one part of the 
software the other part is as we already mentioned, the high-end software to pick up the 
emotional states of the user. At the end of the day we have a complex software which includes 
our own development, scientific software and professional software parts. This is our own 
constructed software package for our own special artistic use.
JP: I was also really entertained by the idea of the mind cupola. You included an image of the 
doctor from Back to the Future where he puts this contraption on his head and he's trying to 
conduct an experiment through this contraption. And in a sense your mind cupola is similar to 
that, which is why you put that photograph on your website. Do you want to talk about the ideas 
that you're playing with?
BZ: Yes, the mind cupola is a kind of'pseudo machine', a creative interface. The idea was to 
affect the user mechanically and I wanted to develop something which also has symbolic 
meaning. The cupola somehow gives a placebo effect. I mean, if the spectator enters into its 
space, the cupola produces a mysterious effect on the user which not describable. On the other 
hand the cupola contains specially developed 'smart machines', little machines which physically
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(with mechanical power) influences the spectators. The idea was to develop a mechanical 
construction where the user is physically affected.
JP: So it's greater than the actual effect scientifically produced?
BZ: Yes, maybe. We just tried to develop some kind of environment for the user where they can 
feel psychologically that something is provided, which then creates an artistic vision. To be 
honest probably a lot of scientists, even my programmers were sometimes really sceptical 
because they don't understand why I need this. But another point of view is to view the world via 
an artistic notion. This world is not just scientific or just proved knowledge; it is a 'collage' of the 
artist's world, which includes every sort of information and expression, hi new media artworks 
this 'collage' is represented through scientific mediums such as computers, but this is just the 
surface, the content is multidimensional.
Brigitta Zics
Out of Body Control (mind cupola), 2004-2007
(work in progress)
The creative interface of the 'Out of Body Control' project. 
The spectator directed devices generate mental 
transformations in the user.
JP: OK, finally I think in reading the users' responses you could create a database which actually 
creates knowledge about the emotional state of each user. Are you creating some kind of 
taxonomy of the users or a record of the users?
BZ: Yes, the idea was always to collect from the different people the different data records or 
better to trace the interaction because every user's visualisation, every reaction and experience is 
very different. We can say every user experience is special and typical just for a certain place at a 
certain time. It would be really interesting to collect this just to see the transformation in the 
spectator's behavioural patterns. I'm really interested in what the user really experiences, what 
you really cannot see. The aim is actually to put the user in some situation that he could never be
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in and to give him some really new kind of experience where we also can play with the different 
levels of consciousness. It's kind of like leading the user through his or her inside and letting him 
or her jump between the stairs of consciousness and maybe create new stairs through the artistic 
experience. This internal process is what you never can really record because it's somehow 
inside, not outside. It's very focused on the user having this kind of really special experience in 
this environment.
JP: I guess in a sense the visualisation is the 'Out of Body Control'; it's the moment where all the 
information and the input to the subject becomes externally visualised, and yet the amount of 
control that the subject has or the user has of that is actually quite limited.
BZ: Yes, this is true, because, I have to say I am always very excited to work on it, the 
visualisation is what is really my main interest, because somehow the visualisations still have 
this kind of traditional idea of the art what everyone can 'read', it's there, it's a visual thing, a 
visual language and this is just the long tradition of art. The other important attribute of these 
visualisations is the time-based process, in which the user has to go trough a particular chain of 
actions. This means that the spectator is included in the live artwork. This new form of 
expression provides some similarities to the old traditional painters, and the experience they 
provided through perspective; this new kind of technological development enables us to picture 
the inside. So this kind of time-based idea is also the new technique of visual arts which 
revolutionises the form of experiencing and artist's expression.
©Julia Peck, 2007
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